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This book explores the accounts of commerce and finance developed by 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historians of England. Writers 
of the period, I argue, were engaged in a series of long- running and 
politically charged debates concerning a range of economic issues: 
the impact of popular and arbitrary forms of government on trade; 
the political and economic consequences of taxation; the develop-
ment and value of England’s trading companies and commercial 
empire; the relationship between war and commerce; and, more 
generally, the meaning of national prosperity and its significance 
for England’s security, greatness and happiness. In discussing such 
questions, historians sought to present kings and queens as managers 
of the nation’s monetary and trading interests, and economic issues 
themselves as aspects of statecraft. As a consequence, commerce and 
finance came to be considered alongside political and military affairs 
as matters in which monarchs could demonstrate their skill, virtue 
and even heroism. This historiographical approach, which I label ‘the 
economic statecraft tradition’, shaped the ways in which  seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century society conceived of politics, wealth and the 
meaning and function of the past, and helped to generate an impor-
tant, but largely unexplored, variety of economic history.
Three characteristics of this mode of writing should be empha-
sised. First, its conceptions of commerce and finance were, in a sense, 
political. Writers did not view the economy as an autonomous or 
semi-autonomous system shaped by the forces of supply and demand. 
Instead, commercial and financial material was presented as a series 
of actions performed by government – primarily the instigation of 
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laws, commercial regulations and taxes – which either helped or 
hindered England’s interests. Economic statecraft’s key concern, 
therefore, was with what can best be described as the history of 
economic policy. Second, and largely as a consequence of this, none 
of the writers who discussed economic statecraft conceived of it as 
an independent field of study. Rather, the achievements of particular 
statesmen in commerce and finance were shown to be connected to 
their political, religious and military roles. This meant that economic 
statecraft formed part of a wider study of statesmanship, and under-
standing it involves tracing its shifting relationship with other aspects 
of this subject. Third, the accounts developed by historians were 
premised on the idea that the past provided a series of good and bad 
examples of economic management. England’s greatest monarchs, 
it was argued, through their skills in this area, had brought wealth, 
power and happiness to the nation. Its less successful rulers had 
allowed nationally beneficial forms of trade to decline and introduced 
morally and financially corrosive types of luxury. Consequently, their 
actions had weakened England in relation to its international rivals 
and had inaugurated periods of poverty and misery. Studying these 
examples was valuable as they could provide practical lessons for 
modern statesmen. Economic statecraft was, as a consequence, a 
self-consciously didactic form of writing.
The narrative that follows examines the emergence of economic 
statecraft in Jacobean historical writing (Chapters 1–3), charts its 
development through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Chapters 4–7) and explores the circumstances that led to its ultimate 
demise (Chapters 8–9). In doing so, it considers the work of a broad 
range of the period’s narrative historians, among them Francis Bacon, 
William Camden, Thomas Carte, William Guthrie, Edmund Howes, 
David Hume, Paul de Rapin de Thoyras and Thomas Salmon.1 Such 
an account will provide, I believe, a useful addition to our knowledge 
of English historical writing. Recent scholarship has done much to 
emphasise the complex ways in which the term ‘history’ was under-
stood in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in the process 
has uncovered a series of previously ignored, but important, historical 
genres.2 The result of this is that we now know much more than we 
did twenty years ago about the historical content of modes of writing 
such as secret history,3 satire and panegyric,4 memoir,5 biography,6 
and the history of women.7 However, with the notable exception of 
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the work of David Hume, the multi-volume narrative histories of 
England that constituted the period’s most popular and prestigious 
historical form have been neglected.8 And even those critical works 
that do deal with the narrative tradition have generally used it as a 
point of comparison to illuminate wider literary and historiographical 
trends. Thus, a number of accounts have contrasted the conventional 
approach to the past employed in historical writing with the radical 
innovations that were taking place in the early novel.9 Others, mean-
while, despite providing useful discussions of the national histories 
of Rapin, Salmon and Guthrie, have seen the primary significance of 
such works as lying in their partial anticipation of the more substan-
tial achievements of Hume, Edward Gibbon and the Scottish stadial 
historians.10
In contrast to such approaches, this analysis treats historical writ-
ing about England as a subject worthy of attention in its own right 
and aims to show that the writers of the period developed a sophis-
ticated form of politico-economic history. Two clarifications need to 
be added to such a claim. First, I am not arguing that the works under 
consideration were ‘doing’ economic history in the modern sense of 
the term. There is, of course, a huge methodological gap between the 
approaches taken by William Camden and David Hume, and those 
of, say, J. H. Clapham, Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole.11 Equally, 
however, there are some connections. A particularly useful definition 
of the discipline is that developed by the late Donald Coleman. 
For Coleman, economic history, in its current form, is that which 
‘asks economic questions – be they about the demand and supply of 
goods and services, about costs of production, levels of income, the 
distribution of wealth, the volume and direction of investment, or 
the structure of overseas trade’.12 As a result, ‘it inevitably deals with 
large numbers, with aggregates’ and ‘has to contend with the task 
of identifying and measuring forces normally outside the conscious 
control of single, individual actors’.13 I want to show that a number 
of these ‘economic’ questions, while not perennial, have substantial 
histories of their own, and have been answered using the conceptual 
vocabulary of neoclassical narrative history, as well as the ‘modern’ 
terminology of aggregates and forces.
Second, while the organisation of this account is broadly chrono-
logical, it does not treat the texts it discusses as a series of incremental 
steps through which historians gradually acquired the techniques of 
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modern economic history. To do so would be to assume that the 
significance of a piece of historical writing lies in its contribution 
to a narrative of progress of which the historian who wrote it could 
have no knowledge. Rather, my approach is to locate the works in 
the specific contexts from which they emerged and to which they 
directly responded.14 Narrative histories require a particular sort of 
treatment from the contextualising intellectual historian. This mode 
of writing was constructed through analysing, paraphrasing and 
transcribing archival sources and, more frequently, other works of 
narrative history. As a consequence, it corresponds closely to Roland 
Barthes’ definition of a literary text as a ‘multidimensional space in 
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash’.15 
Understanding such texts involves establishing the specific writings 
that historians chose to blend, and, in a sense, reconstructing in 
literary terms the real-life desks and libraries of specific authors. In 
addition to this, however, the choice of sources that historians made, 
and the way in which they organised their material, played a part in 
an ongoing series of discussions concerning the nature and function 
of history. There was a general consensus that history constituted ‘a 
narrative of worthy deeds, polite and dignified, written to instruct the 
political elite with moral and political lessons’.16 Nevertheless, both 
the nature of ‘worthy deeds’ and the moral and political lessons which 
history should provide remained vexed and politically charged issues. 
And in discussing such matters, writers frequently found themselves 
responding not just to other historians, but to a variety of works of 
political polemic and political economy.17 As a result, to identify the 
contribution being made by a specific work of narrative history, we 
need to understand its relationship with its sources, and its interac-
tions with contemporary historiography, broadly defined.18
2. Public and private realms
This book also contributes to wider discussions concerning historical 
and economic culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
by developing a critique of what might be labelled neo-Aristotelian 
analyses of commercial modernity. Such ideas received their classic 
exposition in Hannah Arendt’s work of 1958, Vita Activa.19 For 
Arendt, ancient political thought rested on a ‘self-evident and axio-
matic’ distinction between the private realm of the oikos or household 
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and the public realm of the polis.20 Drawing principally on Aristotle’s 
Politics, Arendt went on to define the oikos as the association in which 
a householder ruled over his wife, children and slaves, noting that its 
distinctive trait ‘was that in it men lived together because they were 
driven by their wants and needs’.21 The polis, by contrast, was the 
community of householders who, through the rotation of offices, 
ruled and were ruled by one another as equals. It was created for the 
sake of the good life, a mode of living equated with political action 
and freedom from necessity. Such a division, Arendt argued, meant 
that according to ancient thought, ‘the very term “political economy” 
would have been a contradiction in terms: whatever was “economic”, 
related to the life of the individual and the survival of the species, 
was a non-political, household affair by definition’.22 The key condi-
tion for political economy’s emergence was the development in the 
eighteenth century of ‘society’. This concept served to blur the ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ spheres and enabled peoples and political communities 
to be conceived ‘in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have 
to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of 
house-keeping’.23
Arendt’s thesis has been highly influential. In The Machiavellian 
Moment (1975), for example, J. G. A. Pocock drew on the lan-
guage and conceptual framework of Vita Activa to examine how the 
Aristotelian ideal of the polis and its conception of civic participa-
tion shaped political ideas first in Renaissance Italy and later in the 
Anglophone world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.24 
Through doing so, he endorsed the general chronology of Arendt’s 
account and assumed, as Arendt had done, that Aristotelian virtue 
constituted a barrier to the emergence of modes of thought capable 
of justifying commercial and financial activities. Thus, for Pocock,
Augustan political economics mark the moment when the trader – 
and, still more pressingly the financier – was challenged to prove that 
he could display civic virtue in the sense that the landed man could. It 
was easy to visualise the latter, anxious only to improve his estate for 
inheritance, engaging in civic actions which related his private to the 
public good; much harder to ascribe this role to one constantly engaged 
in increasing his wealth by exchanging quantities of fictitious tokens.25
Such ideas have gone on to play a major role in the history of political 
thought, and much of the best work by Pocock and others associated 
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with the Cambridge School has been concerned with the difficulties 
that eighteenth-century writers faced in reconciling modern ideas of 
wealth with classical notions of virtue.26
Neo-Aristotelian ideas about the nature and value of the public 
realm have also shaped discussions of historical writing, most nota-
bly in the important work of Phillip Hicks and Mark Salber Phillips. 
Hicks’s Neoclassical History and English Culture (1996) focused on 
the problems faced by narrative historians of England in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Readers and writers of the period, 
he shows, continued to conceive of the genre in classical terms 
as ‘a continuous, truthful story about important, public events’.27 
Its primary subject was ‘war and politics’ and its function ‘was to 
instruct political society’.28 However, despite numerous attempts, 
England’s historians struggled to use these conventions to provide 
an adequate account of the nation’s past. Part of the problem was 
modernity. Writers faced the challenge of using a 2,000-year-old 
classical idiom to describe a series of phenomena that had no classi-
cal precedents, among them ‘the mariner’s compass, modern com-
merce, Christianity, gunpowder, the printing press, political parties, 
a middle rank of citizens [and] modern antiquarian scholarship’.29 
Moreover, aspects of the modern world were fundamentally anti-
thetical to ancient historiographical practice; for classical historians, 
issues relating to trade, manners and art were ‘unworthy subjects in 
their own right cut off from politics’.30 Most historians had come to 
grief in the face of such difficulties. And, Hicks argues, it was not 
until Hume was able to synthesise a public, political narrative with 
new forms of literary, artistic and economic analysis in his History of 
England that the nation was provided with a successful, large-scale 
narrative account of its past.31
A similar conception of early modern history’s public orientation 
underpins Phillips’s Society and Sentiment (2000). For Phillips, classi-
cal historiography, and its early modern revival, were ‘predicated on 
a sharply drawn separation between public and private concerns’.32 
The focus of history was on public affairs and, as such, it restricted 
its attention to matters of ‘statecraft and military manoeuvre’.33 This 
ensured that commerce, which in the wake of Arendt’s work we 
see ‘as a principal agent in blurring the division between private 
and public’, was ignored; it ‘had no place in historical narrative 
because it had no legitimate place in the pursuit of the vita activa’.34 
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Phillips’s main interest, however, is not (as Hicks’s had been) in the 
durability of these models, but rather in the forms of writing that 
came to challenge them. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, 
he demonstrates, pressure began to be placed on classical forms of 
historical discourse as Britain came to conceive of itself as a trading 
nation, whose status, identity and survival were dependent on finan-
cial factors. This situation contributed to both the development of a 
variety of philosophical history that emphasised the role that social 
and economic factors played in producing historical change, and the 
emergence of a series of more specialised types of historical writ-
ing.35 While they incorporated elements of classical historiography, 
these innovative forms expanded the field of historical endeavour to 
include detailed analysis of trade, finance and commerce, and their 
interactions with politics and a range of other ‘new’ subjects such as 
navigation, customs and manners, and the arts and sciences. Trade, 
therefore, while it did not stand alone, functioned as ‘the most visible 
sign of history’s new direction’.36
This study builds on Hicks’s and Phillips’s accounts and provides a 
broad endorsement of both the former’s emphasis on the continued 
importance of classical models and their shared characterisation of 
neoclassical history as, in Phillips’s words, ‘the story of the public 
actions of public men’.37 In doing so, however, the book aims to show 
that rather than being a barrier to an engagement with economic 
affairs, the genre’s public, political focus was highly conducive to a 
particular form of economic commentary. From the late sixteenth 
century onwards a growing awareness emerged of the link between a 
state’s economic strengths and its capacity to wage war effectively.38 
Such ideas helped to ensure that commentary on the standard themes 
of classical history – war and politics – increasingly involved anal-
ysis of a nation’s commercial and financial interests and that the 
management of these issues was viewed as a public, political issue. 
To an extent, an examination of these matters reveals a narrative 
that is the inverse of Arendt’s. It is Bacon and Camden who come 
closest to representing the state as a nation-wide administration of 
housekeeping. By the eighteenth century, commerce was beginning 
to be conceived of as separate from the public political sphere, and as 
an activity with its own laws, its own literature and its own history. 
This separation, however, was never total. Much seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century historical writing takes the form of a series of 
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competing analyses concerning the relationship that existed, and 
should have existed, between government and commerce at various 
moments in England’s history.
3. Mercantilism and economic policy
The economic statecraft tradition is also of significance for a series of 
debates in the field of economic theory. Key to Adam Smith’s anal-
ysis in the Wealth of Nations was a coruscating critique of the mer-
cantilist policies that had shaped, and continued to shape, England’s 
approach to commerce.39 In part the errors made were the product of 
an intellectual mistake. There was a tendency, Smith argued, to see 
the amassing of money and the establishment of a positive balance of 
trade as the best ways of producing national affluence. This, in turn, 
led writers and politicians to assume that the object of political econ-
omy was ‘to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign 
goods for home-consumption, and to increase as much as possible 
the exportation of the produce of domestick industry’.40 Such a policy 
was, for Smith, fundamentally misguided. The majority of a nation’s 
wealth lay not in overseas trade but in its ‘lands, houses, and consum-
able goods of all different kinds’.41 Controlling the nation’s money 
supply was not just unnecessary – the forces of supply and demand 
would naturally secure the required amount – but also a potentially 
retrograde measure. Indeed, the various monopolies, drawbacks, 
tariffs and bounties instigated by states had, Smith sought to demon-
strate, raised prices and slowed economic growth. Their perpetuation, 
meanwhile, was a deliberate attempt on the part of the mercantile 
interest to enrich itself at the expense of consumers.
Smith’s critique did much to damage the credibility of mercantilist 
political economy, and it has never quite shaken off its post-Wealth 
of Nations reputation as an intellectual fallacy, rooted in self-interest. 
His ideas have also helped to shape attitudes towards the history of 
statecraft. As had been the case with Smith’s own work, the classical, 
neoclassical and Marxist writers who built on the foundations he 
established tended to present their analyses as critiques of existing 
economic practice. From such a perspective, the history of economic 
policy, particularly in its seventeenth- and eighteenth-century forms, 
was a sorry tale of ineptitude. The influence of statesmen had gen-
erally been pernicious to the nations they ruled over and, where 
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their actions had brought benefits, these had been unintended and 
unforeseen. As a consequence, there was little reason to turn to the 
past for inspiration when intellectual models of ever-increasing phil-
osophical and mathematical sophistication could identify the failures 
of previous generations and prescribe better solutions for the future.
These ideas, while retaining their influence, have not gone 
entirely unchallenged. Central to a series of critiques of ‘orthodox’ 
or ‘mainstream’ economics has been an attack on the discipline’s 
relationship with reality. Joseph Schumpeter, for example, claimed 
that economics suffered from the ‘Ricardian Vice’ of basing practical 
policy  prescriptions on a priori assumptions that lacked any empirical 
basis.42 Similarly, John Maynard Keynes noted that economists had 
become increasingly ‘unmoved by the lack of correspondence between 
the results of their theory and the facts of observation; a discrepancy 
which the ordinary man has not failed to observe’.43 For Robert 
Skidelsky, meanwhile, economics has cut itself off from ‘the common 
understanding of how things work, or should work’.44 Such claims 
have often run alongside an interest in pre-Smithian economics of a 
mercantilist bent. Schumpeter argued that mercantilism’s faults were 
in a sense the opposite of those of orthodox modern economics; it 
was so rooted in the everyday that its practitioners were incapable of 
theorising.45 Keynes, while acknowledging the mercantilists’ prac-
tical leanings, was a good deal more sympathetic. Indeed, the latter 
sections of his General Theory contain a wide-ranging account of mer-
cantilism, which defends the ‘older theory’ endorsed by ‘the majority 
of statesmen and practical men’ against the criticisms made of it by 
modern, free trade ‘theorists’.46 A similar division is at the heart of 
recent work by the Norwegian economist Erik S. Reinert.47 Reinert 
distinguishes between two broad approaches to economic theory. 
On the one hand, there is the ‘standard’ Smith-influenced canon 
of economics, which relies upon abstract mathematical models, and 
assumes as an ideal a ‘self-regulating system seeking equilibrium and 
harmony’.48 On the other hand, however, there exists a counter- 
tradition. This ‘other canon’ draws inspiration from the mercantilists, 
the German historical school, and the work of writers such as Keynes, 
Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen. Its ideas are derived from a series 
of historically informed examples and it assumes that economic sta-
bility is a product of the specific measures followed by individual gov-
ernments. While Reinert acknowledges that both canons have a role 
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to play in modern debates, his key point is that the latter approach 
has come to be neglected in favour of the former. As a consequence, 
economics has lost touch with reality and rich countries have come 
to advocate a series of economic panaceas to the developing world 
that are at odds with the actual policies through which they achieved 
their own affluence. These issues have also, Reinert argues, exerted an 
influence on the organisation of academic disciplines. As he notes: 
‘unlike the history of economic thought (what theorists said ought to 
happen), the history of economic policy (what policies were actually 
followed) is a non-existent academic discipline’.49
Reinert has made the first steps towards rectifying this situation 
through establishing the ‘Other Canon Foundation’, a network of 
heterodox economists and economic historians concerned with issues 
of economic development.50 Key to the work of this group is an 
attempt to trace the types of economic policies that rich countries 
employed as they ‘went from poverty to wealth’.51 Such information, 
it is assumed, can then play a key role in helping modern-day poor 
nations generate strategies to improve their current living conditions. 
The account that follows is sympathetic to Reinert’s project and aims 
to contribute to it by providing a study of the ways in which histori-
ans of the mercantilist era dealt with economic policy. In doing so, 
my objective is to show that while the history of economic policy 
may be extinct as an academic discipline, it is a mode of writing 
with a substantial, if largely ignored, pedigree. A knowledge of this 
pedigree, I contend, is useful for three specific reasons. First, an 
attempt to instigate an investigation of economic policy without an 
understanding of the history of this approach risks the very historical 
impoverishment that proponents of the ‘other canon’ have levelled at 
mainstream economics. This account aims to counter such dangers 
by providing a discussion of an important tradition in the study of 
economic policy. Second, there is a tendency in scholarly work on the 
‘other canon’ to present mercantilist-era writers as having a shared, 
experienced-based method, and as being in broad agreement with 
one another on the lessons that experience taught. Such assumptions 
are highly problematic. As the work of Carl Wennerlind and Steve 
Pincus has shown, particularly from the 1640s onwards, analyses of 
commerce and finance were tied up with and shaped by wider party 
political debates.52 This ensured that mercantilism was not so much 
an agreed economic theory or methodology, but rather a series of 
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often fraught disputes between Royalist and Parliamentarian and, 
later, Whig and Tory polemicists. This book expands upon the work 
of Wennerlind and Pincus by showing that, running alongside the 
debates in ‘economic’ writing that they identify, there existed a parallel 
(if generally distinctive) series of discussions among  seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century historians. My aim is to reconstruct these debates 
and, by doing so, to provide further evidence about the ways in which 
political and polemical concerns shaped approaches to  economic 
policy. Third, as Chapter 8 and, more pointedly, the discussion of 
David Hume in Chapter 9 show, over the course of the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment ideas concerning progress came to undermine 
the humanist conceptions that had previously structured historical 
writing about commerce and finance. One casualty of this process 
was the notion that examples drawn from economic history could 
provide a useful model of emulation for contemporary statesmen. 
As a consequence, the rise and fall of economic statecraft is also 
a key element in the wider story of the triumph of modern, more 
ahistorical analyses over an older, historically informed approach to 
statecraft.
4. Terminology and chapter outline
The terms that feature most frequently in this study are ‘commerce’, 
‘trade’ and ‘finance’. I treat ‘commerce’ and ‘trade’ as synonyms, as 
my sources do, and alternate between them for stylistic purposes. The 
historians discussed had very little interest in the domestic market, 
and, consequently, the ‘commerce’ and ‘trade’ they discussed were 
generally international in character. ‘Finance’ is used, as it was from 
the latter part of the eighteenth century onwards, to refer to the 
various ways in which states raised money and regulated its supply.53 
Key aspects of the former subject include taxes, duties on goods and 
government borrowing. Analysis of the latter leads me to discussions 
of usury, interest rates and the quality and quantity of coinage. The 
adjective ‘economic’ is used as a shorthand for matters relating to 
both commerce and finance. As a result, ‘economic statecraft’ refers 
to both the commercial and the financial practices of a particular 
monarch. As will be made clear, the relationship between commerce 
and finance could be conceived of in a wide variety of different ways; 
the term ‘economic statecraft’ is not, therefore, meant to imply the 
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existence of a particular causal connection between commercial and 
financial policies.54
My focus in the chapters that follow is primarily on ‘modern 
history’, specifically debates concerning the reigns of Henry VII, 
Elizabeth I and James I.55 Discussion of periods before, between and 
after the lives of these monarchs is included when required to illus-
trate the broader historical import of a particular work. The decision 
to concentrate on these monarchs was determined by the material; 
put simply, accounts of their reigns contain the most detailed and 
interesting discussions of commercial and financial affairs. This 
concern with economic issues was, in part, a product of contempo-
rary attitudes to the history of English trade. Particularly from the 
mid-seventeenth century onwards, historians came to see the reign of 
Henry VII as inaugurating a new commercial age, the major events 
of which had taken place during the lives of Elizabeth and James. 
An account of these monarchs, therefore, allows for some detailed 
engagement with debates surrounding England’s emergence as a 
commercial power.
The book is divided into three chronologically ordered parts. Part 
I looks at the emergence of the economic statecraft tradition through 
considering three highly influential works: Francis Bacon’s History 
of the Reign of King Henry VII (1622), William Camden’s Annales 
(1615, 1625) and the account of James I developed by the chronicler 
Edmund Howes in his edition of John Stow’s Annales, or General 
Chronicle of England (1615, 1631). Each of these narratives provided 
an analysis of the role that particular monarchs played in managing 
the nation’s commercial and financial interests, and assumed that 
achievements in economic statecraft had been central to the successes 
of the reign. Despite this, they offered contrasting accounts of what 
constituted good government. Bacon employed a realist, Tacitean 
mode of analysis to explore the public benefits that could be generated 
by amoral, or even immoral, financial management. Camden, in con-
trast, treated successful economic statecraft as a product of a ruler’s 
willingness to subordinate his or her own private interests to those of 
the nation. As a consequence, he was able to show how the sort of 
ideas about exemplary virtue and honour that had underpinned Livy’s 
History, and much Renaissance historiography, could be applied to 
modern commercial affairs. Howes, meanwhile, used the chronicle 
form to investigate the contribution to commercial affairs not just 
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of England’s monarchs, but also of its people. Through doing so he 
was able to advance a highly original account which emphasised the 
transformative role of recent innovations in trade and manufacture, 
and traced the origin of these developments to England’s successful 
imitation of European practices. As the rest of this book shows, it 
was through borrowing from, expanding on and critiquing the ideas 
of Bacon, Camden and Howes that many later historians developed 
their own accounts of economic policy.
Part II traces the impact of the Civil War on ideas of economic 
statecraft. In the wake of the conflict, I argue, discussion of economic 
history was increasingly shaped by polemical, political concerns. As 
part of this process, two rival accounts of the state’s economic man-
agement emerged, each based on an interpretation of the reign of 
James I. For Parliamentarian writers and their Whiggish successors, 
James’s political absolutism and personal extravagance made him 
a calamitous administrator of England’s commercial and financial 
interests. The result was a period of misery and poverty, which was 
in sharp contrast to the contentment and wealth experienced under 
Elizabeth. Royalist and Tory writers responded by arguing that James 
had followed the precedents of Elizabeth with regard to taxation and, 
through the wise use of monarchical prerogative, had surpassed her 
achievements in relation to commerce. The opposition he experi-
enced, meanwhile, arose from a pernicious Puritan faction intent on 
advancing their own selfish interests and undermining the constitu-
tion. Chapter 4 explores the development of these modes of analysis 
in the second part of the seventeenth century through a discussion of 
accounts concerning James I by Anthony Weldon, Arthur Wilson, 
William Sanderson and Roger Coke. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine 
how the political divisions of the seventeenth century came to shape 
eighteenth-century accounts of economic statecraft. My aim here has 
been to provide analysis of a broad cross-section of political views, 
and alongside detailed accounts of histories by a Whig (Rapin), a 
Tory (Salmon) and a Jacobite (Carte), the discussion contains briefer 
accounts of Patriot and Court Whig writing.
Part III focuses on William Guthrie’s General History of England 
(1744–51) and David Hume’s History of England (1754–61). Political 
ideas about history also provided the framework through which these 
works were both constructed and read. What distinguished them 
from their predecessors, however, was a belief that advancements 
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in commerce formed part of a wider and distinctively modern set of 
socio-cultural changes. The key to recent European history, it was 
argued, lay in a series of shifts in property ownership which had 
caused wealth, and with it power, to pass from the feudal barons to 
the commercial classes. These advances had led to the birth of the 
commercial age and transformed the political, legal, social and cul-
tural landscape of the continent. As a consequence, narrative histories 
of England came to conceive of individual incidents in England’s 
commercial past not simply as examples of monarchical achievement 
or failure. Rather, their significance lay in the contribution they had 
made – or failed to make – to national economic development and 
the social transfigurations it had inspired. Part of a historian’s job was 
still to outline the policies that statesmen pursued with regard to tax-
ation, and overseas and domestic trade. Indeed, the defining role that 
commercial affairs played in understandings of modernity meant that 
such a task was more important than ever. However, there was an 
awareness that, as well as shaping the economic sphere, the actions of 
statesmen were themselves shaped by their economic and intellectual 
environments. Tracing a nation’s history, therefore, involved looking 
at the complex relationship between particular actions on the part of 
statesmen and their wider social context. My account examines the 
origins of this approach and its impact on the political, economic 
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1
Tacitean history: Francis Bacon’s 
History of the Reign of King 
Henry VII
On 30 April 1621, a ‘Confession and Humble Submission’ was read 
before the House of Lords. In this document, Sir Francis Bacon 
acknowledged that, as Lord High Chancellor, he had received bribes 
and was, therefore, ‘guilty of corruption’.1 The Lords responded with 
a harsh sentence: Bacon was given a fine of £40,000, imprisoned at 
the King’s pleasure, and barred from holding office or high employ-
ment in the state and from coming within twelve miles of Court. In 
the weeks leading up to this verdict, and aware that punishment was 
inevitable, Bacon had made concerted efforts to cushion his fall.2 
Thus, in a letter dated 21 April, he provided the King with what 
Michael Kiernan has aptly labelled a ‘brashly phrased offer’:
but because he that hath taken bribes is apt to give bribes, I will go 
furder, and present your Majesty with a bribe. For if your Majesty give 
me peace and leisure, and God give me life, I will present your Majesty 
with a good history of England, and a better digest of your laws.3
To an extent, this attempt at bargaining achieved the results that 
Bacon desired; he was to spend only three days as a prisoner in the 
Tower and his fine was never collected. And while the promised 
history of England was never completed, he did, true to his word, 
devote himself to historical research in the months following his 
release. From this emerged The History of the Reign of King Henry VII, 
an account written in fourteen weeks at Gorhambury, near St Albans, 
between the end of June and the beginning of October 1621, and 
presented in manuscript form to the King on 8 October.
The conditions in which Bacon found himself had important con-
sequences for the kind of history he was able to write. Anxious to 
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work quickly, and unable to access the main archival material held 
in London, Bacon based his narrative on earlier printed accounts, 
such as Polydore Vergil’s Anglica Historia (1534), Edward Hall’s The 
Union of the two Noble and Illustrate Famelies of Lancastre [and] Yorke 
(1548) and John Speed’s History of Great Britaine (1611).4 However, 
while Bacon was reliant on these narratives, his engagement with 
them was shaped by his reading of a variety of other sources, prin-
cipally legal records, classical history (particularly Tacitus) and the 
writings of Machiavelli and his various critics. This chapter investi-
gates how Bacon fused methods and ideas derived from these works 
and explores the consequences of this move. Central among them, I 
argue, was the development of a new approach to the representation 
of finance and commerce.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one discusses 
the humanist approach to history employed in pre-Baconian histories 
of Henry VII, most significantly Vergil’s Anglica Historia. Section 
two looks at the challenge to conventional, humanist assumptions 
about history and politics posed by the late Elizabethan and Jacobean 
vogue for Tacitus, and explores how the employment of Tacitean 
ideas led Bacon to place financial affairs at the heart of his account. 
The final part is concerned with Bacon’s use of the parliamentary 
statutes passed during Henry’s reign. Through drawing on this source 
material, it will be shown that Bacon developed a detailed account 
of the King’s achievements as a manager of England’s commercial 
interests and, more generally, an original neo-Machiavellian analysis 
of the relationship between government and trade.
1. Polydore Vergil, humanism and Livian exemplary history
The most influential historical account of the reign of Henry VII 
prior to Bacon’s was that contained in Polydore Vergil’s Anglica 
Historia. Vergil was born c. 1470 at Fermignano, near Urbino, and 
studied at the universities of Padua and Bologna. By 1502 he was an 
employee of the Pope, and serving in London as collector of Peter’s 
Pence.5 Much of the rest of his life was to be spent in England and 
he began compiling a complete history of the country in around 
1506. A manuscript copy of this work – now preserved at the Vatican 
Library in Rome – was completed in around 1513 and, after a series 
of amendments, this text was published in Basel in 1534 as Anglica 
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Historia. New editions followed in 1546 and 1555, which both 
revised the content and extended the narrative from its original end 
point of 1513 up to 1538.
Vergil’s account exemplified a number of trends in human-
ist historiography and, aided by Thomas More’s History of King 
Richard III (written c. 1513–18), was responsible for introducing 
this approach to English historical writing.6 The most distinctive 
features of the humanists, as Antonia Gransden has argued, was their 
conception of themselves as members of an international scholarly 
community which drew ‘its principal inspiration from Italy’.7 Such 
a self- identification generally entailed a rejection, at least in part, of 
native stylistic and thematic conventions. Describing the chronicle 
tradition in England, Vergil noted that these ‘almost day-by-day 
accounts’ formed ‘annals in which both the arrangement and the 
style was so threadbare that they justly strike us, as they say, as food 
without seasoning’.8 His own work, he continued, sought to take this 
‘raw’ material, and ‘learnedly polish and adorn [it]’.9 At one level, 
the process of refinement involved raising the quality of historical 
prose, through the use of a clear and elegant form of Latin and 
the addition of some rhetorical flourishes, most notably elaborate, 
invented speeches. Equally significantly, however, humanists sought 
to improve the organisation of historical writing. Medieval chronicles 
had prized comprehensiveness and the result, as one modern com-
mentator has noted, was a ‘baggy and disordered recitation of names, 
dates, and notable political and natural events’.10 Vergil employed a 
much tighter structure. Following the approaches of Suetonius’ The 
Twelve Caesars (AD 121) and Platina’s Lives of the Popes (1479), he 
divided his post-Conquest narrative into books, each of which dealt 
with the reign of a particular monarch and employed the same basic 
form.11 Discussion opened with a description of the King’s ascent 
to the throne before providing a broadly chronological narrative of 
the principal occurrences in domestic and foreign affairs during his 
reign. The narrative then concluded with an account of his appear-
ance, family and, most importantly, ‘character’ – his main virtues and 
vices.12 These divisions enabled writers to emphasise that individual 
reigns had different distinguishing features, and that these features 
were, to a large degree, determined by the different personal traits of 
particular monarchs.
The Anglica Historia was also rooted in characteristically humanist 
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ideas about the function of history as a source of morally edifying 
lessons or exempla. Central to this approach was the idea that the 
actions described in historical narratives provided useful examples of 
both virtuous and the non-virtuous conduct. The former, as Vergil 
explained in the first section of the Anglica Historia, could stimulate 
readers ‘to achieve immortal glory and virtue’, while the latter helped 
in ‘deterring others from vice by fear of infamy’.13 As a consequence, 
history served to pass ‘judgements about what things are of the great-
est use for the conduct of our lives’.14 This conception of history had a 
long and illustrious heritage. The key discussion in the ancient world 
had come from Livy, who in the preface to his History had observed:
The special and salutary benefit of the study of history is to behold 
evidence of every sort of behaviour set forth as on a splendid memorial; 
from it you may select for yourself and for your country what to emu-
late, from it what to avoid, whether basely begun or basely concluded.15
Such sentiments were, it should be emphasised, broadly in line with 
much medieval historical writing. However, whereas medieval histo-
rians conceived of history as a means of providing ‘pious edification’, 
classical and humanist authors sought to inspire a more active and 
explicitly political form of virtue.16 Alexander Barclay, for example, 
in the dedication that prefaces his 1525 edition of Sallust, noted that 
every good example written in histories ‘is set for a warnyng & mony-
cion unto princes and governours therby to rule & order themselfe: 
& a commen wele’.17 Similar notions inform Thomas Blundeville’s 
The True Order and Methode of Wryting and Reading Hystories (1574), 
the first English work specifically concerned with the study of his-
tory. For Blundeville, history enabled men to gather judgement and 
knowledge ‘as well to direct […] private actions, as to give Counsell 
lyke a most prudent Counseller in publyke causes, be it matters of 
warre, or peace’.18
These ideas about historical writing’s capacity to provide ‘Counsell’ 
also ensured that classical and humanist historians frequently dealt 
with issues relating to government finance. Within the works of Livy 
and Tacitus, for example, there are accounts of matters such as the 
mechanisms through which the state raised money,19 the actions it 
performed in times of dearth and crisis to ensure that the popula-
tion were fed and watered,20 and its management of the system of 
private borrowing.21 Polybius, meanwhile, argued that in relation to 
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each of the specific nations discussed, a ‘general sense of the wealth 
and resources [was] vital knowledge for a historian to have’.22 Such 
comments were echoed by Blundeville. Alongside discussions of the 
‘force’ and the ‘maner’ of government in a particular ‘Countrie or 
Citie’, it was necessary, he argued, for a historian to provide accounts 
both of ‘the trade of lyfe’ and the ‘publique revenues’.23 Knowledge of 
the former meant that we can ‘learne howe to have lyke in like times’, 
while the latter made us aware ‘what things have bene done therwith’ 
and, as a consequence, ‘we come to know what the Countrye or Citie 
is able to doe’.24
Vergil’s account of Henry VII, like the rest of the Anglica Historia, 
is in line with these ideas regarding history’s moral function and 
political focus. His commentary on the King’s character, as such, 
is principally concerned with identifying Henry’s virtues and vices, 
and outlining the various ways in which they shaped his approach to 
government. In the manuscript draft of the text from 1513, Vergil 
provided a balanced account of both the King’s merits and his fail-
ings. With regard to the former, it was noted that Henry’s ‘spirit was 
distinguished, wise and prudent; his mind […] brave and resolute’ 
and ‘his  hospitality […] splendidly generous’.25 The King’s chief 
merit, however, was his respect for justice, which ‘he cherished […] 
above all things’.26 This ensured that he punished the violent and 
wicked, and that his death was greatly regretted by his subjects, who 
under his protection ‘had been able to conduct their lives peaceably, 
far removed from the assaults and evil doing of scoundrels’.27 Such 
virtues, however, were, in part, counterbalanced by the King’s princi-
pal vice: his avarice. To an extent, the Anglica Historia presented this 
trait as an unintended consequence of the King’s successes. It was 
only after 1502, once he had subdued the last of the rebellions that 
blighted his reign, that Henry was shown to have become preoccupied 
with wealth. Two further explanations for this development were also 
provided. The King argued that he treated his people with harshness 
and severity ‘to ensure they remained more thoroughly and entirely in 
obedience to him’.28 The people, however, ‘had another explanation’, 
attributing these exactions to ‘the greed of their monarch’.29 Vergil 
had more sympathy with the latter interpretation, commenting that 
‘it is not indeed clear whether at the start it was greed; but afterwards 
greed did become apparent, so irresolute, vacillating and corrupted 
are all human purposes’.30 The vice was then further accentuated, the 
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Italian continued, by a group of informers, who noting the turn in the 
King’s behaviour, ‘dangled before [him] ways of making money’.31 
This helped to ensure that ‘the good prince by degrees lost all sense of 
moderation and was led into avarice’.32 The implication, therefore, of 
Vergil’s analysis was that the shift in Henry’s behaviour was a product 
of a psychological change. This change, however, had been triggered 
and then exacerbated by specific political factors.
Such developments, Vergil argued, had highly pernicious conse-
quences for the management of Henry’s revenues. Primary among 
these was the appointment of two lawyers, Richard Empson and 
Edward Dudley, as judges. These individuals, ‘realising that they had 
been given the job by the King not so much to administer justice as to 
strip the population of its wealth, without respite and by every means 
fair or foul vied with each other in extorting money’.33 To this end, 
they embarked on a series of prosecutions and land seizures, seeking 
both to amass personal fortunes and to satisfy the rapacious desires of 
the King. For Vergil, therefore, Henry’s avarice was ‘truly burthen-
some to his people’ who, as a result of the ongoing impositions, came 
to ‘greatly [fear] for themselves and their interests’.34 Concluding his 
discussion, he observed:
Avarice is surely a bad enough vice in a private individual, whom it 
forever torments; in a monarch indeed it may be considered the worst 
vice, since it is harmful to everyone, and distorts those qualities of 
trustfulness, justice and integrity by which the state must be governed.35
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Vergil appears to have had reservations 
about making these comments public. There was a twenty-year gap 
between the completion of the first draft of the Anglica Historia and 
its publication. And when Vergil did go to press, he substantially 
revised his verdict on Henry. By the time of the final edition, the 
‘character’ of the King had been entirely rewritten to accentuate 
Henry’s virtues and his various achievements, and the account of 
Empson and Dudley had been greatly reduced in length.36 Moreover, 
Vergil provided an endorsement of the King’s claim that his exactions 
were a product of fears about national security. Suggestions that 
the King was driven by a ‘lust for money-making’, it was noted, 
had arisen from ‘those who were wounded’ by this policy.37 These 
accusations were also fundamentally unfair:
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Indeed, this modest sovereign did not despoil his subjects of their 
fortunes immoderately, for he left behind him a kingdom most wealthy 
in all respects. This is made plain, among other things, by the immense 
amount of gold and silver annually brought into the island by merchants 
plying to and fro, whom he very frequently helped with interest-free 
loans, so that the flow of commerce, both useful and necessary for all 
men, would be more abundant in his realm.38
England’s commercial success, therefore, was evidence that Henry 
could not have been an avaricious ruler.
Later discussions of Henry VII drew extensively on Vergil’s 
account and developed its analysis of both the King’s virtues and his 
vices. In relation to the former, as had been the case in the Anglica 
Historia, particular attention was paid to the King’s legal reforms. 
Edward Hall, for example, noted Henry’s desire to promote ‘good and 
profitable lawes and statutes’ and praised him as an ‘indifferent and 
sure justicier’.39 John Speed, meanwhile, making use of summations 
from a range of other historians, presented Henry as ‘the Salomon, 
who brought peace to this Kingdome, long before oppressed by warre and 
tyranny’.40 His key princely virtues were his ‘singular wisdome, excel-
lent temperance, and moderate frugality’ and his ‘policy, justice and 
gravity’.41 The chroniclers were divided, however, on the issue of the 
King’s avarice. Hall endorsed Vergil’s published account, noting that 
high taxation was part of Henry’s attempt to ‘pollitiquely’ eradicate 
the causes of ‘unquyetnes and mischief’.42 Speed, in contrast, was 
sceptical. While Vergil provided a plausible analysis of the King’s 
conduct, ‘we can hardly find any commendable root thereof, the 
wayes being so importune and harsh, by which hee raised money’.43 
Despite this, Speed sought to temper his criticisms. Discussion of 
avarice was restricted to a single paragraph in the main narrative and, 
in the ‘character’ which preceded the narrative, avarice was presented 
as ‘the naturall maladie of age’.44 Moreover, Speed claimed, the 
‘splendor’ of the public buildings that Henry erected served to divert 
the people’s envy away from him.45
The existence of these competing accounts of royal avarice, and 
Vergil’s abrupt volte face on this issue, imply that this was a matter of 
considerable importance to Tudor historiography. However, under-
pinning all the analyses were the same broad contentions. Henry’s 
successes had been a product of his virtues, and were principally 
legal in character. His failures, if there had been any, related to his 
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management of revenue and were a consequence of his avarice. As a 
result, his life provided a series of clear lessons for future statesmen.
2. Bacon and Tacitean history
Humanist conceptions of history retained their influence well into 
the seventeenth century. Bacon’s generation of historians, like their 
predecessors, identified their work with Graeco-Roman approaches 
to the past, criticised the native chronicle tradition and saw history 
as a source of politically instructive examples. At the same time, 
humanist generic conventions – most notably the use of the mon-
arch’s character as the key organisational principle within narratives 
and the employment of invented speeches – retained their influence. 
In the late Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, however, ideas about 
the sort of lesson the past might teach began to shift. It was this alter-
ation in attitudes to history’s didactic function, as we shall see, that 
opened the way to Bacon’s highly innovative approach to economic 
statecraft.
The key force driving developments in historical writing during 
these years was the growing influence of Tacitus. Over the course 
of the sixteenth century his work achieved popularity across Europe, 
and in the first half of the seventeenth century he became the most 
frequently published of the ancient historians and the subject of 
numerous commentaries.46 While an interest in Tacitus developed 
rather later in England than elsewhere, by the early 1580s he was 
being read and discussed by an influential group of scholars with 
connections to Oxford, among them Thomas Savile, Jean Hotman, 
Henry Cuffe and William Camden.47 A more active form of engage-
ment emerged in the 1590s from the circle of politicians surrounding 
the Earl of Essex, a coterie with close connections to the Oxford 
Taciteans.48 One of Essex’s supporters, Henry Savile, an elder brother 
of Thomas, completed the first English translation of Tacitus’ work, 
a 1591 edition of the first four books of the History and the Agricola. 
This was supplemented by a pseudonymous preface, which in the 
view of some contemporary observers, Ben Jonson among them, was 
authored by Essex.49 Moreover, a number of those individuals asso-
ciated with Essex, including John Hayward and Bacon, went on to 
produce distinctively Tacitean histories.
What was Tacitus’ appeal and what did it mean to write Tacitean 
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history? One answer to this question came in the 1601 discussion 
of historical writing by the essayist Robert Johnson.50 For Johnson, 
history is ‘the mixture of profite and delight’.51 It proceeds by noting 
‘causes and effects, counselles and successes, likenes betweene nature 
and nature, action and action, fortune and fortune’.52 This enables 
history to teach its readers ‘to deliberate with ripenes of judgement’.53 
Johnson went on to emphasise the diverse ways it might achieve this, 
distinguishing between two broad approaches. The first of these is a 
Livian variety of exemplary history. In it:
as it were in Cleanthes table, vertue is set out in her best ornamentes, 
as in the describing of famous battelles, where specious wars, the ruine 
of nations, the scituation of Countries, the uncertaine traverses of for-
tune, the death of brave Commanders, have a certain kind of Majesty 
linked with delight, and the mind by conversing in them is not onelie 
delighted, but also lifted up with a spirite of better resolution, and 
raysed to thinke of imitating: These fil a man with better courage, but 
faile in inabling him for the manage of civill actions.54
The second type of history is:
like labyrinths, relating cunning and deceitfull friendshippes, how rage 
is suppressed with silence, treason disguised in innocence, how the 
wealthy have beene proscribed for their riches, and the worthy under-
mined for their vertue. These provoke us to eschew their viletie and 
lacke of vertue, and to be rather viceles[s] than greatly vertuous: and 
although they bee distasted by those who measure Historie by delight, 
yet they are of most use in instructing the minde to the like accidentes. 
And sithens men prostituting their wittes to all hopefull endes of gaine, 
are ready to adventure themselves in the like actions, they are the most 
necessarie thinges, that can be warned us, to the intent that in the 
like practises, we may seeke meanes of prevention and frustrate all the 
attempts of such subtlely evill companions. In this ranke I preferre 
Tacitus as the best that any man can dwel upon.55
Johnson’s comments, and the more detailed discussion of Tacitus’ 
work that followed, identified a number of characteristics of Tacitean 
history, three of which are particularly significant for this study. First, 
it took as its subject some of people’s less desirable forms of behaviour, 
principally deceit and injustice, and sought to analyse their operation 
and the impact they had on the state. As a result, it had a close 
resemblance to the approach that modern sociologists have labelled 
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‘social pathology’.56 Second, this form of writing was premised on 
the idea that there was a disjunction between the appearance of 
actions and their true meaning and significance. The function of his-
tory was to delve beneath the surface, and uncover the psychological 
drives and arcana imperii (state secrets) which really shaped events. 
Tacitean writing was concerned, therefore, with causation, specif-
ically the interaction between character and action. It maintained, 
however, that this relationship would be complex and, until revealed 
by the historian, concealed from public view. Third, the value of 
this approach lay in its realism. Underlying this suggestion was a 
fundamentally pessimistic view of political life. Great virtue of the 
sort inspired by exemplary history was presented as unsuitable for the 
world of ‘civill actions’. Instead, ‘viceles’ conduct was required which, 
while it avoided direct immorality, was adapted to life in a world 
where treachery and unfairness were the norm. Realist histories both 
‘provoke’ their readers to engage in such behaviour and provide a 
guide to the nefarious actions that they can expect from others.57
Bacon’s relationship to the Livian and Tacitean traditions was a 
complex one. In a letter to Sir Fulke Greville, written in the 1590s, 
he praised Tacitus as ‘simplye the best’ of the historians, noting also 
that Livy was ‘verye good’.58 This judgement was overturned in The 
Advancement of Learning (1605), where it was claimed that, among 
the historiographers, it was Livy who was ‘best’.59 References to both 
Livy’s History and Tacitus’ Annals and History, meanwhile, abound 
throughout Bacon’s published work, and in De Augmentis Scientiarum 
(1623) he included both writers in his discussion of the capacity of the 
‘wiser sort of historians’ to trace the connection between the actions 
of historical personages and their natures.60 Despite his praise for 
Livy, however, Bacon remained highly critical of exemplary forms of 
history, and his own approach to historical writing was distinctively 
realist and, in this sense, distinctively Tacitean in character.
The thinking behind this preference was perhaps explained most 
clearly in the typologies of history developed in The Advancement and 
De Augmentis.61 Figure 1 summarises Bacon’s account as advanced 
in the latter text. The highest distinction was that between ‘Natural 
History’, which dealt with ‘the deeds and works of nature’, and 
‘Civil History’, which concerned itself with ‘those of men’.62 This 
second mode was itself divided into ‘Ecclesiastical’, ‘Literary’ and 
‘Civil’ varieties.63 The last of these was ‘pre-eminent among human 
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writings’, but to be successful, it needed to ensure that ‘events [were] 
coupled with their causes’.64 Indeed, such causal analysis constituted 
‘the ornament and life of Civil History’.65 More generally, its role 
was to relate ‘the revolutions of times, the characters of persons, 
the fluctuations of counsels, the courses and currents of actions, the 
bottoms of pretences, and the secrets of governments’.66 Discussing 
the various subdivisions that made up this category, Bacon stated his 
preference for ‘lives’ – history concerned with a particular person – 
over ‘chronicles’ – history that was concerned with a particular period 
of time:
For History of Times represents the magnitude of public actions, and 
the public faces and deportments of persons, but omits and covers 
up in silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters. 
But such being the workmanship of God, that he hangs the greatest 
weights upon the smallest wires, it comes commonly to pass that such 
a history, pursuing greater things alone, rather sets forth the pomp and 
solemnity of business than the true inward springs and resorts thereof. 
Moreover, when it does add and insert the counsels and motives, yet 
from its love of grandeur it introduces into human actions more gravity 
and prudence than they really have; so that a truer picture of human life 
may be found in a satire than in some histories of this kind. Whereas 
Lives, if they be well and carefully written (for I do not speak of elegies 
and barren commemorations of that sort), propounding to themselves 
a single person as their subject, in whom actions both trifling and 
important, great and small, public and private, must needs be united 
and mingled, certainly contain a more lively and faithful representation 
of things, and one which you may more safely and happily take for 
example in another case.67
In describing ‘lives’ in this manner, Bacon emphasised that realism 
constituted their chief merit. While not necessarily pathological in 
approach, ‘lives’ avoided false attributions of ‘gravity and prudence’ 
and, in this sense, employed a model of human nature closer to satires 
than chronicles. Their aim was a form of psychological uncovering; 
they sought to reveal the hidden but ‘true inward springs’ of human 
behaviour, and to show how these ‘springs’ influenced actions and 
events. Such a focus allowed ‘lives’ to fulfil many of the functions that 
Bacon associated with civil history, most significantly the relation of 
‘characters of persons’, ‘the courses and currents of actions’ and ‘the 
secrets of governments’. At the same time, ‘lives’, as distinct from 
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chronicles, presented a true picture of humankind and, as a conse-
quence, provided worthy and realistic objects for imitation.
Bacon’s historiographical practice in the History was closely con-
nected to his theoretical discussions. The task he set himself, in effect, 
was to transform the ‘exemplary’, Livian-style analysis of his source 
material into a new, Tacitean narrative. Avarice was key to such an 
endeavour. Indeed, it was through placing discussion of this vice at 
the very centre of his analysis that Bacon was able to provide the sort 
of pathological, psychological and character-based analysis associated 
with Tacitus. A key effect of such a manoeuvre, meanwhile, was to 
ensure that the History became a study of the financial interactions 
between the King, Parliament and the populace, and the various 
benefits and losses that accrued to the nation as a result.
At the heart of Bacon’s reworking of his source material was a new 
approach to the relationship between character and action. Discussing 
the ‘springs’ that had shaped the King’s actions, he observed:
No doubt, in him as in all men (and most of all in Kings) his fortune 
wrought upon his nature, and his nature upon his fortune. He attained 
to the crown not only from a private fortune, which might endow him 
with moderation, but also from the fortune of an exiled man, which 
had quickened in him all seeds of observation and industry. And his 
times being rather prosperous than calm, had raised his confidence 
by success but almost marred his nature by troubles. His wisdom, by 
often evading from perils, was turned rather into a dexterity to deliver 
himself from dangers when they pressed him than into a providence to 
prevent and remove them afar off. And even in nature, the sight of his 
mind was like some sights of eyes, rather strong at hand than to carry 
afar off. For his wit increased upon the occasion, and so much the more 
if the occasion were sharpened by danger. Again, whether it were the 
shortness of his foresight, or the strength of his will, or the dazzling of 
his suspicions, or what it was; certain it is that the perpetual troubles of 
his fortunes (there being no more matter out of which they grew) could 
not have been without some great defects and main errors in his nature, 
customs, and proceedings, which he had enough to do to save and help 
with a thousand little industries and watches.68
For Bacon, therefore, action was conceived as the product of a dia-
lectic between ‘fortune’ – by which he meant ‘circumstance’ – and 
‘nature’. The two elements of this dialectic, however, had contrasting 
qualities. Fortune was shown to be in a constant state of flux. An 
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individual’s nature, while it responded to changes in fortune, retained 
a fixed inner core. This idea was important to Bacon’s analysis of 
Henry’s avarice. Vergil and other earlier historians, as we have seen, 
either denied that Henry was led by this trait or presented it as 
something that developed in the latter part of his life.69 In contrast, 
Bacon saw avarice as an innate aspect of the King’s personality and 
one that had informed his actions throughout his political career. As 
was noted with regard to the Parliament of 1485, ‘points of profit 
to his coffers’ were something of which ‘from the very beginning 
[Henry] was not forgetful’.70 Consequently, although Bacon accepted 
Vergil’s claim that the King’s post-1502 impositions were triggered 
by the political stability of the period, he did not see this shift in cir-
cumstances as changing the King’s nature. Rather, it simply allowed 
Henry’s character to reveal itself more clearly; whereas in the first part 
of his reign he was ‘happily contained and refrained by some bands of 
fortune’, later he became free to act as he pleased.71
The suggestion that avarice underpinned the King’s character did 
much to shape the History’s narrative, and led Bacon to emphasise the 
fundamentally mercantile nature of the King’s approach to statecraft. 
On occasions, this simply involved expanding upon the arguments 
of previous historians. Bacon’s discussion of Empson and Dudley, 
for example, both endorsed and borrowed from Vergil’s account, and 
supported its core contention that Henry’s desire for self- enrichment 
had been the driving force behind their extortions. However, as well 
as making reference to a wider range of legal records than other 
historians, Bacon concluded with a unique detail. Switching to 
first-person explanation, he observed:
I do remember to have seen long since a book of account of Empson’s, 
that had the King’s hand almost to every leaf by way of signing, and 
was in some places postilled in the margent with the King’s hand 
likewise, where was this remembrance:
  Item, Received, of such a one, five marks, for a pardon to be pro-
cured; and if the pardon do not pass, the money to be repaid; except 
the party to be some other ways satisfied.
And over against this memorandum (of the King’s own hand):
 Otherwise satisfied.72
The image presented of the King, therefore, is that of a punctilious 
petty tradesman busying himself over his account book.
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Elsewhere, Bacon departed more abruptly from his predecessors. 
Vergil, and the chroniclers who drew on his work, had offered over-
whelmingly positive accounts of Henry’s approach to military affairs, 
emphasising that, while he sought to avoid unnecessary loss of life, 
he had done everything in his power to protect English interests 
and behave justly. This was particularly true with regard to French 
attempts to seize Brittany in the late 1480s and early 1490s. Henry’s 
initial willingness to go to war, Vergil argued, was a product of his 
desire to ‘check, curb, and defeat the French, who were threatening 
the liberty, life, and blood of the [Bretons]’.73 Ultimately, however, 
when the French sued for peace, Henry consented; he was aware 
that Brittany was already lost, and that an end to the conflict would 
mean that ‘he could more readily confront […] coming domestic 
troubles’.74
Bacon’s account was entirely at odds with this. The King, he 
argued, had no intention of fighting, and only declared himself in 
favour of military intervention in order to secure a generous allo-
cation of revenue from Parliament. As a result, he ‘did but traffic 
with that war, to make his return in money’.75 When it came to the 
peace negotiations, meanwhile, Henry’s approach was driven by the 
prospect of further financial inducements rather than considerations 
regarding the nation’s interests and, as such, he obtained ‘rather a 
bargain than a treaty’.76 This behaviour, Bacon concluded, meant 
that the King had aimed at acquiring two distinctive types of ‘profit’: 
‘upon his subjects for the war, and upon his enemies for the peace’.77 
In doing so, he had run England ‘like a good merchant, that maketh 
his gain both upon the commodities exported and imported back 
again’.78
Such representations, of course, constituted direct criticisms of 
Henry’s conduct; to be a merchant, it is implied, is to prioritise selfish 
financial desires over more honourable, kingly concerns. Running 
alongside such commentary, however, is a more Tacitean-style 
analysis concerning the benefits of an amoral, avarice-led form of 
statesmanship. It was Henry’s desire to enrich himself, for example, 
that is shown to be at the root of his promotion of commerce: as ‘a 
King that loved wealth and treasure he could not endure to have 
trade sick’.79 The History’s discussion of the law moves in a similar 
direction. While Bacon maintained that the King’s desire to augment 
the royal coffers led him, on occasions, to ignore or pervert standard 
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judicial practices, he also saw this desire as having contributed to 
Henry’s successes as a legislator.80 The King, it was noted, conceived 
of law-making as a process of financial exchange whereby he would 
provide ‘good laws’ as ‘retribution’ for the treasure he exacted from 
the populace.81 Moreover, a number of the King’s successful laws, 
most notably the measures designed to counter depopulation, were 
shown to have their origins in a desire to maintain tax revenue.82 
Equally significantly, the vast fortune that Henry accrued – Bacon 
estimates it at ‘near eighteen hundred thousand pounds’ – is, in part, 
justified in the History by the close relationship between monarchical 
wealth and power.83 The influence, for example, of Lady Margaret, 
Duchess of Burgundy – the chief promoter of the impostor kings 
Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck – is said to arise from the fact 
she was ‘abounding in treasure’.84 By the same token, Maximilian, 
King of the Romans, was a largely ineffective monarch because he 
was ‘feeble in means’.85 Henry, Bacon implied in his conclusion, was 
aware of these examples: ‘having every day occasion to take notice of 
the necessities and shifts for money of other great Princes abroad, it 
did the better by comparison set off to him the felicity of full coffers’.86 
Consequently, whereas Vergil saw the King’s fortune as bringing him 
only misery, for Bacon it represented both Henry’s moral failings and 
a pathway to political stability and, potentially, happiness.
As a result of this, avarice, or rather avarice-as-statecraft, is key 
to the History’s originality. Vergil and his predecessors had treated 
Henry’s financial exactions, his military record and his legislative 
achievements as separate phenomena; Bacon, by contrast, conceived 
of them as products of a single desire. This approach not only altered 
the impression given of the King’s character, it also constituted a rejec-
tion of the moral framework that had been central to early humanist 
history. Vice, for Bacon, did not necessarily create private and public 
misery, but instead was the source of a complex assortment of gains 
and losses. To an extent, the History’s innovations are a product of 
its fashionable, Tacitus-inspired approach. Avarice enabled Bacon to 
make the sort of causal connections between character and action that 
were often seen by Jacobean writers as the defining feature of the best 
Roman history. It also allowed him to engage in a series of Tacitean 
reflections on deceit and duplicity, and to emphasise the gap between 
the King’s public acts and demeanour, and the drives that shaped 
his behaviour. The lessons that this unmasking demonstrates, mean-
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while, are worldly and realistic, rather than straightforwardly moral; 
consequently, they are a good deal closer to Tacitean arcana imperii 
than Livian exempla. What distinguishes Bacon’s work from classical 
accounts, however, is its focus on avarice. Such a move leads him to 
place money, and with it issues of finance, at the heart of his narrative 
in a manner that has no direct precedent in Graeco-Roman or English 
history. Moreover, and equally uniquely, the image that ultimately 
emerges of Henry is that of a merchant monarch, carefully managing 
his coffers and ensuring that his financial gains outweighed any losses.
3. The law and neo-Machiavellian trade
The second feature that distinguished Bacon’s analysis from earlier 
accounts of Henry VII was its analysis of the law. Previous historians, 
as we have seen, had drawn attention in general terms to Henry’s 
desire to promote ‘good and profitable lawes and statutes’.87 Bacon, 
however, provided a much more detailed form of analysis, tempo-
rarily halting the main chronological narrative in order to outline 
the causes, provisions and ultimate effects of the principal legislation 
passed in the King’s Parliaments. Such an approach, as this section 
will demonstrate, allowed him to develop both an original account 
of the King’s achievements as a legislator and a distinctively neo- 
Machiavellian analysis of economic statecraft.
Bacon’s source with regard to Henry’s legislation was the Rolls 
of Parliament. He could have viewed these parchment manuscripts 
in person at the Tower of London before the terms of his impeach-
ment prevented him from coming within twelve miles of Court. 
Alternatively, and as seems more likely, he may have taken advantage 
of an offer from the antiquarian John Seldon to forward the notes 
that he had taken concerning ‘divers proclamations, & commissions 
touching state of Henry 7. his time in the rolls’.88 The inclusion of 
such material in a work of history was unconventional and contro-
versial. John Hayward was later to provide a direct criticism of the 
use of statutes in histories, and in the History itself Bacon felt obliged 
to include a paragraph-long defence of his own practices.89 Three 
principal reasons were given:
[1] because it was the pre-eminent virtue and merit of this King, 
to whose memory I do honour, and [2] because it hath some 
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 correspondence to my person; but chiefly [3] because in my judgement 
it is some defect even in the best writers of history, that they do not 
often enough summarily deliver and set down the most memorable 
laws that passed in the times whereof they write, being indeed the 
principal acts of peace.90
The emphasis here on ‘memorable’ laws is particularly significant. 
A discussion of history, Bacon was aware, should not be a tedious 
list of legal regulations. Rather it was necessary to identify the most 
important statutes, while avoiding reference to laws that were ‘of a 
more private and vulgar nature than ought to detain the reader of 
an history’.91 Ideas about vulgarity were also of central importance 
to Bacon’s discussion of Henry’s achievements as a lawmaker. The 
King’s regulations, it was noted, were
deep and not vulgar; not made upon the spur of a particular occasion 
for the present, but out of providence of the future; to make the estate 
of his people still more and more happy, after the manner of the 
legislators in ancient and heroical times.92
This reference to ‘ancient and heroical’ legislators served to associate 
Henry’s practices with the achievements of figures such as Solon 
and Lycurgus, and by extension, Bacon’s own work with the his-
torians who described them. Ultimately, however, his engagement 
with the statutes led his work in a different direction to that of other 
classical and neoclassical writers. Among the material contained in 
the Rolls was a substantial body of commercial and financial law. In 
relation to trade, this covered issues such as the import and export of 
goods by English and foreign merchants,93 the taxation of overseas 
traders,94 the prices of particular goods,95 the use of weights and 
measures96 and the management of trading companies.97 With regard 
to finance, there were statutes concerning usury,98 the exchange of 
foreign money,99 coinage,100 as well as various measures relating 
to taxation.101 Bacon, in a manner no previous historian had done, 
engaged with these regulations, sometimes briefly discussing their 
principal provisions, elsewhere offering more lengthy analysis. Given 
the criteria he had established for the inclusion and exclusion of par-
ticular laws, such a move makes a clear statement. For Bacon, these 
were not ‘vulgar’ pieces of legislation, but rather the sort of ‘deep’ laws 
from which precepts could be drawn, and which, as a consequence, 
merited consideration in a serious work of history.
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In dealing with these laws, one of Bacon’s key aims was to judge 
the merits of particular statutes. His approach to this task was, in 
a sense, fundamentally un-empirical. He did not seek alternative 
forms of evidence to examine whether a certain law had promoted 
or hindered trade, enriched or impoverished the people. Rather, the 
laws were his only source material and – as was standard practice in 
classical and neoclassical history – judgements were made using a 
series of seemingly pre-conceived ideas regarding what constituted 
good government.102 With regard to economic issues, Bacon’s under-
standing of good government was derived from his engagement with 
an ongoing European debate concerning the relationship between 
wealth and grandezza (national greatness). Key to this discussion was 
the work of Machiavelli.103 For the Florentine, to achieve grandezza 
it was necessary to create a ‘numerous and well-armed people’.104 In 
his discussions of how this might be achieved, Machiavelli dismissed 
what he referred to as ‘the popular opinion’ of wealth as the ‘sinew 
of warfare’.105 Rather, while money was clearly necessary for a prince 
or republic to enter into a war, it was ‘good soldiers’ who were key, 
as ‘gold is an insufficient means of finding good soldiers, but good 
soldiers are a more than sufficient means of finding gold’.106 These 
good soldiers, he maintained, were generally infantrymen not caval-
rymen, and always free citizens driven by a desire for glory rather than 
mercenaries who fought for a ‘bit of salary’.107
Underpinning such comments were a series of core assumptions. 
Machiavelli associated wealth and the desire for wealth with selfish-
ness and corruption; indeed, excessive riches are presented as incom-
patible with ‘well-organised republics’.108 The poverty of Rome’s 
citizens, meanwhile, was shown to have been central to its success, 
with Machiavelli placing particular emphasis on the selection of 
two small-landowner farmers, Cincinnatus and Regulus, as Roman 
generals.109 Such appointments demonstrated both the virtue of the 
republic, which valued merit over wealth, and the virtue of these indi-
viduals, who sought honour from battle rather than material reward. 
Concluding his account of the generals, Machiavelli observed: ‘it 
would be possible to demonstrate with a long discussion how much 
better are the fruits of poverty than of wealth and that poverty has 
honoured citizens, provinces, sects, while wealth has destroyed them, 
if this subject had not on many occasions been celebrated by other 
writers’.110
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Machiavelli’s arguments were to be subjected to considerable criti-
cism in the years following their publication, as various writers sought 
to demonstrate that wealth was not just compatible with greatness, 
but fundamental to its existence.111 In his Politics (1589, published in 
English in 1594), for example, the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius 
rejected the notion that a state required a spirited citizen militia to 
advance its interests. Rather, he argued, the foundations of mil-
itary success lay in acquiring a disciplined professional army and 
the money to pay and arm it. As a consequence, a provident prince 
should carefully consult his army about the financial costs of war 
before entering into it: for as the ‘phisitions do denie that men cannot 
walke without sinewes, so warre cannot set forward without coine’.112 
A similar argument was developed by the Italian writer Giovanni 
Botero in his A Treatise, Concerning the Causes of the Magnificencie 
and Greatnes of Cities (1588, published in English in 1606).113 As 
Machiavelli had done, Botero maintained that a state’s greatness was 
a product of the ‘multitude’ of its inhabitants.114 However, for Botero 
it was not just liberty that drew individuals to a metropolis, but also 
plenty. In particular, a state that promoted manufacturing would 
not only generate money, but also attract people to make, trade and 
transport goods, and supply the needs of labourers. Consequently, a 
statesman had two important functions to fulfil. First, he needed to 
lure manufacturers who were masters of ‘Art and cunning’.115 This 
could be achieved
if he bring out of other countries excellent artificers, & give them enter-
teinment & convenient seate to dwell upon: if he reckon of good witts, and 
esteeme of singular and rare inventions and workmanship: if other while 
also he doe reward perfection and excellency in things of Art and cunning.116
Second, he had to prevent ‘rude & unwrought things’, such as ‘Wooll’, 
‘Silke’, ‘Timber’ and ‘Metall’, from being exported.117 If this was not 
done, artificers would abandon a city, thereby reducing its population, 
and the prince’s revenue would be diminished, as manufactured goods 
sold for more than the unwrought natural products.118 Concluding 
his discussion, Botero praised the laws against the ‘carrying out of 
Woolles out of their dominions’ made by the kings of England and 
France, arguing that such regulations contributed to the ‘riches and 
the greatnes of the King’ and advanced the interests of his people.119
Bacon was clearly interested in the issues raised by such analyses, 
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and he accepted the notion that one of the key roles of a statesman 
was to administer the wealth and plenty of a polity in a manner that 
advanced its greatness. In relation to military affairs, however, he 
rejected the sort of arguments developed by Lipsius and Botero and, 
albeit with some qualifications, sided with Machiavelli.120 His most 
detailed engagement with this subject before the History came in his 
unfinished work of c. 1608: ‘Of the True Greatness of Britain’.121 
Bacon’s analysis began by outlining the errors and excesses ‘of cer-
tain immoderate opinions’ regarding a nation’s military power, and 
repudiating the suggestion that size of territory, fruitfulness of soil, 
fortification of towns and riches might, of themselves, promote great-
ness.122 To demonstrate this he turned directly to ‘the authority of 
Machiavel’, and endorsed both his rejection of the claim that ‘money 
was the sinews of war’ and his contention that ‘there are no other true 
sinews of war, but the sinews and muscles of men’s arms’.123 Support was 
also provided for the Florentine’s comments regarding the connec-
tion between poverty, physical hardship and military success. Thus 
concluding his discussion of a range of successful kingdoms – among 
them the Persians, Spartans, Turks, Goths and Vandals – Bacon 
noted that ‘in case of foreign wars, you shall scarcely find any of the 
great monarchies of the world, but have had their foundations in 
poverty and contemptible beginnings’.124 This was not to say, how-
ever, that treasure and money were inherently pernicious. Rather, 
Bacon went on to argue, they could assist in bringing ‘true greatness 
and strength to a state’ if three conditions were met:
First, […] that they be joined with martial prowess and valour.
Secondly, That treasure doth then advance greatness, when it is rather in 
mediocrity than in great abundance. And again better when some part of the 
state is poor, than when all parts of it are rich.
And lastly, That treasure in a state is more or less serviceable, as the hands 
are in which the wealth chiefly resteth.125
To an extent such comments remain firmly in the Machiavellian 
tradition. Poverty is presented as a condition of military virtue, and 
Bacon favours the even division of wealth that Machiavelli associates 
with a republic – his preferred form of government. Nevertheless, 
for Bacon, such conditions might be made to exist within a modern 
commercial society. Indeed, when searching for an example of a 
society where wealth had been distributed evenly, he turned not 
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to the farms of ancient Rome, as Machiavelli had done, but rather 
to the warehouses and shops of the Dutch. For Bacon, it was the 
fact that wealth had been distributed between ‘merchants, burghers, 
tradesmen, freeholders, farmers in the country, and the like’ that had 
been key to Dutch survival and success.126
Such arguments were to be developed a good deal further in the 
various discussions of Henry’s statutes which punctuate the History’s 
narrative. These sections of the discussion emphasised that the wealth 
derived from commerce had the potential to enervate a nation and 
was, as a consequence, a potential threat to national greatness. Bacon’s 
contention, however, was neither that trade should be ignored, nor 
poverty embraced. Rather, he sought to show that through the care-
ful management of commerce, Henry had been able to make wealth 
support and augment power.
This concern with economic management meant that there were 
parallels between Bacon’s approach and that of Botero. For both 
writers, one of a monarch’s key functions was to promote a form 
of nationally beneficial commercial activity. Bacon emphasised the 
importance of this role in an invented speech he gave to Henry, 
supposedly delivered to Parliament in the late 1480s:
And because it is the King’s desire that that this peace wherein he 
hopeth to govern and maintain you do not bear only unto you leaves, 
for you to sit under the shade of them in safety, but also should bear 
you fruit of riches, wealth, and plenty; therefore his Grace prays you 
to take into consideration matter of trade, as also the manufactures of 
the kingdom […]127
Underpinning Bacon’s account here was the assumption that a ‘lawful 
and royal’ form of trading could contribute to a nation’s interests. 
And in his discussion of the ways in which Henry had succeeded in 
promoting trade, the History came to endorse a number of Botero’s 
views on good practice. For example, Bacon praised Henry’s statutes 
for ‘the keeping of wools within the realm’, assuming, as Botero 
had done, that exporting raw materials was a commercially ill- 
advised move.128 Equally, the History endorsed measures restricting 
the import of silk. Key to the analysis here was a series of widely 
held assumptions about ‘worked up’ (already manufactured) goods. 
Making and selling these goods to other countries, it was agreed, 
achieved a profit. Buying them from abroad, however, enriched for-
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eign manufacturers and, particularly as they were generally luxury and 
disposable items, wasted native resources. Such an argument could 
then be used to justify bans on foreign imports. As Bacon observed, 
Henry’s regulations preventing certain types of silk from entering the 
country pointed to a ‘true principle’: ‘that where foreign materials are 
but superfluities [by which he means ‘luxuries’], foreign manufactures 
should be prohibited, for that will either banish the superfluity or gain 
the manufacture’.129 For Botero, therefore, as for Bacon, ‘gaining’ the 
manufacture constituted a sensible goal for government policy.
Despite these similarities, however, the bulk of the commercial 
directives that Bacon described had a different goal than those 
endorsed by Botero. Botero’s primary concern had been with how a 
city might attract artificers and merchants and protect the interests of 
its tradesmen. Bacon, in contrast, focused on and applauded the vari-
ous laws that Henry used to regulate these sections of the population, 
paying particular attention to measures used to prevent individuals 
enriching themselves to the detriment of ‘lawful and royal trading’.130 
Reference is made, for example, to the ‘good and politic laws’ made 
to prohibit usury and illegal money exchanges, which are referred 
to as the ‘bastard use of money’ and ‘bastard usury’ respectively.131 
Also summarised and endorsed are measures taken to limit the price 
of cloth,132 to restrict the power and wealth of London’s trading 
companies,133 and to ensure that overseas tradesmen both paid taxes 
and were prevented from withdrawing money earned in England out 
of the nation.134 Underlying these comments is the Machiavellian 
idea of a tension between excessive private wealth and the interests 
of a well-run state. Traders and manufacturers, as Bacon presents 
them, are not simply sources of greatness, but also threats to it. To 
increase their profits, usurers might charge outlandish rates of inter-
est, clothiers set unfairly high prices, trading companies take advan-
tage of monopolistic trading practices, and foreign merchants enrich 
themselves at the expense of the English. Where Bacon differed from 
Machiavelli, however, was in his interest in the ways that trade might 
be managed to alleviate these problems. For Bacon a vital and – as 
Henry’s reign demonstrated – achievable task for government was 
to restrict those forms of commerce that harmed a nation’s interests. 
Through doing so, it was emphasised, a monarch could promote 
beneficial forms of trade and advance a nation’s interests.
A revised form of Machiavellian analysis aimed at circumventing 
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the tension between wealth and virtue was also of central impor-
tance to Bacon’s approach to the relationship between economic and 
military affairs. Although Machiavelli is not invoked directly, his 
influence is readily apparent in the History’s discussion of regulations 
regarding the importation of ‘wines and woads’ from Gascony and 
Languedoc.135 The law under consideration was the 1489 statute ‘An 
act against bringing wine into this realm in foreign vessels’.136 This had 
decreed that only English, Welsh and Irish ships could import these 
goods, with the measure being justified on the grounds that ‘there has 
recently been a great diminution and decay of the navy of this realm of 
England’.137 While Bacon followed his source material in noting that 
the measure was ‘for the better maintenance of the navy’, he placed it 
in a broader historical context.138 Whereas the ‘ancient policy’ of the 
kingdom had sought to secure cheapness by allowing international 
merchants to bring in all sorts of commodities, Henry looked ‘to 
the point of state concerning the naval power’.139 Through doing so, 
he wisely subordinated ‘consideration of plenty to consideration of 
power’.140 Such claims are based on the assumptions that there is a 
tension between power and plenty and that in choosing the latter 
over the former, Henry had made the correct, Machiavellian decision. 
This tension, however, is conceived of as partial rather than absolute. 
Bacon did not maintain that Henry should have banned the trade in 
wine and woads entirely; rather, it was necessary that it continued in 
order to create demand for English shipping. The task for statesmen, 
therefore, was not to ignore or reduce the nation’s ‘plenty’, but rather 
to manage it in a manner that ensured that it contributed to power.
An even more explicitly Machiavellian analysis was to be devel-
oped in Bacon’s discussion of the 1489–90 ‘Act against pulling down 
towns’.141 This statute sought to combat depopulation by decree-
ing that ‘houses of husbandry’ with more than twenty acres of land 
‘should be maintained and kept up for ever’ or face ‘seizure of the 
land itself by the King and lords of the fee, as to half the profits’.142 
For Bacon, however, the law’s real significance lay in its wider his-
torical implications. Two points are of note here. First, in a way 
that the law did not, Bacon traced the origins of the changes in land 
usage that had reduced the population back to the increased use of 
enclosure. The merit of the King’s legislation lay in the fact that it 
did not directly prohibit this practice, which had also augmented 
agricultural productivity, but rather sought to offset its pernicious 
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consequences. For Bacon, therefore, Henry’s achievement was to 
pioneer a regulated and improved form of enclosure that maintained 
improvements in the nation’s ‘patrimony’, but avoided depopula-
tion.143 Second, Bacon greatly expanded the statute’s brief reference 
to the enfeeblement of the nation’s defences to provide a detailed, 
and distinctively Machiavellian, analysis of England’s armed forces. 
His key contention was that, through establishing the conditions 
necessary for a citizen militia, the law had done much to ‘advance the 
military power of the kingdom’.144 The opinion of the ‘men of best 
judgement’, Bacon noted, alluding directly to Machiavelli, was that 
the principal strength of an army lay in its infantry.145 And for Bacon, 
as for Machiavelli, an infantry was the product of a certain type of 
social stratification. A good cavalry might be had in nations such as 
France and Italy, where the people were divided between ‘noblemen 
and gentlemen’ and ‘cottagers’.146 An infantry, however, required 
men ‘bred not in a servile or indigent fashion, but in some free and 
plentiful manner’.147 By ensuring that farms were of sufficient size to 
maintain an able body ‘out of penury’, the depopulation act had put ‘a 
great part of the lands of the kingdom unto the hold and occupation 
of the yeomanry or middle people’.148 As a result, Henry’s reform had 
‘secretly [sown] Hydra’s teeth’.149 England, despite its relatively small 
territories, had no need for mercenaries and was able to field a large 
and able body of armed men.150 Bacon, therefore, clearly imagined 
that the law on depopulation had helped to produce just the sort of 
armed, small landowners that Machiavelli had praised. However, 
not only did he emphasise that such measures were compatible 
with increased agricultural productivity, an issue of little interest to 
Machiavelli, but he also avoided the praise for poverty that had been 
a key feature of Machiavelli’s analysis. This move was to be of central 
importance for English historiography. It was Bacon’s association of 
Henry’s reign with the emergence of a prosperous ‘middle people’ that 
enabled this section of the History, as we shall see in later chapters, 
to play a key role in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accounts of 
the rise of commerce and the commercial classes. Bacon, of course, 
knew nothing of such developments, and they are based, in a sense, 
on a misreading of his work; he is clearly discussing rural, agricultural 
developments, not changes to trade. However, such a misreading 
would itself have been impossible had Bacon not offered a partial 
rejection of Machiavellian ideas regarding wealth and poverty.
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Conclusion
Underlying Bacon’s analysis of Henry’s management of English 
trade is a series of assumptions about commerce, politics and history; 
I would like to conclude this chapter by briefly delineating these. 
Bacon’s account is based on the notion that there exist ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
forms of commercial activity. The former are those which advance the 
interests of the kingdom; the latter those which work against them. 
This distinction was of key importance to the form of ‘reason of state’ 
theory that emerged in the latter part of the sixteenth century and, 
through discussing commercial affairs at length and drawing on such 
concepts, Bacon’s work aligns itself with this tradition. However, 
his contentions that an effective army could not be obtained purely 
through financial means, and that a pernicious form of commerce 
would be one that prioritised plenty over power, ensured that he took 
such ideas in a distinctively Machiavellian direction. In sum, there-
fore, Bacon rejected both Botero’s assumption that plenty and power 
were necessary concomitants and the extreme Machiavellian position 
that private plenty and public power were inherently incompatible. 
Rather, the key task for the lawmaker was to manage and restrain 
commerce in a way that reconciled power and plenty and wealth 
and virtue. The stakes in such an activity were high. Commerce 
could bring riches and wealth to a nation and, through augmenting 
the royal coffers, determine its international power and influence. 
Equally though, it was a potentially enervating force; ‘bad’ types 
of trade could drain a state of wealth, destroy its armed forces and 
enrich its competitors. Documenting attempts to regulate commerce, 
Bacon assumed, was one of the principal roles for a modern historian. 
Key to this idea was the claim advanced by Machiavelli and much 
humanist historiography that the study of history could provide a 
series of examples from which general principles of the utmost value 
to modern statesmen could be drawn. Bacon, however, in a way that 
Machiavelli did not, conceived of the administration of trade as a 
branch of politics worthy of detailed analysis and capable of being 
distilled into a practical and useful form of knowledge.




William Camden’s Annales of Queen Elizabeth (1615, 1625) are 
prefaced by a short essay entitled ‘The Authour to the Reader’. In 
this discussion, Camden sought to associate his own approach to 
historiography with those of Polybius and Tacitus. The chief merit 
of the former, it was noted, was his understanding of causation, 
specifically his awareness that only through developing an account of 
causal processes could history function as a didactic mode of writing. 
As Camden observed:
Circumstances I have in no wise omitted, that not onely the Events of 
Affairs, but also the Reasons and Causes thereof, might be understood. 
That of Polybius I like well Take away from History Why, How, and 
To what end, things have been done, and Whether the thing done hath 
succeeded according to Reason; and all that remains will be an idle Sport 
and Foolery, than a profitable Instruction: and though for the present it may 
delight, for the future it cannot profit.1
His understanding of historical form and style, Camden continued, 
had been derived from Tacitus:
My Work I have intitled by the Name of ANNALS, in regard I have 
disposed every thing in its proper Year: for I have learn’d of Tacitus, 
that Weighty and remarkable Occurences are to be digested by way 
of Annals; and that the principal Business of Annals is, to preserve 
Vertuous Actions from being buried in Oblivion, and to deter men 
from either speaking or doing what is amiss, for fear of after-Infamy 
with Posterity.2
Such ideas about history ensured that Camden’s conception of the 
subject had some significant similarities with Bacon’s. Both saw 
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affairs of state as their principal subjects and, in discussing them, 
drew inspiration from classical historiography. Moreover, both were 
attracted to the works of Tacitus. And although Bacon had relatively 
little to say on Polybius, he, like Camden, entirely endorsed the 
Polybian claim that it was through analysis of cause and effect that 
history could teach men political wisdom.
The similarities between their work have led the two writers to be 
conceived of as part of the same Tacitean, ‘politic’ school of history.3 
However, while an admiration for the Roman historian undoubtedly 
shaped their historical outlooks, there are some important differences 
between them. Whereas Bacon’s exile meant that he had access to 
limited archival sources, Camden received direct support from Court, 
specifically from Lord Burghley, and wrote surrounded by a wealth 
of archival material. They also approached Tacitus’ work in different 
ways. Bacon’s account, as we saw in the previous chapter, was rooted 
in a fashionable, ‘realist’ form of history based around psychological 
and pathological analysis. Camden, however, showed little interest 
in exploring the human psyche. As he noted in ‘The Author to the 
Reader’: ‘Things secret and abstruse I have not pried into’ as ‘The 
hidden Meanings of Princes […] and what they secretly design to search 
out, it is unlawfull, it is doubtfull and dangerous.’4 Their attitudes to 
Tacitus’ moralism also contrasted sharply. Bacon conceived of the 
Roman as a useful guide to the murky labyrinths of an amoral form 
of politics. In contrast, Camden, as his comments show, viewed him 
as a straightforward moralist whose work sought to preserve virtuous 
actions and deter posterity from ‘doing what is amiss’. As a result, 
Camden’s approach to didacticism had more in common with the 
‘exemplary’, Livian tradition of Vergil and Hall than it did with the 
more world-weary history of Bacon.
Finally, as the rest of this chapter will explore, the two historians 
developed very different analyses of economic statecraft. For Bacon, 
the successful administration of the nation’s revenues was a skill, a 
product of a ruler’s political cunning and understanding of the com-
plex workings of finance. By contrast Camden, in similar fashion to 
Burghley, saw good financial management as a virtue, dependent not 
on specialist forms of knowledge, but rather on the monarch’s com-
mitment to the interests and welfare of the commonwealth. Indeed, 
Camden’s key claim was that the Queen’s careful administration of 
the nation’s revenues, coin and commerce had brought her the sort of 
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‘honour’ and ‘glory’ conventionally associated with military victories 
and political successes. The first part of this discussion looks at how, 
through drawing on ideas from Burghley, Camden developed an 
account of Elizabeth’s honourable economic statecraft. The second 
section explores his treatment of those areas of policy – mercantile 
avarice, monopolies and the growth of luxury – which sat less com-
fortably within this framework.
1. Commerce, finance and honour
Camden’s conceptions of commerce and finance were shaped by 
his relationship with William Cecil, Lord Burghley. Born in 1551, 
Camden was educated at Christ’s Hospital and St Paul’s School, 
the latter an institution run by two of Cecil’s associates, John Cooke 
and Alexander Nowell.5 He went on to study at the University 
of Oxford, before eventually gaining employment at Westminster 
School, where he served first as an under-master (1575–93) and 
later as headmaster (1593–97). It was here that Camden moved 
directly into Burghley’s orbit. Burghley had been Elizabeth’s princi-
pal agent when she re-established the school in 1560, and continued 
to act as its patron, regularly presiding over scholarly gatherings, and 
retaining a residence nearby. Consequently, as Camden’s biographer 
Wyman H. Herendeen has argued, the school was ‘deeply imbued 
with the political, scholarly, and religious vision of [Burghley]’, 
and he came to act as ‘the presiding genius over the community in 
which Camden lived’.6 Burghley’s support and patronage also did 
much to shape Camden’s career as an antiquarian and historian. 
Through helping to bring together a like-minded circle of scholars, 
among them Nowell, Gabriel Goodman and William Latimer, and 
providing access to his extensive collection of antiquarian material, 
Burghley provided a fertile intellectual environment within which 
Camden could work. It was only fitting, therefore, that Camden 
dedicated the first editions of the Britannia (1586) to Burghley.7 
Moreover, it was Burghley, as Camden explained in the preface to 
the Annales, who at some point in the 1590s had passed on to him 
‘first his [Burghley’s] own, and then the Queen’s Rolls, Memorials 
and Records, willing me to compile from thence an Historical 
Account of the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH’.8 Camden ‘obeyed’ 
Burghley’s request, he continued, ‘lest I might seem either to 
46 COMMERCE, FINANCE AND STATECRAFT
neglect the Memory of that most Excellent Princess, or to fail his 
Expectation’.9
The long and complex development of the Annales has been well 
covered in the existing scholarly literature, and readers interested in 
the subject are advised to consult the excellent accounts by Hugh 
Trevor-Roper and Daniel Woolf.10 All that needs to be added here 
is that, after progress on the project ground to a halt following 
Burghley’s death in 1598, Camden returned to it in the early years 
of James’s reign at the request of the King and the French histo-
rian Jacques-Auguste de Thou. The first three parts of the Annales, 
covering the period 1558–88, were published in 1615; a final part 
dealing with the period 1589–1603 emerged posthumously in 1625. 
Aspects of the Annales’ content were clearly shaped by the Jacobean 
context in which Camden wrote. In particular, its account of Mary 
Stuart was, in effect, written to order for James as part of his attempt 
to rescue his mother’s reputation from the scandalous accusations 
levelled at her by the Scottish historian George Buchanan.11 The rest 
of the text, meanwhile, has been alternatively presented by modern 
historians both as part of the King’s strategy to identify his approach 
to government with that of Elizabeth, and as an oblique criticism of 
James’s statesmanship.12
The primary influence on Camden’s accounts of commerce and 
finance, however, was not James, but Burghley. This influence took a 
number of forms. At a very general level, by handing over a series of 
government records, Burghley shaped the type of history that Camden 
was able to write. And while the original batch of archival sources 
was later supplemented by further papers from Sir Robert Cotton, 
Camden essentially received more of the same kind of material. This, 
therefore, was a history written through consultation with ‘Charters 
and Grants of Kings and great Personages, Letters, Consultations 
in the Council-Chamber, Embassadours Instructions and Epistles, 
[and] Parliamentary Diaries, Acts and Statutes’.13 These documents 
enabled Camden, as numerous commentators have noted, to create 
an impressively wide-ranging commentary on the age of Elizabeth, 
and one that paid particular attention to economic affairs.14 What 
needs to be remembered, however, is that while Camden had access 
to an unprecedented selection of archival material, the bulk of this 
information was derived from government sources. As a result, he 
saw events from a distinctively political perspective, and his concern 
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was not so much with commerce and finance per se, but rather the 
state’s management and regulation of these activities.
In discussing such issues Camden provided a broad endorsement 
of the statesmanship of Lord Burghley. Burghley’s interest in finan-
cial affairs was a long-standing one.15 As a clerk of council under 
Edward VI he had concerned himself with monetary problems, 
compiling extensive lists of domestic and foreign debts and schedules 
for discharging them. He left this position following Mary’s ascent 
to the throne, but returned to government with Elizabeth in 1558, 
as Secretary of State. Although William Paulet, the marquess of 
Winchester, served as Lord Treasurer during this period, Burghley, 
as Frederick C. Dietz argued, had ‘the real initiative and control 
in matters of revenue policy’.16 When Winchester died in 1572, 
Burghley succeeded him as Lord Treasurer, holding the post and, 
with it, direct responsibility for government revenue for the rest of 
his life.
A flavour of the philosophy that underpinned Burghley’s work 
can be gained from a collection of thirty-four of his aphorisms and 
sayings assembled shortly after his death by his first biographer.17 Key 
to these observations was a conventional Christian view of human 
beings as, by nature, selfish, greedy creatures, who could expect 
this-worldly punishments for their sinful actions.18 Thus Burghley 
observed that ‘he seldom sawe goods yll gotten, but weare quicklie ill 
spent’; ‘Riches weare God’s blessings to such as use them well, and 
his curse to such as did not.’19 Moreover, ‘Private gaine is the pervert-
ing of justice, and pestilence of a Commonwealth.’20 Equally signif-
icant to his comments, however, was a form of Christian humanism 
that valued the vita activa and vivere civile, and understood good 
statesmanship as a product of a ruler’s capacity to, in some sense, 
transcend his fallen status, and subordinate his private interests and 
desires to the common good. Thus the Lord Treasurer is said to have 
commented: ‘He can never be a good Statesman, who respecteth not 
the publique more than his owne private.’21 Moreover: ‘Good Princes 
ought first to preferre the service of God and his Church, and next 
of the Commonwealth, before theire own pleasure or proffit.’22 The 
assumption here was that, while monarchs needed to ‘follow the best 
counsell’ and secure the love of their people, they were also required 
to be ‘better than other men, because they command and rule all 
others’.23 This ensured that ‘Noe wise Prince can be a tyraunt’ and 
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that ‘a happie King’ was one that ‘can governe and moderate his affec-
tions’.24 Elizabeth, Burghley argued, was the perfect embodiment of 
such a monarch, and the list of sayings concluded with a paean to her:
She had so rare gifts, as when her Counsell had said all they cold, she 
wold find out a wise Counsell beyond all theires, and that she shew’d 
her wisdome and care of her Contrie; for there was never anie great 
consultation, but she wold be present herself, to her great profitt and 
praise.25
Burghley was to develop a more extended analysis of the Queen’s 
approach to government in ‘A Meditation on the State of England’, 
a thirty-eight-page 1595 manuscript which provided both ‘a resumé’ 
of the Queen’s policy and an ‘apologia’ for Burghley’s career as secre-
tary and Lord Treasurer.26 The Queen’s management of the nation’s 
finances, he argued in this document, was a source of wonder. She had 
spent substantial sums of money on the nation’s defences, funding 
both an expansion of the navy and a series of new garrisons. Despite 
this, ‘Her Majesty is not indebted but is able with the power of her 
own people with out the help of strange force to defend her realm.’27 
This state of affairs, he continued, had attracted the attention of a 
variety of ‘curious heads’ who ‘although they know this to be true yet 
are inquisitive by what means she doth possess soe much riches’.28 
To satisfy these individuals, Burghley developed a three-pronged 
explanation rooted in the same ideas regarding ‘public’ good and pri-
vate ‘vice’ that had underpinned his sayings. The primary reason for 
Elizabeth’s achievement, he argued, was her absolute commitment to 
the commonwealth; she ‘had regard not to expend her Treasure but 
either for the honor of her estate, […] or for publique defence of her 
realm, or to ayde her neighbors tyrannously oppressed’.29 Such ‘parsi-
mony’, Burghley continued, ‘hath been a great cause of her Majesty’s 
riches’ and had enabled her ‘to perform those actions whereof heads 
are inquisitive’.30 Second, Burghley maintained that the Queen had 
been able to regulate the selfish desires of her populace by reforming 
‘great abuses in such as had charge of her revenues and namely of her 
customs’.31 This had been achieved through preventing officers from 
engrossing money, and reducing the sums left uncollected, moves 
which brought in large yearly sums to the state.32 Third, Elizabeth 
abandoned the system of tax assessment under which individuals 
were forced to undergo inquisitions by ‘oath or others coercion’.33 
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While this ‘voluntary’ system may have reduced income, it helped 
to develop trust in the monarchy and ensured that the ‘subsidies as 
they were collected did also increase [the Queen’s] power’.34 The suc-
cess that Elizabeth enjoyed with regard to revenue was, therefore, a 
product of both her own commitment to the public’s welfare, and her 
capacity to generate a similar public spiritedness from her subjects.
Camden’s narrative was based on the same core assumptions 
regarding financial good practice as Burghley’s account, and drew 
directly on the Lord Treasurer’s ‘Meditation’. This can be seen par-
ticularly clearly in the Annales’ record for 1590. The discussion opens 
with a list of the large sums of money that Elizabeth had spent in 
support of Protestant interests in mainland Europe.35 Such generos-
ity attracted the attention of ‘many’ observers who, like the ‘curious 
heads’ referred to by Burghley,
admired whence this Wealth came to serve all these Turns, seeing she 
was in no man’s Debt (as all other Princes almost were,) and was able 
to defend herself and hers without any foreign Helps, which not one of 
her neighbour-Kings could doe.36
Camden then went on to use and develop the ‘Meditation’s’ analysis 
of Elizabeth’s successes, referring, in sequence, to the same three 
causes as Burghley. He began, therefore, by discussing the Queen’s 
parsimony, arguing that she was ‘providently frugal, and scarcely 
spent any thing, but for the Maintenance of her Royal State, the 
Defence of her Kingdom, or the Relieving of her Neighbours’.37 
The discussion next proceeded to deal with reforms to ‘customs’. 
Camden agreed that reforms in this area had been important, but 
attributed them to Burghley rather than to Elizabeth, noting that 
the Lord Treasurer had ‘looked narrowly unto those who had the 
Charge of Customs and Imposts, by whose Avarice many things 
were under-hand imbezeled’.38 Finally, Camden endorsed and devel-
oped Burghley’s comments on taxation. The Queen, he observed, 
‘detested Extortions, and all Rigidness in exacting extraordinary 
Contributions’, and did not use unpopular forms of revenue such 
as benevolences or poll taxes.39 This ensured that the ‘People always 
granted Subsidies chearfully’ and their subsidies were ‘rather volun-
tary, without Demanding or any Constraint’.40
In addition to the material derived from Burghley, Camden added 
one further explanation for the Queen’s financial successes.41 Through 
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following the advice of ‘one Caermarden’, he noted, ‘an understanding 
and subtil Fellow, of the Mysteries of the Farmers of her Customs’, 
Elizabeth was able to raise the income she derived from customs 
from £14,000 to £42,000.42 The decision to turn to Carmarden was 
opposed by Burghley, Leicester and Walsingham, who maintained 
that it ‘would tend to the Disgrace and Disparagement of her and her 
Council, if she should hearken to the Accusations of so inconsiderable 
an Informer’.43 Elizabeth, however, defended her actions by noting 
that ‘it was the Duty of a Prince to hold an equal Hand over the high-
est and the lowest’ and that she would not ‘endure that the Farmers of 
the Customs should like Horse-leeches suck themselves fat upon the 
Goods of the Commonwealth, whilst the poor Treasury waxed lean 
and was exhausted’.44 Camden’s sympathies in this passage are clearly 
with the Queen, and there is an irony in the fact that the one section 
of his discussion on revenue not derived from Burghley contained a 
direct criticism of him. Ultimately, however, even this passage pro-
vides a vindication of the conception of Elizabeth that Burghley and 
Camden shared. The successful management of the nation’s finances, 
both agreed, was dependent on acting against self-interested prac-
tices, and ensuring that people and government worked in amicable 
partnership with one another to secure the safety and prosperity of 
the commonwealth.
Camden and Burghley’s ideas about the public interest were closely 
connected to another aspect of their approach to statecraft, namely 
their understandings of ‘honour’ and the cognate term, ‘glory’. In 
his highly influential discussion of ‘honour’, Mervyn James argued 
that the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were the time 
of a key shift in the concept.45 ‘Honour’ in the early Tudor period 
had been conceptualised in relation to an individual’s bloodline. 
Although any individual might earn honour for themselves on the 
battlefield, an exalted lineage, it was assumed, ‘predisposed’ indi-
viduals to honourable forms of conduct. To behave with ‘honour’, 
meanwhile, was to engage in self-assertive, masculine and martial 
actions, which simultaneously secured one’s own reputation and that 
of one’s family. Such ideas had an ambivalent relationship with the 
king and the commonwealth. Honour societies revered kingship. 
However, family ties and the symbolic rite of ‘“giving one’s word” 
– the word of honour’ committed individuals to courses of action 
which could not, at least without dishonour, be violated.46 As such, 
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they helped to reinforce a system of social relations that were beyond 
the direct jurisdiction of the state, and had the potential to generate 
a series of motives and justifications for opposition to the will of the 
Crown. Towards the end of the Tudor period, James contended, this 
understanding of honour yielded to a new ‘moralized’ approach.47 At 
one level, although lineage remained an important concept, honour 
became partially detached from its anchorage in pedigree and descent, 
as the privileges of honour were increasingly sought not just by men 
of war but ‘lawyers, officials, merchants, even husbandmen and arti-
sans’.48 Equally significantly, the growing influence of humanism 
and religion, ‘itself the result of a deeper penetration of lay society 
by literacy and education’, helped to redefine ideas of honour, which 
came to be associated with learning, virtue, godliness and, perhaps 
most significantly, public service to the state.49
Such ideas are broadly in line with the accounts of scholars working 
on the influence of humanist ideas.50 In particular Markku Peltonen 
has shown that a form of humanism emerged in England during 
the 1570s and 1580s which assumed that the ‘main aim of human 
life was […] the advancement of the common good’ and that this 
could only be achieved ‘by the relentless pursuit of a virtuous vita 
activa’.51 While many humanist writers continued to define virtue in 
relation to military activity, and it was generally agreed that citizens 
had a duty of honour to defend the fatherland from attack, more 
irenic conceptions of public service also emerged. Thus for some writ-
ers, particularly the authors of moral treatises such as Haly Heron, 
Thomas Pritchard and William Blandy, ‘to take part in the political 
life of the commonwealth and to act as its governor was the way in 
which men could acquire the greatest amount of worldly glory’.52
Camden’s account is rooted in these ideas and, more specifically, 
the notion that an individual’s contribution to the commonwealth 
might be based on the financial aspects of statecraft. This can be seen 
particularly clearly in the lengthy ‘character’ of Burghley included in 
the Annales. Discussing his former patron, Camden noted that
(though [Burghley] detested to scrape Money together by base and 
corrupt ways) he increased both his private Estate and the publick 
Treasure by his Industry and Frugality. For he hardly suffered any 
thing to be expended but for the Queen’s Majestie’s Honour, the 
Defence of the Realm, or the relief of neighbouring Allies. He looked 
strictly, yet not over-rigidly, to the Farmers of the Customes. He never 
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liked (as he was wont to say) that the Treasury should grow too great 
like the Spleen,whilst the rest of the Members languished and pined 
away: and he made it his great Endeavour, not without good Success, 
that both Prince and People might grow rich: saying oftentimes, that 
nothing is truly for a Prince’s Profit which is not conjoyned with 
Honour. Wherefore he would have no Rents raised upon Lands, nor 
the old Farmers and Tenants put out. Which also he observed in his 
own private Estate, which he managed with that Integrity, that he 
never sued any man, nor any man ever sued him. But I will not goe too 
far in his Praises: yet may I say truly, that he was one of those few who 
have both lived and died with Glory.53
Key to Camden’s comments here is an implied contrast between 
honourable and dishonourable approaches to wealth. On the one 
hand, a statesman could use ‘base and corrupt’ means or overly rigid 
revenue-collection to amass a fortune. In such circumstances, the 
interests of statesman and populace would be in opposition to one 
another, and honour and glory would be sacrificed to avarice. On 
the other hand, political figures could, as Burghley had done, forego 
opportunities to seize money and seek to honourably administer the 
nation’s finances. While such an approach required ‘Industry and 
Frugality’, through it the people, their government and their mon-
arch could simultaneously grow rich, and a variety of potentially con-
flicting financial interests could be reconciled. In Camden’s account, 
therefore, we see the emergence of what might be called a ‘negative’ 
conception of ‘honour’ and ‘glory’. Rather than requiring specific 
‘positive’ actions on the part of an individual, honour and glory could 
be acquired, as they had been by Burghley, through the fair man-
agement of monetary and property relations and the avoidance of 
measures aimed at avaricious forms of self-advancement.
These ideas underpinned the Annales’ general discussion of 
Elizabethan economic affairs. Indeed, Camden sought to show that 
through prioritising the welfare of the public in matters of finance, 
the Queen had earned herself ‘honour’ and ‘glory’. With regard to 
commerce, these attributes had been acquired in a number of ways. 
On occasions, Elizabeth gained honour, as Burghley had done, 
through protecting property rights. Thus, following the confiscations 
they had suffered at the hands of the Duke of Alva, the Queen 
intervened to restore property to her tradesmen in the Netherlands; 
consequently, matters are said to have ‘turned to her exceeding great 
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Honour’.54 Alva, in contrast, presumably to his equally great dis-
honour, ‘restored not a Farthing to the Netherlanders’.55 Elsewhere, 
mercantile activity, particularly the development of new commercial 
institutions, was shown to have the capacity to bestow more ‘posi-
tive’ forms of prestige. Discussing the foundation of the East India 
Company in 1600, Camden observed that ‘The Queen nevertheless, 
for the increase of Navigation, the Honour of the Kingdom, and the 
propagation of Trade, about this time set up a Company or Society of 
East-India Merchants with large Privileges.’56 The establishment of 
a factory in Surat by the Company, meanwhile, is described as being 
‘to the Honour of the English Nation’.57 Also of significance here 
is Camden’s account of the Russian Tsar, John Basilides (Ivan IV). 
Summarising a letter from Ivan to Elizabeth, for example, Camden 
noted that Ivan ‘twittingly upbraided’ the English for, among other 
things, being ‘too mindfull of the Merchants Business (which were 
matters unbeseeming a Prince)’.58 Camden had no sympathy for such 
views, arguing that the Tsar had ‘contemptuously and disgracefully 
charged [merchants] as a sordid kind of people, that rather gaped 
after Wealth than sought their Prince’s Honour’.59
Honour was also shown to be a key issue in relation to a nation’s 
coinage, and here, once again, Burghley’s influence was of central 
importance. In the years between 1544 and 1551, the government 
had ‘enhanced’ England’s coins by raising their face value without 
altering their bullion content, and ‘debased’ them through lowering 
the metal content, but maintaining the same face value.60 This situa-
tion was remedied between 1560 and 1561 when Elizabeth reduced 
the face value of a range of enhanced coins and recalled the debased 
money, replacing it with new coin. Burghley played a key role in this 
process, both advising the Queen and helping to draft A Summary of 
Certain Reasons (1560), the government publication that explained to 
the populace the rationale behind the re-coinage.61
At the time Camden wrote, discussion of reforms to the money 
supply was already a standard feature of historiography on Elizabethan 
England. John Stow had introduced a brief comment on the issue 
in the 1570 edition of his Chronicle, describing the changes to the 
value of individual coins produced by Elizabeth’s 1560 proclamation, 
and noting that ‘her grace restored unto all her subjectes fyne and 
pure sterlinge moneye, both of gold and sylver for theyr corrupt 
and base coyne’.62 These remarks were then repeated by ‘Holinshed’ 
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and gradually expanded in later editions of Stow’s Chronicle and 
Annales, first by Stow himself and then by his successor, Edmund 
Howes.63 Camden’s account, however, was not merely a good deal 
more detailed than that of his predecessors, it also interpreted events 
through the lens of humanist ideas concerning ‘honour’ and ‘glory’. 
His key assumption was that a nation’s coinage constituted a marker 
of its reputation and that of its monarch. Problems with England’s 
currency had their origins, Camden argued, in the actions of Henry 
VIII who, ‘to the great Dishonour of the Kingdom, and the Damage 
of his Successours and People’, had mixed the coin with brass ‘leaving 
thereby a notable example of Riot and Prodigality’.64 Edward VI 
could not act to restore this situation and Mary ‘durst’ not.65 Such 
a situation was not just embarrassing for England, it also worked 
to the detriment of its people. To prove this, Camden drew on the 
arguments from Burghley’s Summary of Certain Reasons, justifying 
coinage reforms on the grounds that they would bring an end to 
fraudulent practices ‘at home and abroad’, and help to abate the high 
prices of commodities, a move of particular value to those on fixed 
incomes.66 Given its importance, therefore, Elizabeth’s re-coinage 
constituted ‘a great and memorable Act’, which, Camden argued, 
turned to Elizabeth’s ‘greater, yea greatest, Glory’.67
Through presenting the Queen’s management of commerce and 
finance as a product of her identification with the interests of the 
public, and associating her achievements in these fields with ideas of 
‘honour’ and ‘glory’, Camden was able to show how economic affairs 
could form part of a Livian type of exemplary history. And like other 
exponents of this mode of writing, Vergil and Hall among them, 
Camden emphasised that virtuous actions, as well as being ‘good’ 
in themselves, could expect to achieve this-worldly recompense. On 
occasion, this recompense emerged from God’s personal interven-
tion. For example, when at the start of her reign, Elizabeth ‘found her 
Treasure exhausted […] God (as if he favoured what she undertook)’ 
helped her furnish her armoury by discovering ‘a most rich Vein 
of pure and native Brass […] near Keswick in Cumberland ’.68 This 
both satisfied native demands for the metal and generated exports. 
Elsewhere, the Almighty’s involvement was less direct, and events 
were simply shown to work to the advantage of the virtuous states-
man. Thus Camden contrasted Elizabeth’s willingness to take in 
Protestant refugees with the behaviour of Alva, who ‘breathed noth-
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ing but Slaughter and Bloud against them’.69 Alva’s actions gained 
him and his people nothing; Elizabeth’s, however, worked ‘to the 
great Benefit and Advantage of the English: for they were the first 
that brought into England the Art of making those slight Stuffs 
which are called Bays and Says, and other such like Stuffs of Linen 
and Woollen weaving’.70 Such comments, when viewed alongside 
the Annales’ discussions of Elizabeth’s other achievements, imply 
the existence of a providentially ordered world in which virtuous, 
 public-spirited actions would be rewarded. Camden’s point, however, 
was that both the acts that were worthy of reward, and the rewards 
themselves, could be economic in character.
2. Dishonourable commerce: luxury, avarice and the free trade 
debate
Ideas of honourable and, on occasion, glorious economic statecraft 
underpin much of Camden’s discussion of economic affairs. Equally 
significantly, however, his association of honour with public interest, 
on the one hand, and dishonour with self-interest, on the other, led 
him to adopt a critical attitude towards those aspects of commercial 
life that he saw as dominated by prodigality and avarice. In discussing 
such issues, Camden is rather less reliant on Burghley than in the 
examples considered thus far. However, his approach remains rooted 
in the broad humanist framework he inherited from his patron, and, 
as we shall see, on one occasion at least his analysis worked to protect 
the reputation of the former Lord Treasurer.
Camden’s discussion of prodigality was primarily concerned with 
new approaches to luxury goods, particularly clothing. Reflecting on 
this issue in his record for 1574 he observed:
In these days a wonderous Excess in Apparel had spread it self all over 
England, and the Habit of our own Countrey, through a peculiar Vice 
incident to our Apish Nation, grew into such Contempt, that men by 
their new-fashioned Garments, and too gaudy Apparel discovered a 
certain Deformity and Arrogancy of Mind, whilst they jetted up and 
down in their Silks glittering with Gold and Silver, either imbroidered 
or laced.71
Elizabeth objected to such practices on economic grounds. Not only 
did expenditure on these items cause the nobility to ‘waste their 
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Estates’ and acquire debts, it also, through taking large quantities 
of money out of the kingdom, led to the ‘impoverishing of the 
Commonwealth’.72 At the same time, the growth of an ‘excess of 
Pride’ was said to have been accompanied by the emergence of ‘riot-
ous Banquetting and prodigal Bravery in Building’.73 While the latter 
development worked to ‘the great Ornament of the Kingdom’, it also 
caused, Camden concluded, the ‘Decay of the glorious Hospitality of 
the Nation’.74 Fashionable Elizabethans were, therefore, prioritising 
their own vain and selfish interests over the needs of the state and its 
people.
Similar accusations of selfishness were levelled at tradesmen. 
Negotiations aimed at restoring goods taken from English traders by 
pirates from Zeeland, for example, failed ‘by reason of the Avarice of 
the English Merchants, and the Insolency of the Zelanders’, thereby 
resulting in ‘Loss to both Nations’.75 Avarice was also blamed for the 
breakdown of trading relations between England and Portugal in 
the 1570s and the decision by certain English merchants, despite the 
ongoing military engagements between England and Spain, to 
furnish the Spanish with ordnance in the early 1590s.76 Elizabeth 
herself meanwhile, in one of her letters responding to accusations 
from the Hans Towns that England had violated ancient commercial 
agreements, is shown to defend the right of the English to suspend 
trading privileges by distinguishing between ‘the Case of Kingdoms’ 
and ‘the Case of Cities’.77 In relation to the former, she argued, 
trading privileges may be revoked for the good of the commonwealth 
as ‘it concerneth Kings to maintain and support their Royal Dignity, 
rather than to encourage the Avarice of Merchants, lest they grow 
too insolent and high for Kings’.78 The implication of Elizabeth’s 
remarks, therefore, was that although trading cities might be entirely 
beholden to the lowly desires of merchants, kingdoms had higher and 
more honourable concerns.
Such comments appear to place Camden very close to a contra-
diction. On the one hand, he condemned a ruler such as Ivan for 
his contemptuous attitude towards merchants. On the other, both 
Camden and the Queen whose life he celebrated were suspicious 
of the low, avaricious desires of those engaged in trade. Camden’s 
point, however, was not that trade was fundamentally dishonourable, 
but rather that to advance a nation’s interests, its government needed 
to regulate commercial affairs carefully. This was an area in which 
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Elizabeth was shown to have excelled. Thus she abruptly dismissed 
the claims of the Hans Towns and, despite the distrust generated 
by her merchants, successfully negotiated a peace treaty with the 
Portuguese monarch. This agreement proposed ‘a perfect Amity and 
free Commerce on both sides’, and allowed the English to trade 
in ‘the Azores, Madera, and the Coast of Barbary’.79 Actions were 
also taken against over-elaborate forms of dress and the Spanish 
traders. With regard to the former, the Queen issued a series of 
proclamations, which demanded that ‘every man should within 
fourteen days conform himself for Apparel to a certain prescribed 
Fashion’.80 In relation to the latter, ‘as soon as the Queen found out’ 
about her merchants’ illegal trade, she ‘prohibited the same by a strict 
Proclamation, under such Penalties as are due to those who aid the 
Enemies of their Countrey’.81
Elizabeth’s greatest regulatory success, however, occurred in rela-
tion to monopolies. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards gov-
ernment had begun to grant exclusive royal patents to manufacturers. 
Although these were initially introduced to protect innovation in 
manufacture, they quickly became subject to abuses as patents were 
passed on to and exploited by royal creditors and favourites.82 In 
discussing this issue, Camden used ideas regarding the public interest 
both to attack monopolistic practices and to defend Elizabeth’s con-
duct in relation to them. His first mention of the issue came in his 
account of the Parliament of 1601, the final session of the Queen’s 
reign.83 After briefly outlining some of the ‘wholsome laws’ passed, he 
noted that, considering the complaints ‘brought in’ to the lower house 
concerning monopolies, the Queen ‘to be beforehand with them, put 
forth a Proclamation, whereby she partly declared those Grants to 
be void, and partly left them to be tried by the Laws’.84 Camden 
approved of this action, observing in parentheses that ‘under a spe-
cious Pretence of the Publick good, but indeed to the great Prejudice 
of the Commonwealth’, some individuals had gained letters patent 
from the Queen granting them ‘sole Privilege and Leave of selling 
certain Merchandizes’.85 His discussion concluded with a transcript 
of a section of the so-called ‘Golden Speech’ which Elizabeth gave to 
Parliament. In it, she thanked the lower house and, for recalling her 
from errors, proclaimed her affection for the nation and emphasised 
her awareness that the commonwealth should be governed for the 
‘Good and Advantage’ of its people, not its monarch.86 Responsibility 
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for recent ‘Misdemeanours and Miscarriages’, meanwhile, was placed 
firmly at the feet of her courtiers.87 The servants of princes, Elizabeth 
noted, are ‘oftentimes too much set upon their own private advan-
tage’, a truth frequently concealed from princes whose shoulders are 
burdened ‘by the Weight of the greatest and important Affairs’.88
Two features of Camden’s analysis are of particular significance 
here. First, the organisation of his account of monopolies is unu-
sual. The lion’s share of the word count is devoted to the incident’s 
resolution, while the ‘problem’ that Elizabeth solves is dealt with 
only very briefly. As a result, questions regarding how the Queen 
had allowed such a system to develop or the extent to which she 
profited from it are entirely ignored. The reasons for such a move are 
unclear. However, given that it was Burghley who played a key part 
in establishing the system of monopolies, such an approach certainly 
enabled Camden to avoid further censure of his former patron.89 
Moreover, as monopolies remained a contentious issue for James, it 
is understandable that Camden, generally a highly cautious commen-
tator when it came to controversial topics, sought to avoid delving 
too deeply into their operation.90 Second, underpinning Camden’s 
comments on monopolies, and his account of the monarchical 
regulation of commerce more generally, was the same distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of commerce that had been key to 
Bacon’s History. Thus, like Bacon, Camden assumed that there was 
a difference between ‘lawful and royal trading’ which brought real 
benefits to the commonwealth, and bastardised forms of commerce 
that enriched particular avaricious individuals but compromised the 
nation’s wider interests. Moreover, both Bacon and Camden thought 
that it was the monarch’s role to legislate against the latter type 
of trade and promote the former, thereby ensuring that commerce 
contributed to, rather than undermined, the kingdom’s prosperity 
and security. Where the two writers differed, however, was in their 
application of these ideas. Bacon presented Henry, on occasions at 
least, as using the rhetoric of public interest to advance his private, 
avaricious desires. Camden, in contrast, as we have seen, had little 
desire to trace the psychological roots of Elizabeth’s behaviour, and 
treated her publicly stated aims as the key forces shaping her actions.
Generally speaking, therefore, Camden maintained that while 
certain individuals had sought selfishly to advance their own interests 
during the Queen’s reign, her careful regulation had worked to curb 
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such activities.91 Nevertheless, on a couple of occasions Camden used 
the same ideas of public interest with which he had defended the 
Queen’s economic statecraft to question aspects of English policy. 
The key issues here concerned the organisation of trading companies. 
While England’s trading bodies were not run directly by government 
in the manner of the Dutch East India Company, they drew their ‘very 
existence from Royal Prerogative’.92 Indeed, each of them was reliant 
on a Royal Charter through which they were granted exclusive rights 
to trade with a particular territory. This practice had been utilised by 
Mary, who chartered the Muscovy Company (1555), and Elizabeth, 
who helped to establish the Barbary (1585), East India (1600) and 
Levant Companies (1592). James then extended it, augmenting the 
East India Company’s privileges in 1609, and granting new char-
ters to, among others, the Spanish Company (1605), the Virginia 
Company (1606) and the Newfoundland Company (1610). What 
was unique to James’s reign, however, was the level of opposition such 
measures received.93 Two Bills seeking to abolish the exclusive rights 
held by trading companies passed through the House of Commons 
in 1604.94 As part of their progress, a committee, chaired by Sir 
Edwin Sandys and containing a number of notable critics of James, 
investigated the issue. Its subsequent report, authored by Sandys, 
judged the trading companies to be ‘monopolies’ – a claim rejected 
by their supporters – and called them violations ‘against the natural 
Right and Liberty of the Subjects of England ’.95 Sandys’ ‘Free Trade’ 
Bills eventually foundered in the Lords, but the Commons achieved 
a notable victory in 1606 when it was able to end the monopoly held 
by the Spanish Company.96
To an extent, the East India Company was able to escape the ire 
of the free trade campaigners. While the criticism of other trading 
bodies, particularly the Muscovy Company, was savage, the expense 
involved in trading with the East meant that even a critic of monop-
olies such as Sandys acknowledged that ‘a joint stock company’ was 
required.97 This is not to say, however, that the East India trade lacked 
opponents. The difficulties involved in selling English goods in the 
East meant that the Company was reliant on the export of bullion, 
particularly silver, to support its trade.98 Such procedures led a range 
of writers, among them Robert Kayll, Thomas Milles and, later, 
Gerard Malynes, to blame England’s shortage of precious metals, 
and with it the nation’s other economic woes, on the East India 
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merchants. Indeed, the most famous work of mercantilist literature 
of the period, Thomas Mun’s England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade 
(1664), was written specifically to defend the East India Company 
from popular accusations about its practices with regard to bullion.99
Given such a context, it is noteworthy that Camden himself 
showed a degree of sympathy with the trading companies’ critics. 
Despite his praise for the achievements of the East India Company, 
his account of its activities ends on a distinctly cautious note: ‘whether 
to the Good of the Commonwealth, so great a Mass of Silver being 
still exported out of England, and such a Multitude of Sea-men con-
sumed every Year in the Voyage, let Wise men speak and Posterity 
judge’.100 Even more significant is the Annales’ discussion of com-
merce with Muscovy. In his record for 1569 Camden had noted the 
extreme dissatisfaction that German merchants and non-company 
English merchants had expressed towards the Muscovy Company’s 
‘monopoly’ on trade with Russia. Further criticism, he showed, was 
to come from Feodor I, Ivan IV’s successor as Tsar. Feodor, Camden 
observed,
granted to all Merchants of what Nation soever free Access into Russia: 
and being oftentimes solicited by the Queen to confirm the Privileges 
granted by his Father to the Moscovia Company of English Merchants, 
to wit, that onely English-men of that Company should come into or 
trade in the North parts of Russia, and that Customer-free, in regard 
they were the first that discovered the Passage thither by Sea; he there-
upon desired her to give Liberty to all the English to trade into Russia; 
for to permit some, and deny others, was Injustice. Princes, he said, 
must carry an indifferent hand betwixt their Subjects, and not convert 
Trade (which by the Law of Nations ought to be common to all) into 
a Monopoly to the private Gain of a few.101
This passage is, perhaps, one of the most interesting in the Annales, 
not least because the core arguments that the Tsar utilised against 
Elizabeth are very similar to the sort of claims the Queen makes 
elsewhere in the text. Indeed, both the English and Russian rulers 
are shown to criticise monopolies and private gain, while calling for 
monarchs to treat their subjects in an even-handed manner. Also 
noteworthy here is Camden’s use of sources. His account appears 
to be based on the English translation of Feodor’s letter by the dip-
lomat and traveller Jerome Horsey, a copy of which is preserved in 
the state papers. In this document, Feodor asserted that Elizabeth 
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should ‘license or make open the trade’ without any restriction in 
favour of ‘those five, six, or ten men which hath from long time so 
traded into our countries’.102 However, neither Horsey’s translation, 
nor the original Russian letter on which it was based, contained 
any direct mention of ‘private gain’ or the politically charged term 
‘monopoly’. Moreover, no reference is made in the source documents 
to ‘the laws of nations’. The precise reasons for Camden’s unchar-
acteristically ‘free’ approach to archival material here are difficult to 
fathom. However, the effect of his reformulation was to put into the 
Tsar’s mouth a forceful critique of a key plank of English commercial 
policy. Moreover, this critique was in line with both the broader 
economic logic of the Annales and the scathing critique of govern-
ment practices developed by Sandys. As a result, while it cannot be 
claimed that Camden specifically endorsed the arguments of the 
trading companies’ critics – he makes, after all, no direct comment on 
Feodor’s letter – he certainly allowed an eloquent distillation of their 
core claims to be expressed in his work.
Conclusion
The Annales is a key text in the history of economic statecraft. Its 
principal contribution was to use conventional humanist criteria of 
the Livian, exemplary variety to judge the worth of financial and com-
mercial actions. With regard to finance, this was a relatively straight-
forward task, and one made easier by the accounts of Elizabeth’s 
reign that Camden received from Burghley. At her accession to the 
throne, Camden emphasised, as Burghley had done, that Elizabeth’s 
situation was an unpropitious one. England in 1558
lay […] most afflicted, imbroiled on the one side with the Scottish, on 
the other side with the French War; overcharged with Debt incurred 
by Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth; the Treasure exhausted; 
Calice and the Country of Oye, with great Provision for the Wars, lost, 
to the great Dishonour of the English Nation; the people distracted 
with different Opinions in Religion; the Queen bare of potent Friends, 
and strengthened with no Alliance of foreign Princes.103
The Queen’s success in dealing with these problems lay in her abso-
lute identification with the commonwealth’s interests. This enabled 
her to limit personal spending, provide liberal funds for the defence 
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of the nation, and take firm actions against those who sought to 
enrich themselves through co-opting state revenues or debasing the 
currency. As a result, Camden was able to link the effective man-
agement of revenue to the pursuit of the public good, and then use 
discussion of these issues as part of a narrative of national recovery 
and renewal. This ensured, in turn, that finance was presented as an 
aspect of statecraft, which had the capacity, like military and other 
political achievements, to bring a statesman honour and glory.
Commerce, however, was rather more complicated. The 
 public-spirited forms of behaviour that the Annales sought to defend 
were, in one sense, directly opposed to the self-interested, profit-seek-
ing activities involved in trade. Indeed, Camden used their departure 
from the ‘common good’ as a means of criticising what he saw as 
some of the defining features of Elizabethan commercial life: mer-
cantile avarice, extravagant forms of dress and housing, and monop-
olies. Underlying his comments on these issues was a Machiavellian 
suspicion of the ethical value of mercantile life. As J. G. A. Pocock 
has noted, ‘if there was a morality for the trading man, exchanging 
one commodity for its equivalent value in another, that morality 
was conspicuously not linked to the virtue of the citizen – the only 
secular virtue yet known to Western Man’.104 However, while these 
issues undoubtedly linger on the edge of the Annales, Camden’s key 
concern, like Botero’s, was not so much with trade itself but its 
management by government. And here it was much easier to link the 
Queen’s activity with ideas of public service. In promoting English 
trading companies, Elizabeth was not enriching herself, Camden 
showed, but rather promoting the wealth and honour of the nation. 
Her role in defending merchants from attacks by foreigners, mean-
while, was conceived of as part of her larger duty of care towards 
her subjects. Finally, the frequent disjunction between the interests 
of tradesmen and the interests of the commonwealth was shown to 
provide opportunities for the statesman. Through legislating against 
corrupt, avaricious practices, Camden demonstrated, it was possible 
to develop the sort of ‘lawful and royal trading’ that advanced the 
common good. Indeed, while commerce was frequently viewed as 
ethically dubious, economic statecraft was shown to bring a monarch 
virtuous forms of honour and glory.
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3
Chronology and commerce: 
Edmund Howes’s Annales
Bacon’s History and Camden’s Annales exerted a prolonged influence 
over the reputations of Henry VII and Elizabeth I. Indeed, as will 
be explored in Part II of this book, the eighteenth-century debate 
concerning the financial and commercial management of these mon-
archs was structured around a series of attempts to adapt and update 
Bacon’s and Camden’s narratives. The situation with regard to James 
I was a good deal more complicated. No account of a similar stature 
emerged and the historiography of the first English Stuart king is 
characterised by its diversity, and, particularly in the years following 
the Civil War, its vituperative debates and disagreements.1 Perhaps 
the most influential ‘early’ analysis of commercial and financial prac-
tices during James’s reign, however, was that contained in Edmund 
Howes’s Annales, the principal subject of this chapter. At one level, 
this influence was direct; the Annales continued to be read into the 
eighteenth century, and, as will be shown in Chapter 9, was both uti-
lised and praised by David Hume. Howes’s sway was also increased 
by the work of Richard Baker, whose commentary on James in his 
hugely popular Chronicle (1643) was based around a series of pithy 
summaries of the Annales. A brief discussion of Baker’s Chronicle 
follows my account of Howes.
1. Edmund Howes’s Annales
Edmund Howes, like Bacon and Camden, was interested in com-
merce. His relationship with the subject, however, was different to 
that of his more renowned contemporaries. Both Bacon’s History and 
Camden’s Annales were, in some sense, products of Jacobean Court 
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culture, and drew mainly on government sources to provide narratives 
of high politics. This helped to ensure that, while both writers were 
happy to deal with issues relating to trade, the focus of their accounts 
was the state’s management of commercial affairs. Howes, as we shall 
see, shared this concern with economic statecraft. His analysis, how-
ever, was also shaped by his links with the workshops, warehouses 
and offices of the City. And it was through describing the activities 
of individuals attached to these locales, both in England and across 
the world, that he was able to develop a highly innovative account of 
English commercial history. In dealing with Howes’s writing, I begin 
by looking briefly at his life and approach to historical writing. I then 
explore his interrelated accounts of immigration, manufacture and 
trading companies, before outlining his analysis of the role that James 
had played in augmenting national prosperity.
Howes commenced his historical research in around 1602, when he 
gained employment as an assistant to the chronicler John Stow.2 On 
Stow’s death in 1605, Howes took on the task of updating his various 
works, publishing new and expanded editions of his Abridgement or 
Summarie of the English Chronicle in 1607, 1611 and 1618, and of the 
Annales in 1615 and 1632.3 This latter work revised Stow’s account, as 
well as adding new prefatory material and a section on James I.4 In the 
dedication to the 1615 edition of the text, Howes attributed his work 
on the Annales to a personal promise made to Archbishop Whitgift, 
and his list of acknowledgements included six bishops – three of them 
Archbishops of Canterbury – the Lord Chancellor, the Lord High 
Treasurer and the Captain of the King’s Guard.5 Thanks were also 
extended to Camden and Cotton.6 What Howes failed to acknowledge, 
however, at least in his printed works, were his close financial links 
with the City’s trading companies. From 1605 onwards he received an 
annual pension of £10 from the Merchant Taylors’ Company.7 This was 
supplemented by a further 5 marks seven years later when he presented 
the Company with a copy of the Annales – a work containing a lavish 
description of the visit the King paid to the Merchant Taylors in July 
1607.8 Howes’s discussions of the Virginia and East India Companies 
were seemingly a result of similar connections. The court minutes of the 
Virginia Company for 20 May 1622 noted that:
Mr Howe the Chronicler makinge a request for 12li of Tobacco, which 
he pretends was promised him yearely in consideration of his paines 
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and willingenes to doe the Companie service in his Booke relating [to] 
the Passages concerninge Virginia, The Court was pleased to graunt his 
request for this yeare, givinge order that somuch should be delivered 
him of the Companies Tobacco which he thankfully accepted of.9
A comparable, if perhaps more informal, arrangement existed with 
the East India Company. The Company’s minutes for 3–5 June 1629 
contain the following account:
Petition of Mr. Howe, the chronicler, that he had in his labours past 
set down many things of importance concerning the affairs of the 
Company, which will remain upon record to posterity for their honour, 
so in his works not yet divulged he intends to make some further 
relation, and therefore he desired the Court to consider his zeal, and 
in regard he is now grown old and hath lost his sight that they would 
bestow upon him some gratuity. The Court although they remembered 
at present nothing in this kind in any work of his, yet were pleased in 
charity to confer upon him 5l., to be paid by Mr. Mountney in respect 
there was not so much in the poor box.10
Four years later, Howes was still involved with the Company, 
although his financial situation seems to have dramatically improved. 
The minute book for 9 January 1633 contains a request from Howes 
that he be allowed to reinvest back into the Company the £12 
10s. dividend he was to receive, and through adding some of his 
own money, make the investment up to the sum of £50.11 These 
appeals for monetary support, it should be emphasised, took place 
after Howes had completed the majority of his contribution to the 
Annales. Consequently, it is possible that he exaggerated his previ-
ous links with commercial organisations in order to extract himself 
from financial difficulties. However, the detail with which he treated 
Company affairs, and the fact that his applications were accepted, 
gives credence to the idea that he was officially or semi-officially 
employed. There were also a number of precedents for such arrange-
ments. From 1579 onwards Stow himself had received patronage 
from the Merchant Taylors’ Company, in the form of a £4 annuity; 
from 1592 this income was supplemented by a pension, initially 
worth £4 and later rising to £6.12 Indeed, it was Stow’s pension 
that Howes appears to have inherited.13 Also noteworthy were the 
dedicatees of Stow’s various volumes. His initial patron had been 
the Earl of Leicester, one of Elizabeth’s key advisors. However, in 
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the later part of his career he increasingly identified his works with 
the City of London. A Summarie of the Chronicles from 1590 was 
dedicated to Sir John Hart, a merchant tailor and Lord Mayor of 
London, while A Survay of London from 1603 and the 1604 edition 
of A Summarie were both dedicated to later Lord Mayors. Howes’s 
own interactions with London’s trading companies, therefore, can 
be seen as symptomatic of an increasingly close relationship between 
England’s merchants and its historical writers.
As well as moving in a different social milieu to Bacon and Camden, 
Howes also wrote a different type of history to them. The Annales 
was explicitly conceived of as an English ‘chronology’, a genre of 
writing that Howes defined by distinguishing its stylistic conventions 
from those employed in humanist histories. Chronology avoided 
the ‘phantastique speaches’ and the ‘superfluous curiosity, lofty stile, 
and needlesse Eloquence, such as our fore-fathers never knew or 
heard of’; instead it was written in ‘good plaine English, without 
affectation’.14 References to Graeco-Roman ideas of character and 
causation were entirely absent and it was chronological order, rather 
than any causal or thematic links, that determined the arrangement 
of material. As a consequence, Howes’s discussion, like that of other 
chroniclers, had a fragmented feel, with his detailed – at times day-
by-day – account of James’s activities frequently being interrupted 
by the staple fare of chronicle literature: transcribed documents and 
tales of violent crime, unusual animals and bizarre weather. Through 
offering such information, the Annales sought both to capture the 
specific details of past events and to provide a series of moral exempla. 
‘The Originall and true purpose of Chronology’, it was argued, ‘was 
to shew Successors, the Actions good and bad of their Ancestors, and 
to remaine as documents to pursue the good, and eschew the bad.’15 
Like other practitioners of exemplary history, however, Howes did 
not present a random assortment of moralistic fables. Rather, he 
maintained that underpinning the movement between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ actions was a divinely ordained plan. Over time, God’s ‘mercy 
and benefits have haply encreased more and more’, thereby ensuring 
that human beings had been able to achieve a series of ever greater 
feats, and that history itself formed a narrative of progress.16 While 
the matter was never fully theorised, the Annales implied that divine 
support came in concentrated bursts, which served to create rapid and 
highly advantageous transformations in particular locales. During 
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the previous fifty years, England had experienced one such burst and 
had seen a ‘universall encrease of Commerce, and traffique through-
out the kingdome, great building of royall ships, by private mer-
chants, the repeopling of Cities, Townes, and Villages, besides the 
undiscernible, and sudden encrease of fayre and costly buildings’.17 
Developments had been particularly rapid in London. And, showing 
none of the scruples about the corruptive capacities of luxury found 
in Camden’s writing, Howes celebrated the city as
one of the best governed, most richest, and flourishing Citties in 
Europe, plenteously abounding in Free Trade and Commerce with 
all nations, richly stored with gold, silver, pearle, spice, peper & many 
other strange commodities, from both Indies; Oples from Candy, 
Cyprus, and other places under the Turkes dominion; strong wines, 
sweete fruits, Suger, and spice from Grecia, Venice, Spayn, Barbary, 
the Islands, and other places lately discovered and knowne.18
God’s ‘ineffable goodnesse’, Howes emphasised, was the ultimate 
cause of modern forms of prosperity.19 However, while the key 
function of chronology was to pay tribute to the almighty’s achieve-
ments, this necessarily involved reflection on the secondary (worldly) 
causes that God had employed to generate change. In developing an 
account of these secondary factors, Howes looked at developments 
that had occurred both inside and outside England. With regard 
to the former, the nation’s recent advancements were traced back 
to a single source: immigration. ‘Civill dissension’ in Flanders, and 
the ‘great factions, and brawles’ in France had led many Protestant 
families to flee their homelands.20 Such individuals, Howes argued, 
had increased the population, and through marrying into the local 
population, raised the birth-rate. These changes had, in turn, created 
a property boom as the large numbers of previously empty houses 
were filled, rents were raised, and the building of new properties 
was encouraged. Importantly, therefore, the smart new districts of 
London which the Annales celebrated were a direct consequence of 
England’s adept handling of a refugee crisis.
An increasingly cosmopolitan society also led to important inno-
vations in manufacturing. To demonstrate this the Annales provided 
short accounts – usually a paragraph or two long – of changes in 
a diverse range of production processes including those relating to 
printed material, silk stockings, knitted worsted stockings, coaches, 
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cambric, starching, ruffs, taffeta, dyes, silk production, Spanish 
felts, alum, Venetian glass, the cutting of iron bars, copper-plate 
and paper-making.21 For each item, the nature of the advancement 
was explained and, where the information was available, the names 
and nationalities of those involved were listed. The vast majority of 
these innovators were shown to be foreigners. Coaches, it was noted, 
were introduced into England by a Dutchman, Guilliam Boonen, in 
1564.22 Another Dutchman made the country’s first dyes.23 The pro-
duction of alum was achieved with the help of manufacturers from 
Germany, while starching was pioneered by a Mistris Dinghen van 
den plasse of Flanders.24 Foreigners also helped to create beneficial 
patterns of emulation. The apprentice William Rider, for example, 
‘chanced to see a paire of knit Wosted stockings, in the lodging of 
an Italian Merchant, that came from Mantua’.25 He borrowed the 
stockings, and was able to reproduce a similar product; ‘these’, Howes 
concluded, ‘were the first worsted stockings made in England’.26 The 
success of Mistress Dinghen’s starching business, meanwhile, was 
partially attributed to ‘the best and most curious [English] wives of 
that time, observing the neatnesse, and delicacy of the Dutch for 
whitenesse, and fine wearing of linnen’ and desiring something simi-
lar for themselves.27 English innovation had also played a role, albeit 
a limited one, in shaping continental practices. ‘The Art of Knitting, 
or weaving silke stockings, Wastecoates, and divers other things, by 
Engines, or steele Loomes’ was ‘devised and perfected’ by William 
Lee, ‘Master of Arts, of Saint Johns Colledge, in Cambridge’.28 Lee 
took this innovation to France, ‘where hee obtained a pattent of the 
King’, and his servants then ‘taught the secret of their Art’ in ‘Spayne, 
Venice, and in Ireland’.29 Importantly, Howes does not present such 
practices as in any way unpatriotic. Rather his account is premised 
on the ideas that advancements in knowledge, specifically practical 
manufacturing knowledge, were a key source of England’s transfor-
mation into a successful, affluent state, and that it was the role of an 
English chronicler to celebrate English achievement – understood in 
the broadest possible sense.
While Howes appeared sure that his narratives of innovation were 
a useful and original addition to his chronicle, he was rather less 
confident when dealing with overseas affairs. This, he acknowledged, 
was a crowded field in the literary marketplace, and it was impossible 
for a general work of English history to match the detailed accounts 
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collected and published by Richard Hakluyt. Equally, however, he 
was aware that trading companies had played a vital role in advancing 
‘traffique’ and saw them as a key feature of modern English history. 
Such beliefs necessitated a degree of historiographical innovation, as 
events taking place thousands of miles from England, and beyond 
the immediate control of its statesmen, needed to be integrated 
into an Anglocentric narrative. Indeed, there is a sense in which 
the re-evaluation of ideas regarding England’s political and national 
identity necessitated by colonial expansion reverberated into histor-
ical writing as a question of historiographical form.30 Put simply: 
where should one place discussion of the colonies? Howes’s ‘solution’ 
was a relatively straightforward one. At various points in his account 
he abandoned basic chronology, and provided narratives of the devel-
opment of individual trading companies, primarily the East India 
Company,31 the Virginia Company,32 the Muscovy Company33 and 
the New Foundland Company.34 The source material for these sec-
tions was the period’s travel writing, and like the mariners and traders 
who produced these works, Howes combined business and colonial 
history with tales of nautical adventure and geographical and anthro-
pological analysis.
Howes’s discussion of such material served both to legitimate and 
support the specific actions of England’s trading companies, and to 
provide a more general justification for colonial, commercial endeav-
ours. The former aspect of Howes’s agenda can be seen particularly 
clearly in relation to discussions of Bermuda. His account of the 
island, initially a territory of the Virginia Company, was drawn prin-
cipally from material contained in the published work of the Lyme 
Regis merchant Silvester Jourdain. Jourdain had been a passenger 
on the Virginia-bound Sea Adventure when it sank off the coast of 
the island in 1609, the event that led to the territory’s colonisation. 
Howes opened his discussion by paraphrasing Jourdain’s dramatic 
account of the ill-fated voyage, before offering a brief narrative con-
cerning the development of the colony. The text then concluded 
with some remarks on its government and a vivid description of the 
island’s resources, again drawn from details provided by Jourdain:
And when the said new company was truely informed of the whole-
somenesse of the Aire and pleasantnesse of the soyle, and the aptnesse 
thereof, of it selfe in all respects to maintaine a Collony, the ground 
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being so fertile that it will yield two harvests in one yeere: great plentie 
of woods, and lofty Ceaders: well stored with fowle, and, great plenty 
of good fish: and that besides the fertilitie of the soyle, which they 
had tryed, would beare with great encrease, all kind of English graine, 
fruits, trees, hearbes and vines, besides the great store of Abergreece 
[i.e. ambergris], and some pearle, which is found there they sent yeerely 
supplies thither of men, and some women, with all things necessary for 
so worthy a plantation, so as at this time there are six hundred persons 
well fortified, with plenty of great ordinance.35
This already lengthy description was further expanded in 1632, when 
an extra paragraph was added dismissing the claim that Bermuda was 
a series of floating islands, and attributing such suggestions to excuses 
made by navigators who had failed to locate the settlement.36 What 
the Annales demonstrated, therefore, was that the Company’s terri-
tories were extravagantly fertile, well-armed and firmly fixed to the 
ocean’s floor. As such, they were in no more danger of being invaded 
by foreign powers than they were of drifting away in the wind, and 
represented a potentially appealing prospect for any would-be inves-
tor or colonist.
Howes provided further support for the trading companies 
through his discussions of the diligence and industry that charac-
terised their endeavours. His approach here echoed that of Richard 
Hakluyt. Hakluyt conceived of the Principall Navigations (1589) 
as a way to ‘recommend to the world’ the previously unheralded 
‘industrious labors, and painefull travels of our countrey men’.37 In 
continuing this project, Howes offered numerous new examples of 
English endurance. At Nycobar, the discovery of ‘great kingdomes’ 
by the English ships was attributed to ‘their painefull and industrious 
travaile’.38 The ultimate success of the Virginia colony was described 
through an account of its attitude to work; thus Sir Thomas Dale, 
the Marshal of Virginia, Howes notes, wrote to the Company’s 
governors declaring that ‘the English were now become laborious 
and industrious’.39 Similar qualities characterised the activities of 
the key figures involved in colonisation. Sir George Somers, the 
admiral of Virginia, and Robert Harcourt, the planter of a colony 
in the south of Guyana, were described in identical terms as ‘very 
industrious and forward’.40 Iohn Gwy, the ‘Generall’ of the colony in 
the south-eastern parts of Virginia, was ‘a man very industrious and 
of good experience’.41 The Lord De La Warr, the Lord Governor 
 CHRONOLOGY AND COMMERCE 71
and Captain General of all the English Colonies of Virginia, used so 
much of ‘his best diligence and industrie’ that he became ill and was 
forced to return to England.42 England’s colonial activity, therefore, 
was not based on the violence and duplicitousness that Elizabethan 
accounts had frequently associated with Spanish endeavours. Rather, 
the expansion of territories and markets constituted a respectable 
form of labour, which enabled individuals to do their duty both to 
the commonwealth and God.
These arguments were developed further through a general vindi-
cation of European and English commercial and colonial endeavour. 
The ‘Westerne Christian Princes’, Howes argued, had received the 
particular ‘blessings of Almighty God’ in the form of ‘free possession, 
of [God’s] divine Gospell’ and ‘the most use, and best practice of 
all excellent Artes, and Sciences, as well for warre as peace, espe-
cially in building of Shippes, and profoundnesse in the Admirable 
Art of Navigation’.43 This had enabled them to defeat the ‘tyran-
nous oppressions’ of the ‘Turke’, and become ‘great masters of the 
Ocean’.44 As was demonstrated through a short but celebratory series 
of accounts of the feats of Columbus, Magellan and Cortes, the first 
nations to master navigation were the Spanish and Portuguese. In 
contrast, England’s geographical position ensured that it had lagged 
behind other countries. Thus while it was a ‘truely auncient, and right 
worthily renowned’ nation, the fact that it was ‘divided by the Ocean 
from the maine land’ isolated it from intellectual developments in 
Europe. In recent years, however, ‘the providence of her Princes, 
together with the diligence and industry of the people’ had enabled 
England to overcome this handicap. As a result, it was ‘now possest 
with as full measure of knowledge in all things, as any kingdome in the 
World, especially in navigation and discovery of remote Nations’.45 
This, in turn, raised the already high estimation in which the English 
were held, advancing their ‘Wealth and Traffique’.46 For Howes, 
therefore, the expansion of commercial markets, like developments 
in manufacturing, was the product of recent advancements in knowl-
edge. Moreover, as had been the case with manufacturing, providing 
a narrative of English commercial development involved tracing the 
various ways in which the nation had emulated other countries and, in 
doing so, matched and, on occasions, surpassed their achievements. 
The ultimate effect of such arguments, however, was to emphasise 
that the origin of the knowledge on which  commerce depended lay 
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with God, and that, as a consequence, England’s commercial ascend-
ency had its roots in God’s providential order.
What role had the monarchy played in England’s divinely ordained 
commercial success? Howes’s assumption that new forms of technical 
knowledge were the key worldly drivers of development led him to 
present mariners, merchants and manufacturers, rather than states-
men, as the principal instigators of England’s recent transformation. 
Equally though, innovation was shown to be dependent on support 
and encouragement from government. To demonstrate this argument, 
Howes reflected on James’s involvement in both domestic manufac-
turing and overseas trade. With regard to the former, the King’s key 
function had been to provide backing for emerging industries. In 
relation to silk, for example, James, ‘well knowing’ the benefits the 
manufacture of the fabric had brought to Spain and Italy, and ‘being 
desirous by all laudable meanes to imploy his poorest Subjects’, made 
several experiments in cultivating silk worms.47 When these proved 
effective, ‘according to the Kings expresse order’, mulberry trees, the 
principal food for silk worms, were obtained from France.48 After 
this, it was the ‘industrious gentlemen that kept worms’, foremost 
among them William Staledge, the ‘Comptroller of the Custome 
house’, whose endeavours enabled silk manufacture to expand.49 The 
King, however, offered continued and useful encouragement through 
granting a patent to ‘bring in’ mulberry seed, and an order allowing 
trees to be planted across the country.
Royal support had also brought about the development of England’s 
alum industry. Production of the chemical, a key element in dyeing 
processes, had been pioneered by John Bourcher, with assistance 
from Yorkshire landowners and skilled workmen from Germany.50 
To aid their work, the King granted Bourcher and his associates a 
thirty-one-year patent for the ‘sole making’ of alum, prohibited alum 
from bring imported, provided storehouses and gave ‘very gracious 
respect and Princely remuneration’ to those who had taken pains in 
the manufacture of the product.51 James later went on to take ‘the 
whole traffique [of alum] to himselfe’.52
In relation to international trade, Howes stressed that James’s 
pacifistic foreign policy and the peace it brought had opened up the 
enticing prospect of ‘free trade with all nations’.53 At the same time, 
the King had made a series of specific interventions on behalf of 
the  corporations, most notably the East India Company. Although the 
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territories discovered by the Company were rich, the ‘long and charge-
able’ nature of their voyages, their great wages and other expenses 
‘discouraged them to persist, except their Charter were greater’.54 
Such issues were, however, swiftly and wisely resolved by James 
who, for the ‘enriching, and better strengthening of this Kingdome’, 
granted them ‘an enlargement of their first Letters Pattents, and gave 
them a Charter to continue for ever’ and banned all other tradesmen 
from engaging in the importation of pepper.55 In describing the 
companies and schemes for which James provided support, Howes 
avoided the highly loaded term ‘monopoly’. Nevertheless, his key 
point was that through restricting competition, the King had enabled 
fledgling manufacturing and commercial endeavours to survive and 
prosper. This, in turn, had enriched the nation as a whole.
To further emphasise the importance of the relationship between 
monarch and merchants, Howes provided lengthy accounts of James’s 
visits to two companies: the Merchant Taylors’ Company and the 
East India Company. With regard to the former, Howes observed 
that on 16 July 1607:
his Majestie, and Prince Henry being accompanied and attended with 
very many of the Nobilitie, and other Honourable Personages, came 
in private manner to Merchant taylors Hall to Dynner (the Queene 
being also expected) where they were very Royally and joyfully feasted 
and entertained, with great and pleasant variety of Musique, of voyces 
and Instruments, and ingenious speeches, being the feast day of the 
Merchant taylors for the election of the Master and Wardens.56
An elaborate description of the proceedings followed, focusing on 
the lavish gifts the Company presented to the King, principally a 
purse of gold and a ‘role’ containing the names of the various royal 
and noble individuals who had previously been ‘freemen’ of the 
Company. Howes then went on to discuss the entertainments the 
Company put on – lute music and song from a series of individuals 
concealed in a large model ship – and the ceremony through which 
Prince Henry was made a freeman of the Company. He concluded 
his account by observing that
the bountie of this feast and plenty of all things as well for pleasant 
Princely entertainments of the King, the Prince, the Nobilitie, and the 
rest, where were very many brave Courtiers and other Gallants, […] 
was most rare and excellent.57
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A similar description is provided of a visit the King made to the 
East India Company in 1609:
[On] the thirtieth of December, the King, and Prince, with divers of 
the chiefe Nobilitie, went to Debtford to see the great Shippe [Trade’s 
Encrease] Launched, and when they had seene every roome in the 
Shippe, they were royally Banqueted in the chiefe Cabin: and their fol-
lowers were Banqueted at a long Table in the halfe decke, plenteously 
furnished with delicates served in fine China Dishes, all which were 
freely permitted to be carried away by all persons. The King shewed 
many favours unto the Merchants of the company and gave unto 
Sir Thomas Smith, Governor of that Society, a very fayre Chayne of 
Golde, with a Jewell wherein was the Kings picture, and commended 
his sundry good endeavours, for the Company and common wealth: 
the Chiefe Elders of the Company kissed the Kings Hand.58
Such accounts fulfilled two principal functions. First, they allowed the 
Companies to display their wealth and good taste; they are presented 
here not as associations of avaricious merchants of the sort described 
by Camden, but rather as refined courtiers, capable of putting on 
elegant forms of entertainment. Second, they celebrated the close 
relationship between the Companies and the King, and, as such, 
served to enhance the credibility of both. The former, it was empha-
sised, had received royal sanction for their endeavours, the latter 
had supported and contributed to the honourable activities of the 
nation’s leading tradesmen. The key implication of Howes’s accounts, 
therefore, was that the interests of ‘Company’ and ‘Commonwealth’ 
were firmly aligned.
2. Richard Baker’s Chronicle
Howes’s ideas were to be repackaged and popularised by the work 
of the chronicler Richard Baker.59 In the early part of his life Baker 
had enjoyed a good deal of success. A descendant of Henry VIII’s 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Baker, he held land in 
Essex, Gloucestershire, Kent and Oxfordshire, served as an MP, 
and later went on to become a JP for Middlesex and High Sheriff 
of Oxfordshire. However, his decision to act as guarantor for his 
father-in-law’s debts proved a disastrous one. He lost his properties, 
and, from 1635 onwards, was incarcerated in the Fleet Prison. It was 
while he was a prisoner that Baker began his literary career, initially 
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focusing on devotional and moralistic themes. In the final part of his 
life, his attention turned towards history. He completed Discourses 
upon Cornelius Tacitus, a translation of a study by Virgilio Malvezzi, 
in 1642, and the following year published his Chronicle, an account 
‘of the Kings of England from the time of the Romans Government, 
to the Raigne of King Charles’.
Baker’s principal innovation, as he openly acknowledged in ‘An 
Epistle to the Reader’ that prefaced his account, was its organisation. 
His own position, he noted, resembled that of the Roman historian 
Suetonius. Before Suetonius came to write his Lives of the Caesars, 
‘many excellent men had [already] written the Story of the Roman 
Emperours, both accurately and eloquently’.60 However, Suetonius 
was able to gain ‘Commendation’ not by adding to the ‘matter’ or 
‘substance’ of history, but rather through altering its ‘forme and dis-
position’ and by ‘distinguishing […] into Classes and Chapters’ that 
which had formerly been ‘delivered in one continued Narration’.61 A 
similar sort of innovation, Baker contended, would improve chron-
icle writing, enabling it to extend beyond ‘matters of State’ to cover 
the matters of ‘meaner Accidents’ which it had failed to address 
and which were ‘proper’ for the genre.62 Consequently, although his 
chronicle contained ‘whole passages, as they are already set downe by 
others’, it distinguished itself from these works by combining a brief 
chronological narrative of each of England’s monarchs with thematic 
essays concerning their reigns. These latter sections dealt with a wide 
range of matters, among them ‘Lawes and Ordinances’, ‘Works of 
Piety’ and ‘Casualties’. The work was a popular success. By the end of 
the seventeenth century Baker’s Chronicle had run to nine editions in 
England, and had been translated into Dutch.
Both the narrative and essay sections of Baker’s account of James 
I discussed financial and commercial affairs at length. The narrative 
material is dominated by a series of paraphrased accounts of Howes’s 
work; indeed, Baker’s comments on the manufacture of alum,63 the 
role played by the King in the extension of the East India Company’s 
charter,64 and his attendances at the launch of the Trade’s Encrease65 
and the Merchant Taylors’ dinner66 are all summaries of the Annales. 
More interesting, however, were the two ‘essays’ on economic themes. 
The first of these concerned taxation, an area dealt with only briefly 
by Howes. Baker’s discussion took the form of a list of the various 
levies that James had imposed, among them parliamentary subsidies, 
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fines, customs and benevolences. His central argument was that the 
King was not guilty of ‘covetousnesse to gather wealth’.67 Instead, his 
taxes and impositions were a product of the need to maintain many 
ambassadors, show ‘bounty’ to his followers and fund several courts. 
None of these expenses, Baker emphasised, ‘hee could avoyd’, and, 
consequently, any ‘grudging’ against his measures was without ‘just 
cause’.68
Further support for James was offered in Baker’s other economic 
essay: ‘Of the English Plantation in the Indies, that were in King 
James his time’. The content of his analysis closely resembled that of 
Howes’s discussions and, like his predecessor, Baker provided brief 
narratives of the development of colonies in Virginia and Bermuda, 
supplementing this material with a description of New England. 
Baker’s main source was John Smith’s The Generall Historie of Virginia, 
New-England, and the Summer Isles (1624).69 This work had not been 
published when Howes completed the section of the Annales dealing 
with North America, but, in compiling it, Smith made extensive use 
of two works that Howes had drawn upon: his own earlier account, A 
Map of Virginia (1612), and Silvester Jourdain’s A Plaine Description of 
the Barmudas (1613).70 Baker’s key move with regard to this material 
was to emphasise the role played by James in the development of the 
North American settlements. Introducing his account, Baker noted 
that James’s feats with regard to the acquisition of colonies came ‘very 
neare’ to those of Augustus Caesar.71 However, rather than acquiring 
an empire ‘by the violent ways of Armes, King James did it by the 
civill way of Plantations’; indeed, these plantations constituted ‘the 
proper effect of his Peaceable government’.72 Baker returned to this 
theme in the essay’s conclusion. The extensive treatment of the Indies 
by other authors, he noted, made it unnecessary to provide a detailed 
analysis of such matters. It was ‘sufficient to have shewed, that King 
James had the honour, to have settled [the plantations] in His time, 
and under the Influence of His peaceable Government’.73
It is difficult to imagine that Howes could have taken issue with 
any of Baker’s comments. Much of his analysis, after all, either drew 
out conclusions that were implicit in the Annales or simply summa-
rised Howes’s account. Nevertheless, Baker’s selection of material 
is significant. In relation to manufacturing he included only those 
sections of Howes’s account that had ascribed a significant role to 
the King. With regard to the plantations, meanwhile, he ignored 
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Howes’s discussion of a Europe-wide advancement in knowledge, 
and presented English success less as a consequence of the industry 
of the colonists, and more as a product of the wise government 
of the monarch. To an extent, such an approach served to reverse 
Howes’s partial separation of political and economic analysis; in this 
respect Baker’s account resembled the narratives of royal achievement 
authored by Bacon and Camden. What distinguished Baker’s account 
from other works, however, was not just its unconventional structure, 
but its more polemical tone. Baker used each of the essays to provide 
a defence of a particular aspect of James’s government. Thus, just as 
the taxation essay pointedly rejects claims of monarchical extrava-
gance, so the plantations essay provides a defence of the King’s highly 
controversial pacifism. In taking such an approach, Baker’s work 
seeks not just to describe the King’s actions, in the manner of Howes, 
but to vindicate him in the face of his critics. This more disputative 
approach, as we shall see, was a harbinger of future developments in 
the historiography of economic statecraft.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude Part I of this book with a few general 
observations. The ‘modern’ historical writing of the Jacobean and 
Caroline periods was characterised by its unprecedentedly detailed 
engagement with commercial and financial themes. In discussing 
such matters, historians employed a variety of ‘new’ types of source 
material, including legal records, state papers and narratives compiled 
by colonialists and merchants. The decision to turn to such documents 
was a consequence of the widely accepted assumption that economic 
affairs constituted an aspect of statecraft. As such, they were a worthy 
subject for the historian to address, and one that could be treated 
alongside discussions of military, political and ecclesiastical issues.
However, while there was a broad consensus regarding the 
importance of finance and commerce, there were also considera-
ble divergences in the ways that writers dealt with such matters. 
Success in economic management could, in the manner of Bacon’s 
History, be presented in a ‘realist’, Tacitean manner, and be seen 
as emerging from a monarch’s amoral – and sometimes immoral – 
desires and interests. Equally, Camden showed that it was possible 
to conceive of good commercial statecraft as an exemplary Livian 
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virtue, a product of the statesman’s willingness to subordinate pri-
vate interests to the welfare of the commonwealth. There were also 
distinct differences between the way in which historians viewed 
the relationship between power and plenty. None of the writers 
discussed here went as far as Machiavelli and conceived of these 
two categories as fundamentally incompatible. Nevertheless, both 
Camden and Bacon saw plenty as a potential threat to the nation’s 
welfare and suggested a series of measures to ensure that commercial 
interests were reconciled to the national interest. Howes and Baker, 
in contrast, like Botero, assumed that plenty and power were con-
comitants; for both, what was advantageous to a state’s merchants 
was necessarily advantageous to the state itself. Howes’s interests are 
also, in a sense, broader than those of the other writers considered. 
Bacon, Camden and Baker were writing histories of particular mon-
archs; as a consequence, commercial and financial issues were dealt 
with only when they had an impact on Westminster and Whitehall. 
While Howes fully acknowledged the importance of the monarchi-
cal management of commerce, he was also interested in tracing the 
role that individuals outside of government had played in shaping 
commercial developments. As a consequence, his account was able 
to acknowledge the achievements of someone like Mistress Dinghen 
in a way that would not have been possible in the ‘high’ political 
history of his contemporaries.
It is also important to emphasise that modern history was by no 
means the only genre of writing which sought to analyse devel-
opments in commerce and finance. The early 1620s were years of 
economic depression, as exports in cloth declined, producing high 
unemployment and social unrest.74 Attempts to understand the ori-
gins of these problems led to a wide-ranging debate, conducted first 
in a series of government committees, and later in print. From these 
discussions two broad groups emerged. The first, headed by Gerard 
Malynes, saw this as a monetary crisis; through the corrupt dealings 
of usurers, bankers and foreign exchange-dealers, it was argued, 
England’s currency had become undervalued.75 This had led to a 
shortage of money, as foreign investors bought up currency, forcing 
England’s merchants to offer ever greater quantities of goods at ever 
lower prices to preserve their profits. To solve the crisis, Malynes and 
his supporters argued, it was necessary to raise the value of currency 
through direct government regulation. The second group, contain-
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ing Thomas Mun and (in his later work) Edward Misselden, saw 
England’s problems as the product of a trade crisis.76 Consequently, 
while Mun and Misselden agreed with Malynes that there was a 
shortage of money, they attributed this to problems with the balance 
of trade. As Misselden observed: ‘If the Native Commodities exported 
doe waigh downe and exceed in value the forraine Commodities 
imported; it is a rule that never faile’s, that then the Kingdome 
growe’s rich, and prosper’s in estate and stocke: because the over 
plus thereof must needs come in, in treasure.’77 Underlying such 
comments was the notion that it was the forces of supply and demand 
that determined the value of goods and currencies, not government 
regulation. Consequently, as Lars Magnusson has argued, Mun’s and 
Misselden’s analyses are premised on ‘the existence of an independ-
ent economic sphere outside polity and state’.78
To an extent, these debates are completely detached from the his-
torical narratives with which this discussion has been concerned. The 
historians do not engage with or quote from the political economists 
and vice versa; indeed, although it was written in the 1620s, Mun’s 
key work, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, was not published 
until 1664. There are, however, some important points of congruence 
between the approaches of works of political economy and works of 
history. The two discourses dealt with the same cluster of commercial 
and financial issues, foremost among them the role of monopolies, 
free trade, reforms to coinage, the dangers of luxury, the relationship 
between war and commerce, and the benefits of technological inno-
vation. Even more significantly, historians and political economists 
were united in their conception of the role that could be played by 
the monarch with regard to trade. Thus, while Magnusson is correct 
to note that Mun opposed direct interference from government in 
relation to exchange rates, he did not hold a similar view about com-
merce. Indeed, for Mun, it was through government involvement 
that a positive balance of trade could be produced. As was noted in 
England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade:
So that a King who desires to lay up much mony must endeavour by all 
good means to maintain and encrease his forraign trade, because it is 
the sole way not only to lead him to his own ends, but also to enrich his 
Subjects to his farther benefit: for a Prince is esteemed no less powerful 
by having many rich and well affected Subjects, than by possessing 
much treasure in his Coffers.79
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Malynes broadly endorsed this view, arguing that:
Traffique […] may properly be called, The Preheminent studie of Princes; 
the rather, because the Sacred wisdome hath approved this Axiom: That 
a King is miserable (how rich soeuer he be) if he Raignes over a poore 
people.80
While history was concerned with a broader range of issues than 
political economy, both discourses accepted that the success of a state 
was dependent on the soundness of its finances, and both maintained 
that it was the task of the monarch to manage a nation’s commercial 
interests. Moreover, both sought to establish the principles through 
which kings and queens might succeed in this task. At the same time, 
in tracing these principles, political economists and historians, on 
occasion, saw the need to look to the successes of other nations for 
inspiration. Just as Howes saw the imitation of the Dutch, Italians and 
Germans as the key reason for modern developments in manufacturing, 
Mun argued that similar practices were required with regard to trade. 
As he noted, the strength and wealth of England would be matchless ‘if 
we should (but in part) apply our selves to such policies and endeavours 
as are very commonly used in some other Countreys of Europe’.81 The 
key example of good practice here was the Dutch. Indeed, for Mun, as 
for many subsequent writers on economic affairs, the Dutch were both 
a commercial rival and, perhaps more importantly, world leaders in 
economic statecraft. As a consequence, while Dutch successes posed a 
threat to English interests, they also provided England with opportu-
nities to acquire useful forms of economic knowledge.
These close connections between history and political economy 
imply that the ingredients were in place by the second quarter of the 
seventeenth century for new, sophisticated and detailed treatments of 
the history of economic statecraft in England. A Baconian historian 
might, for instance, have provided a complete history of economic 
legislation. Howes’s work could have led to the development of 
further case studies regarding innovation in manufacture. More anal-
ysis might have been provided of immigration’s impact and the role 
played by emulation. Ultimately, however, such forms of writing did 
not come to fruition in English historiography. Rather, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, it was the political events of the 1640s 
which were to determine history’s future direction.
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The English Civil War and the 
politics of economic statecraft
The relationship between historical writing and the political and 
religious conflicts of the 1640s was a complex one.1 Historians of 
the period generally emphasised that their loyalty was to the ‘truth’ 
rather than to any particular faction or party. Hamon L’Estrange, for 
example, used the frontispiece to his The Reign of King Charles (1655) 
to claim that this was a work ‘Faithfully and Impartially delivered’.2 
Similarly, in the preface to his Observations (1656), a detailed critique 
of L’Estrange’s History, Peter Heylyn claimed to be writing ‘with 
a minde free from love, or hatred, or any of those other affections, 
which pre-ingagements in a party doe possesse men with’.3 Thomas 
Fuller, meanwhile, defended his Church-History of Britain (1655) 
by observing that the work ‘was so far from prostituting her Self to 
Mercenary Embraces, She did not at all Espouse any Particular Interest, 
but kept her self a Virgin’.4 In making such comments, authors were 
emphasising their adherence to a series of well-established ideas 
about the importance of impartiality in historical writing. Indeed, 
before stating his own commitment to ‘Truth’, the parliamentarian 
historian Thomas May noted that ‘the use of History, and the just 
Rules for composure of it [had] been so well and fully described 
heretofore’ that it was ‘lost labour and a needlesse extention of the 
present work’ to discuss them further.5
Authors were also aware, however, that writing in a time of 
conflict presented certain challenges. Civil wars served not only 
to divide people, but also historical source material and, as May 
observed, his own position in Parliament meant that his knowledge 
of Parliamentarian ‘Councels’ was better than that of Royalist ones. 
Moreover, May acknowledged that the nature of the subject he was 
84 COMMERCE, FINANCE AND STATECRAFT
to discuss made it difficult to avoid partiality and impossible ‘to escape 
the suspition or censure of it’.6 A similar point was made by Fuller, 
who gave the first chapter of his Appeal of Iniured Innocence (1659) 
the title: ‘That it is impossible for the Pen of any Historians writing in 
(as our’s) a divided Age, to please all Parties’.7 The politically charged 
atmosphere in which history was written and read was also affected 
by the role that historical argument played in the period’s ideological 
conflicts. As J. G. A. Pocock has argued:
what occurred was that belief in the antiquity of the common law 
encouraged belief in the existence of an ancient constitution, reference 
to which was constantly made, precedents, maxims and principles 
from which were constantly alleged […]; and discussion in these 
terms formed one of the century’s chief modes of political argument. 
Parliamentary debates and pamphlet controversies involving the law 
or the constitution were almost invariably carried on either wholly or 
partially in terms of an appeal to the past made in this way.8
This ensured that history and politics became intertwined to the point 
where, in the words of David Norbrook, it was ‘very hard to separate 
political debate […] from debates about the true meaning of English 
history’.9 To write history, therefore, was to enter into a public dis-
cussion concerning the relative rights of king, Parliament and people, 
and the position of the Church of England within English society.
From the 1640s onwards, historical accounts of James I came to 
be shaped by these considerations. The key issue to be decided was 
the relationship between the King’s approach to government and 
established English constitutional practices. For historians critical 
of the Stuarts, James had rejected the constitution and instigated the 
chain of events that led to the Civil War. Those more sympathetic to 
the Scottish King argued that his conduct was broadly in line with 
that of his predecessors; the unrest that had occurred in the period 
was a product of the malign Puritan and republican factions who 
were later to dismantle the constitution and execute their monarch. 
Writers were, of course, acutely aware that a complex blend of polit-
ical, legal and confessional concerns had been at stake in the various 
confrontations between Charles and his critics. Nevertheless, they 
saw that debate had frequently coalesced around issues concerning 
revenue, most significantly disagreements regarding the King’s right 
to ‘Tonnage and Poundage’, his attempts to raise money through 
CIVIL WAR & THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 85
the forced loan of 1626 and ‘Ship Money’, and his various efforts 
to secure parliamentary subsidies. The origin of these conflicts, it 
was agreed, was to be found in the reign of James, whose struggles 
to raise money in the face of a recalcitrant Parliament prefigured 
those of his son. As a consequence, James’s management of revenue 
became a highly politicised and divisive issue, which received detailed 
commentary from the period’s historians. Indeed, Michael Sparke’s 
The Narrative History of King James, for the first fourteen Years was 
published with ‘An abstract or Brief Declaration of the Present State 
of his Majesties Revenew’, a seventy-two-page list of ‘all monies 
[James] brought into his […] coffers’.10 Commerce occupied a 
more complex position in the period. Discussions of James lack the 
detailed engagement with the commercial aspects of economic state-
craft that, as we have seen, had been a feature of Jacobean writing. 
Equally, however, references to trade and tradesmen are frequent, 
and England’s moral decay – a theme as important to Royalist writers 
anxious to ‘explain’ the Regicide, as it was to Parliamentarian authors 
seeking to condemn Stuart practices – was frequently presented as a 
process of commercialisation.
The main body of this chapter explores how these ideas were treated 
by the Civil War era historians Anthony Weldon, Arthur Wilson 
and William Sanderson.11 Each of the writers, it will be argued, 
despite their political differences, developed a moralistic analysis of 
James’s financial management rooted in Livian ideas of exemplary 
virtue and honour. The final section of the discussion shows how 
these ideas were developed by the historian and political economist 
Roger Coke in the 1690s.
1. Parliamentarian history: Anthony Weldon’s Court and 
Character of King James
Anthony Weldon’s writing was shaped by his personal relationship 
with the King.12 In the first part of his career Weldon had served 
in James’s Court, acting as both clerk of the green cloth and clerk 
of the kitchen. At some point during the later years of the King’s 
reign, however, he lost these positions; some accounts have claimed 
that this was a result of a scurrilous description of Scotland that he 
wrote in 1617, while others have seen Weldon as a victim of reforms 
to the royal household introduced by Lionel Cranfield in the 1620s. 
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What is clear, however, is that by the time of the Civil War, Weldon 
was an avowed opponent of the King. He served as the head of the 
parliamentary committee for Kent, and acquired a reputation – albeit 
possibly an undeserved one – for his autocratic and tyrannical man-
agement of the county.
Weldon died in 1648, and his The Court and Character of King James 
was published posthumously in 1650. The image of James that it 
presented was not a flattering one. Attention was drawn to the King’s 
cowardice, his over-large tongue and his poor personal hygiene, and 
he emerges from the text as both a ludicrous figure and a repulsive 
one.13 Running alongside these highly personal attacks, however, was 
a more general narrative regarding the effects of Stuart government. 
For Weldon, James’s reign had seen the emergence of a new and 
pernicious obsession with money. The origins of this development 
lay in the King’s poor financial management and, more specifically, 
his violation of the core precepts of conventional Aristotelian ideas 
about liberality. Aristotle had argued that the liberal man was one 
who ‘will both give and spend the right amounts and on the right 
objects, alike in small things and in great, and that with pleasure; he 
will also take the right amounts and from the right sources’.14 While 
James could not be called mean, he had, in Weldon’s view, spent 
both excessively and unwisely, wasting huge amounts of money on 
enriching unworthy individuals, primarily the ‘beggarly’ Scots and a 
series of undeserving favourites.15 Equally, the King had erred in his 
approach to the taking of money, drawing excessively on the purses 
of his subjects, and spending resources that were not his own. As 
Weldon observed, James would ‘rather part with 100li. hee never had 
in his keeping, then [sic] one twenty shillings peece within his owne 
custody’.16
The ultimate consequence of the King’s failings was that financial 
concerns came to be prioritised over all other matters. As Weldon 
noted, ‘ever since Queene Elizabeths death, the raysing money hath 
been the only way to raise men, as being held the essential property 
of a wise man, to know how to bring in money (per fas aut nefas)’.17 
This idea was further emphasised by Weldon’s attempt to associate 
the actions of James’s primary political advisors and ministers with 
low and corrupt forms of mercantile activity. Thus Weldon described 
the struggle between Salisbury and Suffolk for the King’s favour 
as a confrontation to decide ‘who should ingrosse him, and make 
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him their Monopoly’.18 Particularly vehement, meanwhile, were the 
attacks launched on the courtiers Lionel Cranfield and Sir Arthur 
Ingram. The former was the holder of a series of Court posts and, 
from 1621 to 1624, Lord Treasurer. The latter served as ‘cofferer’ of 
the king’s household in 1615. Weldon described them as
two meane fellowes grand Projectors, the one, Ingram, an ordinary 
Waiter of the Customes, the other, Cranfield, an Apprentice, who had 
served three broken Citizens, and it is probable by his wit and honesty 
he might thrive by the all, and lay that for his first a foundation of his 
future projecting.19
Such backgrounds, it was argued, rendered them fundamentally 
unsuitable for high office. As was observed in relation to Cranfield: 
‘[he was an individual] whose minde was ever so base, as never to dis-
cerne what Honour was, nor ever had hee any other inherent Honour 
then what in his Apprenticeship he raked out of the Kennel’.20 
Similar themes are also present in Weldon’s discussion of the selling 
of honours. Salisbury, Weldon argued, had bought himself a position 
of power in the early days of James’s reign. He then went on not only 
to teach the King ‘how to enhance his [James’s] Prerogative so above 
the Lawes, that he might inslave the Nation’, but also successfully 
instigated a scheme for selling new ‘Baronets’.21 Defending this idea 
to the King, Salisbury observed:
he [James] should finde his English Subjects like Asses, on whom he 
might lay any burthen, and should need neither Bit, nor Bridle, but 
their Asses eares; And when the King said, It would discontent the 
generality of the Gentry: He replyed, Tush Sir, you want the money, 
that will doe you good, the Honour will doe them very little; And 
by these courses he raised himselfe, friends, and family, to Offices, 
Honours, and great Possessions.22
The key implication of such comments was that ‘honours’, in becom-
ing a commercial object freely available for purchase on the open 
market, had lost their fundamental honourableness. More gener-
ally, the corruption that England underwent during James’s reign is 
imagined by Weldon as a process through which both statesmen and 
honour itself became commoditised and, as a consequence, morally 
compromised.
In making such comments Weldon employed a highly conven-
tional anti-commercial rhetoric, which had received its most famous 
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formulations in Aristotle’s Politics and the work of Machiavelli. His 
position, however, is complicated by his claim that it was James’s poor 
financial management that had brought about the decay of honour. 
Indeed, the effect of the King’s dishonourable conduct is measured, 
in part, in financial terms. Thus, when discussing James’s pacifism, 
Weldon noted that he ‘had rather spend 100,000li. on Embassies, 
or to keep or procure peace with dishonour, then 10,000li. on an 
Army that would have forced peace with honour’.23 As a result, his 
decisions were ‘no less chargeable then dishonourable and unprofit-
able to him and his whole Kingdome’.24 The key consequence of the 
King’s approach to finance, meanwhile, was to have ‘enriched many 
in particular, as Salisbury, Suffolke, Northampton, Worcester, Lake &c. 
yet [to have beggared] himself and the Nation in generall’.25 For 
Weldon, therefore, if the King had behaved in a more honourable 
manner, prioritising national interests over individual ones, both he 
and England would have benefited in financial terms.
2. Parliamentarian history: Arthur Wilson’s The History of Great 
Britain
A more detailed and scholarly account of James’s reign was to emerge 
in Arthur Wilson’s The History of Great Britain (1653).26 Before 
turning to history in the latter part of his life, Wilson had enjoyed a 
rich and varied career.27 Born in around 1595, he spent two years of 
his youth in France as the guest of wine merchant relatives. On his 
return to England, he eventually trained as an exchequer clerk, before 
entering the service of Robert Devereux, third Earl of Essex. He 
accompanied Essex to the Palatinate in 1620 and later saw military 
action as part of the campaign to restore Frederick V, the territory’s 
deposed ruler, to his former throne. After leaving Essex’s service 
in 1631, Wilson studied medicine at Trinity College, Oxford, and 
authored a series of plays, three of which found their way on to the 
London stage. Later he gained employment with Henry Rich, the 
Earl of Warwick, and both served under him in the wars in the Low 
Countries and acted as the steward of his estates when Warwick was 
fighting for Parliament. Wilson continued to write during this period, 
penning both his history and an autobiography, a work which, in line 
with Presbyterian beliefs, sought to trace the role played by ‘Divine 
Goodnes’ in shaping ‘the many occurences of […] life’.28
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The History of Great Britain opened with a ‘Proeme’ in which 
Wilson confidently proclaimed his own impartiality. This work 
would, he noted, occupy a middle passage between the ‘Scylla’ of 
Weldon’s angry attack on James and the ‘Charybdis’ of William 
Sanderson’s hagiographic Aulicus Coquinariæ (1651). However, 
while Wilson largely avoided the Court and Character’s scurrility, 
his approach had a good deal more in common with Weldon’s than 
Sanderson’s. Indeed, the bulk of his introductory remarks were 
concerned with defending the right of the historian to criticise a 
monarch. This point, like many others in Weldon’s ornately written 
account, was made through an extended metaphor. ‘Histories’, he 
argued, ‘are like Anatomies, especially when they reflect on Persons.’29 
Crude attempts to ‘hack, hew or bespatter’ were to be avoided; rather 
a ‘gentle hand’ was required, which could work with ‘Authority and 
Knowledge’.30 However, while neither history nor anatomy should 
‘cauterise, and slash with Malice’, they both needed to be truth-
ful in order to be useful.31 When tracing the ways and passages of 
the body in dissection, therefore, it was necessary to note ‘where 
Obstructions have been, where Diseases have bred, and by this Pattern 
learn to remove the accrecion of bad Humours’.32 Similarly, in history, 
‘Examples of basenesse, and unworthinesse, if truly and genuinely 
related, may deterr and hinder the violent Career of such as mind no 
other happinesse than what this vapour of vain-glory can contribute; 
and esteem a good Name more among men, than acceptance with 
God.’33 Such an approach to history had been widely endorsed in 
the past; Tacitus, for example, Wilson argued, was never blamed for 
‘personating Tiberius Dissimulation, Nero’s Cruelty, Seianus Pride, 
[nor] Livia’s and Messalina’s Adulteries’.34 ‘These times’, however, 
were ‘full of perplexed and disastrous Divisions’, which ensured that 
any impartial work, his own included, was likely to face a series of 
impassioned criticisms.35
The key aim of the History of Great Britain was to explain the origins 
of such divisions. Its general argument was that in Jacobean England 
the ‘sensitive faculties’ had gained ‘predominance over the Reasond’, 
thereby producing an age of excess and vanity.36 James was in large 
part responsible for this state of affairs. His excessive generosity to 
favourites had fomented luxury and debauchery, and these, in turn, 
had undermined the dignity, popularity and financial security of the 
monarchy. Such developments were frequently presented as either 
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literal or metaphorical processes of commercialisation. A particularly 
useful example of the latter approach comes in his general analysis 
of the role of the monarch. Wilson began by thinking about the 
movement of heavenly objects, noting that ‘We see all the Motions of 
Superiour Bodies, in what excellent Order and Perfection they move.’37 
He went on to contrast two types of bodies. On the one hand, there 
are comets which, emitting ‘grosse and putrid Matter’, follow an 
unpredictable course, are auguries of ‘Prodigious Calamities’, and, 
after blazing a little, extinguish themselves.38 On the other hand, there 
are celestial bodies that ‘beget no wonder […] but keep a constant 
Course in their own Spheres, and are not contaminated with things 
below them, yet they retain a Powerfull Influence over them’.39 This 
latter type of body provides a good model, Wilson notes, for Princes 
who should ‘shine in Glory’.40 However, he continued, when Princes
grovell here for trash and trumpery, and trade away that gallant stock 
of Love housed in their Peoples Hearts, for some false Coin, minted 
by Passion, mutable Affection, or mis-led Reason, they doe degrade 
themselves. And then the onely difference betwixt a King, and a mean 
Man, is, That the one, by his Trade, cosens a few; the other a great 
many, but himself most.41
A monarch’s failure to perform his duties, therefore, is viewed – in 
metaphorical terms at least – as transforming him from a celestial 
object into a corrupt tradesman. Similar associations are at play in 
the History’s main narrative. The disastrous state of James’s revenue, 
it is noted, meant that he came to see Parliament not as a source 
of counsel, but rather of money. Consequently, he sought to make 
‘Merchandize of the Common-wealth’ by conceiving of them as ‘his 
Banke, his Merchants’.42 This attempt to treat politicians as tradesmen 
was based on a fundamental misunderstanding: ‘Merchants looke for 
their money againe with advantage, and therefore their Counsell in 
disposing it may be well spared’.43 Parliament, however, ‘if they raise 
money from the People (which is never to be repayed) there is good 
reason they should know not onely to what purpose it is levied, but 
how prudently and fitly laid out’.44 The logic of commerce, therefore, 
was not the logic of the constitution. Equally, those engaged in 
commercial and financial activities were not, at least in a well-run 
polity, statesmen. Indeed, Cranfield’s tenure as Lord Chancellor was 
evidence of the Court’s failings. This individual,
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who had been a Citizen of London, bred up in the Custome-house, and 
knowing the secret contrivances of those Officers, was thought fittest 
to manage the King’s Revenue: For in expensive and wanting Courts, 
those great Officers are most acceptable, that by their finesses and pro-
jects, can bring in that, which with riot and prodigality goes out.45
For Wilson, therefore, poor financial management had helped to 
create an age of projects and projectors.
Such comments have a good deal in common with the analysis 
developed in Weldon’s Court and Character. What separates Wilson 
from Weldon, however, is his account of the consequences of James’s 
government. As we have seen, Weldon argued that James’s gratuitous 
expenditure had served to impoverish the people of England, while 
his pacifism had sacrificed the interests of the nation in order to 
enrich a small group of corrupt courtiers. For Wilson, by contrast, 
peace had brought universal plenty, albeit a form of plenty that had 
undermined England’s moral and political fabric. These ideas were 
developed through yet another analogy, this time between political 
and natural bodies. If a body is inactive and overfed, he argued, it 
will contract ‘gross humors, which will have vent’.46 To maintain 
a healthy body, therefore, ‘Exercise’ is required to ‘keep the spirits 
active, […] digest the grosser and sulginous matter’ and strengthen 
‘the Nervs of a Kingdom or Republique’.47 Such exercise could only be 
achieved through ‘Warre’, which, he argued, ‘is necessary as Physicke 
for unsound Bodies’.48 These assumptions led Wilson to present the 
King’s pacifist foreign policy as a contagious, enervating force. It had, 
he observed, ensured that the Germans had ‘swelled into a Dropsie of 
Voluptuousness, by Plenty, and the sweets of Peace’, while France ‘want-
ing Exercise’ had become ‘surfetted with diseases at home, which by 
fits broke out into Tumors among themselves’.49 In England ‘bravery 
and feasting, the Parents of Debaucherie and Riot, flourished’.50 Such 
behaviour not only served to corrupt the populace, but also made the 
writing of history difficult. ‘There is’, Wilson contended,
no Theam for History when men spill more drink than blood; when plots 
and contrivances for Lust, acted in dark corners, are more practiced 
than Strategems in War; and when the Stages with silken Pageants 
and Poppets, that slacken the sinews, are more frequented than those 
Theaters of Honor, where Industry brawns and hardens the Armes.51
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Perhaps more worryingly, peace also had the potential to breed 
civil discontent. ‘Some’, Wilson noted, compared James to Tiberius 
‘for Dissimulation’; however,
Peace was maintained by him as in the Time of Augustus; And Peace 
begot Plenty, and Plenty begot Ease and Wantonness, and Ease and 
Wantonnesse begot Poetry, and Poetry swelled to that bulk in his time, 
that it begot strange Monstrous Satyrs, against the King own person, 
that hauntrd [sic] both Court and Country.52
Wilson was unwilling to provide details of these ‘satyrs’, but switching 
to a horticultural metaphor, noted that the ‘tongues’ of those times
made every little miscarriage (being not able to discover their true oper-
ations, like smal seeds hid in earthy Darknesse) grow up, and spread into 
such exuberant branches, that evil Report did often pearch upon them. 
So dangerous it is for Princes by a Remisse Comportment, to give growth 
to the least Error; for it often proves as fruitful as Malice can make it.53
These events, it was emphasised, had been avoidable. If the King’s 
‘spirit’ had ‘raised’ him up to war when ‘the voice of God (the voice 
of the people) called him to it, happily it might have hindred the 
great Effusion of Bloud amongst our Selves, that happened after in 
his Sonnes time’.54 What the King had failed to understand was that 
‘Peace is a great Blessing, if it bring not a Curse with it; but War is more 
Happy in its effects than it, especially if it takes away the distemper 
that grows by long surfets, without destroying the Body.’55
To an extent, such comments simply constitute a rejection of eco-
nomic statecraft. Wilson showed little interest in discussing James’s 
day-to-day management of commerce, and presented England’s 
colonial successes as achievements of its oppressed people rather than 
its absolutist monarch. Moreover, there is no sense in the History of 
Great Britain that commerce might contribute to a nation’s military 
greatness. Rather, wealth is conceived of as a sensuous, feminine 
form of sickness, and war as its harder, more masculine cure. Despite 
this, Wilson continued to see the management of finances as crit-
ically important. Indeed, the King’s inadequacies were, in a sense, 
economic in character. He had, with disastrous consequences, failed 
to administer the nation’s revenues adequately, and the key event of 
his reign had been the growth of a new, pernicious form of plenty.
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3. Royalist history: the writings of William Sanderson
Direct responses to Weldon’s and Wilson’s accounts are to be found 
in the work of the Royalist historian William Sanderson.56 Born in 
1586, Sanderson was the son of a merchant, also called William. 
The elder Sanderson enjoyed a highly successful career in trade, 
acquiring property in England and Ireland, providing funding for 
the voyages of Martin Frobisher and Walter Raleigh, and becoming 
a well-known figure in the Elizabethan Court. His son also claimed 
exalted connections, noting that he had lived a ‘long time in Court’ 
and adding, with a nautical flourish, that while he did not ‘have any 
hand to the Helm, [he] cabin’d neer the Steerage’.57 His precise activities 
during the conflicts of the 1640s are not known, but the inscription 
on his memorial in Westminster Abbey observed that he was famed 
for ‘his family, learning, untainted fidelity to his prince’ and noted 
the ‘great hardships [he] sustained under the late tyranny of rebels’.58 
His reputation, such as it is, rests primarily on his work as a historian. 
In 1651 he published Aulicus Coquinariæ, a point-by-point denunci-
ation of Weldon’s Court and Character. He later expanded this pam-
phlet-length piece into a larger, descriptively titled narrative work: A 
Compleat History of the lives and reigns of, Mary Queen of Scotland, and 
of Her Son and Successor, James the Sixth, King of Scotland, and (After 
Queen Elizabeth) King of Great Britain, France and Ireland (1656).59 
This account repeated many of his previous comments on Weldon, 
often copying directly from his earlier discussion, and developed a 
detailed critique of Wilson’s History.
Sanderson’s principal argument was that James’s reign had been 
characterised by ‘peace and plenty’.60 These conditions had brought 
England considerable advantages: enriching the King’s subjects, 
increasing revenues and raising the nation’s reputation internation-
ally.61 Moreover, ‘trade increased [mightily] by the wise Government 
of this King’.62 Such claims constitute a direct rejection of Weldon’s 
arguments about the poverty of Jacobean England. Equally, however, 
Sanderson sought to counter the arguments about luxury that had 
been central to Wilson’s work, arguing that
The splendor of the King, Queen, Prince and Princess with the rest 
of the royall yssue, the concourse of strangers hither from forein 
Nations, the multitude of our own people from all parts of our three 
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Kingdoms gave a wonderfull glory to the Court, at this time, the only 
Theatre of Majesty; Not any way inferiour to the most Magnificent in 
Christendom; Prince and people increasing in honor and wealth.63
Setting forth this wealth in state, Sanderson continued, with ‘all 
moderate additions of Feasts, Masks, Comedies, Balls and such 
like’ was a ‘prudentiall’ move.64 Such spectacles acted as ‘necessary 
Mirrors, wherein mens Actions are reflected to their own view’.65 
The objections of Wilson – or as Sanderson labels him, the ‘squeazie 
stomacht Historian’ – were a product of his own historical ignorance, 
and consequent lack of awareness that such practices were ‘politickly 
used in the Romane-Common-wealth and Monarchy’ and were judged 
‘tollerable’ in Christian kingdoms and states.66 Attention is also 
drawn to Wilson’s own literary background. He was ‘bred up a Poet, 
frequently, a Rymer and Composer of playes’, Sanderson observed, 
and had only turned to history when ‘his trade fell to decay’ and he 
was forced to ‘trot any way to get money’.67 A comparison, therefore, 
is implied between the wealth and glory of the Jacobean Court and 
the poverty, hypocritical spite and jealousy of its Puritan historian. 
While such comments constitute a complete rejection of the account 
of luxury developed in the History of Great Britain, elsewhere in his 
discussion Sanderson sought to use Wilson’s argument about modern 
corruption against him. In the ‘Proeme’, which prefaces his account, 
for example, Sanderson argued that in James’s time the kingdom had 
grown ‘aged in happinesse’ to the point that
The very excess seemed to abate the pleasure: Or as the hot sent of Musk to 
some Savors seems to stink. Repetitions of our Blessings then, did not so much 
affect our Nations as dull them. Peace made us wanton; Plenty intemperate; 
Mercies secure; Our Benefits then became our Weapons to rebell against his 
[James’s] fame now; The whole Land being sowred by the Peoples Sins; too 
much felicity introduced Luxury, and Correllaries of Vices, Pride, Ambition, 
Contempt of things Divine and Human. This Nation in short time sick of 
a surfeit of Health; afterwards broke with two [sic] much wealth; and now 
it comes to amendment. Ryot begins to grow thirsty, made so, to go plain; 
Gluttons to fast; Wantonness, starved into Soberness.68
The illness that Sanderson diagnoses here is not, as had been the case 
in Wilson’s account, one of the Court: rather it is one of the people. 
Indeed, the primary symptom of the nation’s sickness, for Sanderson, 
was the emergence of the sort of gratuitous criticism of the monarchy 
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found in the work of Weldon and Wilson. Such claims allowed 
James to be exonerated of any real crime; he was, in a sense, a victim 
of his own good government. Equally, however, they ensured that 
Sanderson was distinctly ambivalent with regard to the ‘peace and 
plenty’ which are presented as both James’s primary achievement and 
the causes of the Stuart dynasty’s demise.
Ambivalence also characterises Sanderson’s attitude to the 
growing mercantile presence at Court, as can be seen most clearly 
in his discussions of Ingram and Cranfield. As noted previously, 
James’s critics had made much of these individuals’ backgrounds 
in trade, and portrayed them as lowly and dishonest projectors. In 
response, Sanderson drew attention to Cranfield’s ‘antient Family in 
Gloucestershire’ – as demonstrated by ‘their bearing of Arms in the 
Heralds office’ – and sought to defend his career in trade.69 His rise 
from merchant adventurer to minister of state was evidence of ‘his 
extraordinary qualities’ and the ‘blessing of God upon his indeav-
ours’.70 Moreover, his skills as a merchant were highly useful to the 
state, giving him ‘great understanding in the affairs of the Customes’.71 
As a result, Sanderson asked rhetorically, ‘who [was] more fit […] 
than this man of experience, in Stating the Accompts, for the Revenues 
of the State, which […] he improved, and not unlikely thereby, pur-
chased Envy for his Eminency’.72 A similar defence is provided of 
Ingram. At the time of his appointment to the King’s household, 
the ‘Customers’ [the tax farmers] at the Treasury ‘had cozened the 
King, engrossing by that means, the wealth of Trading’. Because of 
his own knowledge of trade, however, Ingram could ‘and honestly 
might, discover the cunning craft of the cosening Merchant’.73 This 
was of particular importance, Sanderson noted, at a time when royal 
expenditure was rising and revenue was falling.
However, while Sanderson defended Cranfield and Ingram per-
sonally, his general assumptions regarding merchants were highly 
unflattering. These individuals are characterised by their desire to 
‘cozen’ both fellow traders and the nation, and they ‘never want 
will […] to abuse each other, and [acquire] gain to themselves’.74 
Mercantile expertise was useful to government because only a mer-
chant could understand and uncover the fundamentally deceitful 
practices of his fellow tradesmen. James’s decision to appoint such 
individuals, meanwhile, was a product of the dire state of the nation’s 
finances. As Sanderson observed:
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indeed was in this Kings life, the last of that Office [Lord Treasurer], 
and the meanest of birth, lately altered from the Trust of Nobly-born 
persons. The Treasury of antient Spring-tides was of late sunck into 
neap-ebbs of Revenue, and enforced a necessity of providence in col-
lecting, and judgement and practice in disposing: Neither of these 
could be found by experience suitable to our latern Lord like-breeding, 
ignorant and careless.75
Such comments are used to emphasise the appropriateness of the 
King’s actions for the situation in which he found himself. Equally, 
however, the fact that individuals such as Cranfield and Ingram were 
required in government was, for Sanderson, evidence of fundamental 
problems in the Jacobean Court and Jacobean society more generally.
4. The Civil War, history and economic statecraft
At the heart of Civil War era debates concerning James’s economic 
statecraft lay a paradox. Discussions were characterised by new, more 
combative forms of argumentation. Historians sought not just to 
represent the people and events of the past, but to actively discredit 
rival interpretations. The result was a shift not just in the tone of 
history, but also in its form. Writers either needed to balance chrono-
logical narrative with polemic, or reject chronology entirely in favour 
of a point-by-point denunciation of alternative accounts. Ironically, 
however, despite the increasingly vituperative nature of such con-
frontations, the historiographical differences between historians 
actually narrowed during this period, and a consensus emerged, albeit 
a broad one, regarding what constituted good economic statecraft. 
The task of historians, commentators agreed, was to act as judges 
of the statesmen whose lives they narrated, and to assess whether a 
particular monarch provided a good or a bad example to posterity. 
The criteria used to make such assessments were Livian in character. 
A good monarch, it was assumed, was necessarily a virtuous mon-
arch; a bad monarch was either personally sinful, or lacked the moral 
authority to counter the influence of his nefarious courtiers. Given 
the focus on praising or discrediting specific individuals, there was no 
room for Baconian-style analysis of the relationship between private 
virtue and vice on the one hand, and the public’s interests on the 
other. Nor was there a place for the broader engagement with issues 
relating to economic and social change found in the work of Howes.
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With regard to financial issues, the framework was straightfor-
wardly Aristotelian. It was the specific duty of the monarch to manage 
the nation’s financial resources in a manner that demonstrated his 
liberality. This involved both collecting the right amount of revenue 
from the right sort of people in the right way, and distributing that 
revenue in a similarly judicious manner. Commerce, meanwhile, and 
England’s increasing commercialisation were treated with a good 
deal of suspicion. Indeed, while the accounts of Weldon, Wilson 
and Sanderson drew on the ideas of honour and dishonour that 
had underpinned Camden’s Annales, their primary concern was not 
with celebrating honourable trade, but condemning its dishonourable 
forms. Given such views, the key questions for historians concerned 
blame. Their task, after making the conventional claims regarding 
the need for impartiality, was to identify who had caused England’s 
problems and what they had done wrong. While no consensus was 
to emerge on this issue, it was widely accepted that the nation’s 
difficulties were, in part, financial and commercial in character.
5. Whig history and political economy: Roger Coke’s A Detection 
of the Court and State of England
To conclude this chapter, I would like to look at a final account, which 
in part moves away from the approaches discussed above: Roger 
Coke’s A Detection of the Court and State of England (1694).76 After a 
successful career as a writer on commerce and trade, and a rather less 
successful career as a businessman, Coke turned to historical writing 
in the final years of his life. The move appears to have been a profitable 
one. The Detection, a narrative account of the four Stuart kings and 
the Protectorate, ran to four editions, the last of which was published 
in 1719. Coke’s conception of historical writing was, in many ways, 
a conventional one for the period. ‘To compose Histories’, he noted, 
paraphrasing the Venetian historian Giovan Battista Nani, ‘is sacred, 
and not to be undertaken but with an upright Mind, and undefiled 
Hands’.77 The sacred quality of history writing, he continued, was a 
product of the historian’s immense power:
taking to himself an absolute Dictatorship, nay an Authority more 
than Human, over Times, Persons and Actions, governs Fame, 
measures Deserts, penetrates Intentions, discloses Secrets; is with an 
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undistinguished Arbitriment over Kings and People, the Judg of Ages 
past, and Master of those to come; Absolves or Punishes, Deceives or 
Instructs.78
In exercising this quasi-judicial function, Coke sought to evaluate 
the achievements of England and its monarchs against a series of 
Whiggish criteria. His key concern, therefore, was with the degree 
to which the King and the people, particularly the former, had con-
formed to the ‘Constitutions and Laws of the English Monarchy’. These 
institutions, Coke observed, ‘have continued for near Nine hundred 
Years, viz. since King Egbert’.79 At their heart was the notion that 
kings could not ‘abrogate old Laws, or impose new, or raise Monies 
from the Subject above the Revenues of the Crown, without Consent in 
Parliament’.80 When monarchs conformed to the constitution, popu-
lar resistance to them is ‘High Treason in this World and Damnation 
in that to come’.81 However, if kings failed to abide by England’s 
laws and constitutions, then the will of the king and the will of the 
people came into conflict with one another.82 This served to ‘distract 
the Allegiance’ of the king’s subjects, and give ‘Life and Motion to the 
ambitious Humour of Male-contents’.83 The aim of the Detection, Coke 
asserted, was to show the consequences of the emergence of just such 
a divided will in ‘the Reigns of the Kings of the Scottish Race’.84
These ideas directly informed Coke’s treatment of James I. His 
key claim was that the King’s violations of the constitution and 
poor management of the nation’s economic interests were intercon-
nected products of his flawed character. James, Coke argued, was an 
incompetent, lazy and prodigal individual, who showed an unhealthy 
regard for a series of highly pernicious favourites. To an extent, 
these traits meant that he neglected his kingly duties. And while he 
did so, the Dutch ‘still grew more powerful at Sea’ and Henry IV of 
France ‘was accumulating incredible Treasure at Home, and laying 
the Foundation of vast Designs Abroad’.85 James’s crime, however, 
was not simply inaction. Rather, his incompetence in economic 
management and his extravagant, debauched lifestyle had led him 
to adopt a series of unconstitutional approaches to revenue, among 
them payments for knighthoods, the selling of honours, benevolences 
and monopolies.
Such ideas are entirely in line with the accounts of Weldon and 
Wilson. Coke, however, was to develop his analysis a good deal 
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further than his predecessors by drawing on the principles that had 
underpinned the pamphlets on trade that he published in the 1670s, 
foremost among them A Discourse of Trade (1670) and England’s 
Improvements (1675).86 His key claims in these works had been that 
three particular factors determined the wealth of a nation: conveni-
ence of place, numbers of people and free trade.87 While England had 
the best natural resources of any nation, Coke argued, it had failed to 
increase its population and had introduced a series of measures that 
restricted commerce, notably monopolies, the apprentice system and 
the Navigation Acts. In the Discourse and England’s Improvements 
Coke had offered a systematic analysis of England’s errors with 
regard to economic policy based around a series of theorems and 
propositions. The Detection essentially transformed this material into 
a chronological narrative, outlining the specific actions that England’s 
monarchs had performed with regard to commerce and finance, and 
assessing their effectiveness.
In relation to James I, Coke’s most detailed discussion of commer-
cial affairs concerned monopolies, a theme he returned to repeatedly. 
His approach to the issue is distinctive. He is not so much concerned 
with the reasons why James set up monopolistic trading compa-
nies or the events and debates surrounding their  establishment. 
Rather, as can be seen particularly clearly in his discussion of the 
monopoly on Spanish trade established in 1604, his account departs 
from conventional historical analysis entirely and provides a long 
list of arguments in favour of free trade, derived in part from the 
Discourse on Trade. Coke’s assertion was that people’s subsistence is 
naturally dependent on the assistance of others and their own labour. 
Monopolies, he contended, by excluding individuals from certain 
trades, deprive people of the assistance and labour they naturally 
require to live and, therefore, violate the law of nature. This violation, 
Coke continued, was worse than the tyranny that the Pharaohs exer-
cised over the Israelites; whereas the Egyptians imposed ‘a greater 
Hardship how to live’ by compelling the Israelites to make bricks 
yet denying them straw, monopolies deny ‘poor Men their Means of 
living’.88 In addition to this, monopolies, by restraining the ‘Labours 
and Industry of Men in any Profession, Art or Mystery’, not only 
hinder their improvement in a particular country, but provide a way 
for rival nations to enlarge their own manufactures.89 After outlin-
ing these issues at length, Coke concluded by noting that ‘we have 
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thought fit to premise this, that a better View may be had of what 
follows’.90
The discussion that follows is essentially a brief account of the 
end of the monopoly, by means of a ‘memorable Law’ passed by 
Parliament.91 To an extent, Coke’s account here is conventionally 
Whiggish in its desire to attribute any positive developments that 
took place in Jacobean England to Parliament rather than the King. 
What is noteworthy, however, is that his argument marks a substan-
tial departure from those of James’s other critics. As we have seen, 
Weldon conceived of James’s reign as a time of poverty, while Wilson 
saw it as dominated by a corrupt and debauched form of plenty. Coke 
disagreed, arguing that ‘tho the King was never poorer than at this 
time’, free trade with Spain ensured that ‘the Nation was far richer 
than in all the long Reign of Queen Elizabeth’.92 Such comments, 
coupled with Coke’s opposition – on commercial grounds – to war 
with Spain, provide an important hint as to his priorities. He was, it 
would seem, rather more interested in defending what he conceived 
of as England’s trading interests than he was in advancing conven-
tional pro-Whiggish or anti-Stuart arguments.
To an extent, Coke’s account provides a demonstration of the 
difficulties of blending political economy with narrative history. In 
showing how James had failed to understand the basic principles of 
commerce, Coke was obliged to offer lengthy summaries of those 
principles himself. As a result, the narrative tended to stop at the 
point where the economic analysis began. At the end of the Detection, 
meanwhile, Coke abandoned narrative altogether, and expressed his 
argument in a numbered list of twenty-three commercial policy rec-
ommendations. Consequently, his work functions as a useful exam-
ple of a historical account that puts commerce at its heart; indeed, 
the Detection is built on the idea that ‘the Riches of England ’ and 
its ‘Strength and Glory’ are ‘derived from our Foreign Trades’.93 In 
this sense, therefore, concerns regarding commercialisation, which 
had been a key feature of the work of Civil War era historians, 
are entirely absent from the Detection. When discussing economic 
issues, however, Coke does not reject conventional assumptions 
regarding history’s didactic function. His account of the Act that 
ended the Spanish monopoly, for example, concluded by noting that 
‘the Reasons in this Act extend to all other Beneficial Trades, as 
to Turkey, the East-Country and Hamburgh Trades, and to Africa 
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and the East-Indies’.94 Implicit in this statement was the suggestion 
that action against monopolies was required from modern statesmen. 
Coke also stressed that his motivation for writing the Detection was 
rooted in his concern for England’s economic interests. He had taken 
up his pen to convince the various orders of society – listed as nobility, 
gentry, clergy and merchants – that ‘the Employment of People, and 
the Freedom of Trade, be the two great Principles of the flourishing 
and happy State of any Country’.95
Writing in the conclusion to the Detection, Coke observed that ‘I 
have done, and I do not know but I am the first that ever begun a 
Work of this Nature.’96 This claim, while a bold one, is entirely jus-
tified; no other history of the period had attempted to blend political 
economy with history in quite this manner. It might be added that 
no other work was ever to attempt it again, and there is undoubt-
edly a sense in which Coke’s approach represents a historiographical 
dead end. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the next chapter, his ideas 
helped, in part, to set the agenda for the most successful historian of 
the first half of the eighteenth century: Paul de Rapin de Thoyras.
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5
Whig history: Paul de Rapin de 
Thoyras’s Histoire
The latter years of the seventeenth century saw a series of calls for a 
complete account of England’s history from the Roman invasion to 
the present, which would be able to rival both in quality and scale the 
work of Livy.1 Initial attempts at such an endeavour were made by, 
among others, John Milton, William Temple and Jonathan Swift, 
while more substantial accounts emerged from Robert Brady and 
James Tyrrell, both of whom reached Richard II.2 A success, of sorts, 
was achieved in 1706 with the publication of A Complete History of 
England, a two-volume compilation of material from authors such as 
Bacon, Camden and Wilson, supplemented with a new volume cov-
ering the period from Charles I onwards authored by White Kennet.3 
Laurence Echard, meanwhile, produced the first single-authored 
‘general’ account, the History of England (1707, 1718).4
A more popular and, ultimately, more influential work, however, 
was to emerge a few years later with the publication of Paul de 
Rapin de Thoyras’s Histoire d’Angleterre (1724–27), the subject of this 
chapter.5 In the thirty years following its publication, Rapin’s Histoire 
received three separate English translations,6 sold around 18,000 
copies,7 and spawned a range of derivative texts.8 It also contained, as 
Hugh Trevor-Roper has argued, ‘the classic exposition of the Whig 
– the “old Whig” – interpretation of history’.9 From this perspective, 
England’s past was the story of the ongoing survival of the nation’s 
Saxon constitution in the face of a series of threats from innovating 
monarchs and their proto-Tory supporters. Such an account, Trevor-
Roper noted, was rooted in a ‘philosophy of idealist conservatism’ 
and contained ‘no suggestion […] that change has occurred or should 
occur in history, no reference to economic life or ideas’.10 While 
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other historians writing both before and after Trevor-Roper have 
maintained that institutional political development did play a key 
part in the Histoire,11 the absence of an engagement with economic 
ideas continues to be seen as a distinguishing feature of Rapin’s work. 
Laird Okie, for example, has argued that Rapin was a ‘transitional’ 
figure between the early modern compilation chroniclers and the 
more enlightened approaches of Hume, Robertson and Gibbon.12 
His modernity lay in his innovative use of sources, his concern with 
causation, and his desire to explain the emergence of the party system 
rather than simply vindicate one or other faction. Rapin remained, 
however, a traditionalist in the sense that he wrote ‘political history 
pure and simple, unleavened by any significant discussion of the 
economy or cultural history’.13
Such claims usefully highlight the political focus of the Histoire, but 
they require, I believe, further clarification. Rapin’s account empha-
sised not just the constitution’s ancient origins, but also its capacity 
to bring prosperity and, with it, felicity to the nation’s populace. 
And in developing an analysis of the material foundations of happi-
ness, Rapin sought to show that trading and financial interests were 
promoted by constitutional government and damaged by arbitrary 
rule. This argument led him to utilise and develop earlier accounts of 
economic statecraft, provide some important commentary on trade 
and taxation, and, consequently, to engage with economic ideas. The 
result of this engagement, it will be argued, was the development of 
a Whiggish form of exemplary history, which frequently drew upon 
commercial and financial material.
1. Rapin and Leclerc
Born into a Protestant Savoyard family and trained as an advocate, 
Rapin was forced to leave France by the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes in 1685.14 After residing for a time in London, he enlisted 
with a group of French Huguenot volunteers, a move that ultimately 
led to his joining William of Orange’s invasion force of England 
in 1688. Rapin continued his military career until 1693, when he 
accepted, possibly at William’s bidding, a position as tutor to the son 
of the Earl of Portland. Over the next ten years he moved frequently 
between England and the United Provinces, before the marriage of 
Portland’s son provided him with an opportunity to settle down and 
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devote himself to full-time historical study. Initially he took up res-
idence in The Hague but, seemingly in an attempt to economise, he 
moved to the small town of Wesel in 1707. Here Rapin kept in touch 
with the wider Republic of Letters through a correspondence with 
Jean Leclerc, the editor of the erudite periodical Bibliothèque choisie.15 
It was Leclerc who presented Rapin with his key source, Thomas 
Rymer’s Foedera, a collection of England’s various alliances and trea-
ties, which Rapin both abridged for publication in Bibliothèque choisie 
and employed extensively within his own narrative.16
Rapin’s approach to historiography also had much in common 
with that of Leclerc. The Dutch Huguenot circles in which both 
writers moved had close connections to Whig politics in England.17 
Huguenots had helped to provide refuge and companionship for 
those fleeing Stuart England in the 1670s and 1680s, enthusiastic 
backing for the Revolution of 1688, and military support for the new 
state that emerged under William. At the same time, the attack on 
absolutist forms of government that underlay much exclusion-era 
Whig thought meant that it enjoyed considerable popularity and 
influence among exiled Protestants, who were anxious to find ways 
of theorising their opposition to Bourbon cultural practices.18 Leclerc 
was among the most significant of these exiles; he corresponded with 
Locke, played an instrumental role in translating and publicising the 
Englishman’s work and, in his 1699 work Parrhasiana, developed a 
distinctively Whiggish analysis of historiography.19
Leclerc’s primary aims in the historical sections of Parrhasiana 
were to establish the sort of skills historians required to produce good 
history and to measure the successes and failures of various classical 
and contemporary writers in acquiring those skills. After looking at 
the importance of a knowledge of one’s subject, impartiality and a 
clear and concise style, he went on to defend, as Wilson and Coke 
had done, the right of historians to pass judgement on the individuals 
and events they described. His discussion of historical judgement, 
however, drew not on the ideas of Wilson, but rather on those of the 
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. In his legal work, Grotius had sought 
to demonstrate the existence of a natural law that was ‘manifest and 
self-evident’ to all, regardless of the society they lived in or the reli-
gion to which they adhered.20 Thus, for Grotius, all individuals had 
the right to defend their own lives, and ‘to retain, those things which 
are useful for life’.21 At the same time, they could neither inflict 
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injury upon their fellows, nor seize their possessions.22 Despite the 
absence, therefore, of a shared civil code of regulations, a universal 
natural law made it possible to judge the justice or injustice of the 
often mutually antipathetic claims made by different states. Leclerc’s 
innovation was to apply this basic approach to historical writing. The 
historian, he showed, whose craft was also concerned with providing 
judgements in the face of a series of competing, hostile claims, could 
identify a series of universally accepted criteria through which to 
assess the merits of individual historical actions.23 Praise or cen-
sure for individuals should be given to those who conform to ‘the 
Principles of Humanity’ – ‘that we ought not to do that to another, 
which we should call Injustice if they did to us’ – while governments 
should be assessed on their capacity to ensure the happiness of those 
committed to their charge.24 This happiness was conceived of in 
typically Whiggish terms as a product of the state’s ability to protect 
the liberty and property of its populace. It consisted of three things:
1) In being only obliged to obey the Laws, which are approved by a 
long Use, or enacted according to the usual manner;
2) In enjoying quietly one’s Estate, and the Fruit of one’s Labour, as 
long as one obeys the Laws, without being under the apprehension of 
being deprived of it by any violent Means.
3) In contributing to the publick Charges, as much as the Subjects can 
bear, without being over-burthened.25
The final point is developed elsewhere in Parrhasiana, where Leclerc 
argued that if ‘exorbitant’ levies are extracted from a nation’s subjects, 
‘there is not Money enough among Trading-men’ and ‘Industry 
ceases’.26 Affordable taxes, therefore, are a vital factor in determining 
whether a state is ‘Flourishing’ or ‘must necessarily fall to Decay’.27
Leclerc went on to compare the successes of ancient and modern 
historians in employing such ideas in their work. Ultimately, he 
concluded, despite the weaknesses of other aspects of their histor-
ical writing, it was the Greeks and Romans who had understood 
politics best. Whereas the ‘Heathen Historians’ had adhered to the 
principles of justice, modern historians sought to flatter their princes 
by embracing a brand of Machiavellianism which maintained ‘that 
a State cannot be Happy and Quiet, unless People blindly submit 
to the Will of a Prince’.28 It was this ‘Spirit of Slavery’ that had led 
historians to label the English ‘a wild and inconstant Nation, for no 
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other reason, but because they obey their Kings, when they do not 
incroach upon their Priviledges; and oppose their Designs, when 
they go about to destroy them’.29 Indeed, for Leclerc, what England’s 
neighbours labelled ‘Wildness and Inconstancy […] a Greek or Roman 
Historian would call […] Constancy and Love of Liberty’.30
Rapin accepted these basic principles and employed them in two 
distinctive ways in the Histoire. First, he approved of the idea that 
a historian should act as a judge over the individuals he described 
and, as Leclerc had done, he used the people’s happiness, and the 
extent to which they prospered in material terms, as the key crite-
ria for assessing the success or failure of particular political lead-
ers. Underlying such an approach was a belief that the people are, 
in a sense, always right; that which pleases them is praiseworthy, 
that which troubles them, blameworthy. Second, in his account of 
England’s system of government, Rapin endorsed Leclerc’s commen-
tary on the measures that produced popular happiness and offered 
some additional analysis of the constitutional and political practices 
through which such happiness could be achieved. Thus, for Rapin, 
although English kings were entrusted with a substantial income and 
‘some Privileges approaching Absolute Power’, there were two things 
over which they were denied jurisdiction: ‘The Power of changing the 
Laws that had been enacted by Consent of King and People; and the 
Power of raising Taxes by [their] own Will and Pleasure’.31 At one 
level, by making such comments, Rapin is offering a contribution 
to the ongoing debate concerning the pedigree of English liberties. 
In his A Complete History of England (1685–1700), Brady, drawing 
on the analysis forwarded by Henry Spelman, had argued that the 
Norman invasion, and the  subsequent introduction of feudalism, 
constituted a fundamental rupture in English government and 
law. This ensured that Englishmen did not have the ancient rights 
claimed by Whiggish writers and that English liberty was a modern 
innovation. Such claims were rigorously opposed by a number of 
writers, foremost among them James Tyrrell, whose General History 
(1696–1704) sought to demonstrate both that the ancient form of 
English government was a limited monarchy, not an absolutist one, 
as Brady had claimed, and that England’s constitution had remained 
fundamentally unaltered since Saxon times.32 Rapin, while willing 
to acknowledge the presence of beneficial constitutional innovation, 
clearly sided with the Whiggish Tyrrell over the Tory Brady. What 
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is perhaps most significant, however, is that the emphasis of Rapin’s 
account, like Leclerc’s, is less on de jure historical rights, and more on 
the de facto benefits that good government could provide. Thus for 
Rapin, England’s constitution was successful because it aligned the 
interests of the king with those of his people. Through securing liberty 
and property from any monarchical incursions, it allowed individuals 
to enjoy ‘the Fruits of their own Labour and Industry’, and this, in 
turn, generated the wealth among the populace required to uphold 
the monarch’s income.33 ‘It can’t be denied’, Rapin concluded, ‘but 
such a Government is extremely well calculated to render both Prince 
and People Happy.’34
The key task for government was to maintain this happiness. 
English liberties, as Rapin conceived of them, were dependent on 
‘an Intimate Union between the Prince and People, like that between 
the Head and Body’.35 Communication and cooperation between 
these parties was vital; if conflict or mistrust arose, their union was 
threatened. Indeed, for Rapin, parliaments, and their predecessors, 
the Saxon ‘Wittena-Gemots’, acted as ‘Representatives of the whole 
Nation’ whose function was to facilitate conversation – and with it 
understanding – between the king and his people.36 This emphasis 
on cooperation also shaped Rapin’s analysis of war. To wage war 
with other nations, monarchs required the backing and funding of 
Parliament. As a result, wars were a product of the sort of par-
liamentary and monarchical cooperation on which the constitution 
relied, and they could only be fought with any conviction if advancing 
popular and, therefore, for Rapin, legitimate aims. In contrast, those 
monarchs who avoided international conflicts were less dependent on 
Parliament for money and prone to following their own rather than 
the nation’s interests.
2. Rapin’s James I
Such arguments placed considerable emphasis on financial issues 
and, in developing them, Rapin scoured a broad range of histo-
ries for information about money and taxation, adapting material 
where necessary. With regard to James I, only a limited amount of 
adaptation was required. The profligate lifestyle and absolutism of 
England’s first Stuart king, Rapin argued, meant that he was a highly 
unsuccessful manager of the nation’s economy. Such a view was a 
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seventeenth-century commonplace and, in developing an analysis in 
this vein, Rapin drew on a range of sources including the works of 
Weldon, Wilson and Coke.37 Like his predecessors, Rapin empha-
sised James’s extravagance and repeated anecdotes from Wilson and 
Coke concerning the liberal gifts he presented to his courtiers,38 
and copied out in full Coke’s list of the fortunes amassed by such 
individuals.39 He also referenced, albeit in more negative terms 
than the original, Baker’s accounts of the lavish entertainments that 
James organised for foreign dignitaries,40 and provided a fully item-
ised balance sheet – copied from the work of the antiquary Thomas 
Frankland – to show how the King had spent £93,294 – including a 
£7,680 bill for fireworks – on the marriage between his daughter and 
Frederick V, Elector Palatine.41
This excessive expenditure, Rapin argued, served to undermine 
political cooperation. Aware of the King’s profligacy, and opposed to 
his views on monarchical prerogative, the Commons were unwilling 
to provide James with additional money. As a result, he was forced to 
find new, unconstitutional ways of raising income both at home and 
abroad. Extensive details are provided of these innovations and the 
opposition with which they met. The domestic programme, Rapin 
noted, included a series of measures, ‘not all legal ’, among them 
‘Monopolies, Benevolences, and Loans’, as well as various attempts 
to sell honours and titles.42 Particular attention is paid to James’s 
monopolies, and Rapin paraphrased accounts from Coke, Baker and 
Wilson to discuss the selling of patents on cloth,43 alum,44 inns, 
ale houses, and gold and silver thread.45 Such measures were per-
ceived by the populace as a threat to their rights, and were rigorously 
opposed by Parliament, which argued that they worked ‘to the great 
Prejudice of Trade’.46 Criticism is also made of James’s dealings with 
England’s neighbours and, employing material from Coke, Rapin 
drew attention to the King’s mismanagement of Spanish and Italian 
commerce through the creation of a monopolistic trading company,47 
his misguided attempt to sell fishing rights to the Dutch,48 and his 
decision to cancel part of the debt owed to England by the United 
Provinces in return for quick payment.49 For Rapin, therefore, the 
King prioritised his own short-term need for money over the long-
term political and economic welfare of the nation.
While he was deeply reliant upon the work of other historians, 
Rapin’s economic analysis also had a degree of originality. A central 
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theme of Wilson’s work had been the ways in which James’s pacifist 
statesmanship had corrupted his subjects. As he observed in the con-
clusion to the History of Great Britain: ‘Peace was maintained by him 
as in the Time of Augustus; And Peace begot Plenty, and Plenty begot 
Ease and Wantonness.’50 Coke, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
did not see ‘plenty’ as an enervating force in this manner, but agreed 
with Wilson that James’s reign had increased national wealth. Rapin 
pointedly rejected both interpretations; rather than being morally 
defiled by James’s policy, the people in his analysis consistently act as 
the voice of the constitution, emitting critical ‘Murmurs’ whenever 
the King’s actions impinged upon popular rights.51 Moreover, for 
Rapin, the peace that James brought had led not to commercial gain 
but rather to humiliation, as England became the subject of Europe-
wide ridicule for its failure to defend itself in the face of affronts 
from the Spanish and Dutch.52 While acknowledging that weakness 
was an ingrained feature of the King’s character, Rapin maintained 
that it had been exacerbated by his wider political interests. The 
King’s reluctance to defend Protestantism through a war with Spain 
stemmed both from his half-hearted adherence to the reformed reli-
gion and his desire to secure a marriage between his son and the 
Spanish Infanta and with it a massive dowry for the English crown.53 
Despite, therefore, the high-flown rhetoric with which he defended 
it, the origins of James’s pacifism lay in ‘Fear, Carelessness, [and an] 
excessive Love of Ease and Repose’.54 Even when James did, finally, 
agree to enter into battle, the money he secured from Parliament 
was largely taken up with servicing his debts. Indeed, for the King, 
war, or the prospect of war, functioned simply as ‘a good Pretence 
to get Money, which he wanted very much’.55 Rapin’s conclusion, 
therefore, was unequivocal; as a result of the various financial burdens 
placed on the populace and the lack of support for trade ‘’tis certain 
England never flourished less than in [James’s] Reign’.56
Rapin’s ideas concerning James and his immediate successors 
profoundly shaped his analysis of English history. Indeed, he 
generally presented the nation’s monarchs either as proto-Stuarts 
who disregarded the people and followed their own desires – with 
disastrous political, military and economic consequences – or as 
more  constitutional rulers who, like Alfred the Great and Edward 
III, aligned their own interests with those of the populace.57 This 
approach permeates the whole of the Histoire, but can be seen 
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 particularly clearly in its discussions of the reigns of Elizabeth I and 
Henry VII. The Frenchman’s commentary on these rulers is based 
on earlier accounts. However, it adapts the Stuart-friendly analyses 
of writers such as Camden and Bacon to produce a more Whiggish 
narrative that emphasises the importance of popular government and 
the virtues of liberty and low taxes.
3. Rapin’s Elizabeth I
‘Let a Man turn over the whole History of England ’, Rapin pro-
claims in relation to Elizabeth’s government, ‘and he will find no 
Reign wherein […] the Kingdom was more flourishing.’58 The 
Queen’s key achievement was to have ‘caused the English to enjoy 
a State of Felicity unknown to their Ancestors under the most part 
of the Kings her Predecessors’.59 ‘This’, Rapin continued, ‘is the 
Touchstone by which all those are to be tried whom God has set over 
Nations and Kingdoms.’60 To support such a thesis and to situate 
Elizabeth’s actions within a European context, Rapin utilised a 
number of other works of history, most notably George Buchanan’s 
and James Melville’s accounts of Scotland, Mézeray’s Histoire de 
France, and Grotius’s Annales et Historiæ de rebus Belgicus.61 His 
discussion of domestic policy and the circumstances that had caused 
England to flourish, however, was entirely based on material taken 
from Camden. So, as Camden had done, Rapin presented Elizabeth 
as a defender of the merchant interest, and utilised material from 
the Annales concerning the Queen’s moves to protect English trade 
with the Hans Towns,62 her attempt to persuade the Danish king 
to reduce the customs imposed on English merchants,63 and her 
commercially beneficial decision to allow Huguenot refugees to 
settle in England.64 He also followed Camden in emphasising the 
importance of Elizabeth’s frugality.65 By keeping expenditure to 
a minimum and assiduously rooting out financial abuses such as 
monopolies, the Queen won the goodwill and trust of the nation.66 
As a consequence, when extraordinary occasions demanded it – such 
as the threat posed to European stability and English sovereignty by 
the Spanish – the people and Parliament were able and willing to 
provide her with extensive revenue. Both writers agreed, therefore, 
that Elizabeth’s successful management of the nation’s finances 
helped to produce contentment at home, and allowed England 
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to achieve a series of military and diplomatic successes against its 
European rivals.
To adapt the Annales’ account of Elizabeth’s management for a 
Whig audience, however, Rapin employed two principal strategies. 
First, when information in Camden’s work threatened to undermine 
Elizabeth’s Whiggish credentials, Rapin simply ignored it. Thus, 
while Rapin had sharply criticised James’s use of a trading monopoly 
with regard to the Spanish and Italian trades, he chose not to refer 
to Camden’s account of Elizabeth’s role in the establishment of the 
equally monopolistic companies of Turkey, Barbary and East India 
merchants.67 Similarly, when Rapin came to discuss the successes of 
the Muscovy Company, he based his account entirely on Camden’s 
work, but carefully edited out the Englishman’s references to the 
exclusive privileges that the Company had been awarded. For Rapin, 
it would seem, monopolies were a characteristic of absolutist gov-
ernments and, therefore, not a feature of the reign of a successful 
monarch such as Elizabeth. Second, Rapin developed an original 
account of Elizabeth’s motivations. Camden’s discussion, as we have 
seen, focused on Elizabeth’s wisdom and skill, which she directed 
towards her ‘cares’: defending the Protestant Church, preserving her 
people’s safety and winning ‘Love amongst her Subjects, amongst her 
Enemies Fear, and Glory amongst all Men’.68 Although he accepted 
that such ‘cares’ were significant, Rapin argued that they were them-
selves a product of the Queen’s self-interest. The secret to under-
standing her reign lay in the precariousness of her position when she 
ascended the throne; she had France, Scotland, the Pope and all the 
Catholic powers for enemies, and could put little faith in the Irish or 
the greater part of her English subjects.69 On occasion, particularly 
with regard to her treatment of Mary, Queen of Scots, Elizabeth’s 
concern for her own safety had led her to act in a cruel and duplic-
itous manner. Moreover, throughout her reign she had prioritised 
self-preservation – the desire to keep her ever ‘tottering’ crown ‘firm 
upon her Head’70 – over ‘Generosity’, ‘Justice’ and ‘Equity’.71 With 
regard to domestic policy, however, Elizabeth’s fragile power base 
had been central to her success. The Queen’s weakness meant that 
she needed to secure the goodwill of her subjects, and to this end 
she was obliged to follow a populist programme of measures, of 
which low taxes and Protestantism formed a key part. As a result, 
her actions were entirely shaped and regulated by the will of the 
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people, and the successes of her reign demonstrated both the value 
of restricting a monarch’s powers and the wisdom of the populace’s 
political judgement.
4. Rapin’s Henry VII
Further adaptation was also required in relation to Henry VII. 
Rapin’s account is based on material taken from two works: Rymer’s 
Foedera and Bacon’s History of the Reign of King Henry VII. The 
former provided Rapin with details concerning the various trea-
ties that Henry negotiated with the monarchs of France, Brittany, 
Spain, Flanders and the Holy Roman Empire, many of which were 
translated and transcribed for inclusion in the Histoire.72 Such 
extracts allowed Rapin to develop a much more detailed account of 
England’s diplomatic relations with other powers than that contained 
in any previous general history, and to show the central role which 
commercial negotiations had played within international relations. 
However, this material was interpreted through the lens of one of 
Bacon’s central arguments, namely that Henry’s avarice had shaped 
all aspects of his relationships with foreign powers. Thus, before 
transcribing from Rymer the 1489 treaty between Henry and Anne 
of Brittany, Rapin noted that Henry’s actions were determined by a 
desire to counter the French and ‘to make Money of the Succours he 
sent the Dutchess, the Expences whereof he was willing to advance, 
in order to be re-paid with Usury’.73 Similarly, the peace treaty 
negotiated with France in 1492 is interpreted as a straightforward 
product of Henry’s desire to augment his income.74 Underlying such 
analysis is the idea that for Henry, as for James I, war, or the threat 
of war, was simply a justification for levying taxes on England’s 
ever-bellicose population. The profits from such impositions could 
then be siphoned into the royal coffers if conflict could be minimised 
or avoided altogether.
In advancing this argument, Rapin stays very close indeed to 
Bacon. For example, in his account of the war with France during 
1491, Bacon noted that Henry sought to make profit from war in 
‘two ways’: ‘upon his subjects for the war, and upon his enemies for 
the peace’.75 Rapin simply translated Bacon’s statement and expanded 
it: ‘In this [Henry] had a double View of Profit, upon his Subjects by 
means of a Subsidy for the War, and upon his Enemies for a Peace, 
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which would secure him the Payment of what was due to him.’76 
Rapin was also dependent on Bacon when dealing with domestic 
affairs. Particular attention is paid in the Histoire to the way in which 
Henry raised money, and detailed accounts are provided of the var-
ious taxes, fines and benevolences he levied. Again, all of this mate-
rial is derived directly from Bacon’s History. Rapin paraphrases its 
account of the revival of ‘benevolences’ as a means of raising money,77 
repeats the lengthy account of the impositions and fines levied by 
Henry’s notorious tax-collectors, Empson and Dudley,78 and utilises 
a number of anecdotes from Bacon concerning Henry’s punctilious-
ness with regard to financial affairs.79 More generally, Rapin assumes, 
as Bacon had done, a direct causal relationship between monarchical 
financial policy and popular political action. For both writers, it was 
the high levels of taxation under Henry that had created ‘murmurs’ 
of discontent among the people, and, ultimately, fomented a series of 
angry, if unsuccessful, rebellions.
While Rapin’s debt to Bacon was large, he was, as he had been 
with Camden, highly selective in his appropriations. Bacon, as noted 
in Chapter 1, tempered criticism of Henry’s approach to monarchical 
revenue with accounts of, and praise for, his skills as a legislator 
and manager of the nation’s commercial interests. Rapin, however, 
ignored such concessions, passing over the list of good statutes that 
punctuate Bacon’s narrative and, in spite of his extensive borrow-
ings from it, maintaining a generally critical view of Bacon’s work. 
Inaccuracies in Bacon’s account of a truce with France, for example, 
are attributed to the fact that Bacon was ‘prepossessed no doubt in 
[the King’s] Favour’,80 and later, when discussing Bacon’s fall from 
power, Rapin accused him of making ‘his Court to [James I], by 
setting up [Henry VII] as a Pattern of Wisdom and Virtue’.81
Perhaps even more significantly, Rapin, as he had done in relation 
to James, developed his own analysis of the nation’s economic health. 
In Bacon’s view, Henry’s desire to heap up riches had itself helped 
to promote commerce; as ‘a King that loved wealth and treasure he 
could not endure to have trade sick’.82 For Rapin, however, violations 
of popular liberties of the sort carried out by Henry were inevitably 
damaging both to individual wealth and national commerce. As he 
observed, Henry had ‘doubly ruined his Subjects; first by draining 
their Purses, and secondly by hindering the Coin, of which he had 
great Quantities in his Treasury, from circulating in Trade’.83 Rapin’s 
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verdict on Henry was, ultimately, a damning one. It could not be 
denied that the King had ‘great Abilities’, perhaps most notably as an 
‘Oeconomist’.84 However, ‘these Abilities had no Object but himself’.85 
Moreover, while Rapin insisted that it was not always conquerors 
who were the greatest kings, the peace that Henry eventually insti-
gated proved to be more ‘more fatal’ to the people than war.86 It was 
the ‘insatiable Avarice of the King [that] hurried him continually 
to devise Means to accumulate Riches, the which must be done 
at [the People’s] Expence’.87 Such practices rendered Henry highly 
unpopular, and this, coupled with the King’s doubts concerning the 
legitimacy of his claim to the throne, ‘filled his Soul with Fears and 
Suspicions’.88 Henry’s reign, therefore, could not ‘be said to be happy, 
either for himself or for England ’.89
Conclusion
Rapin’s approach in the Histoire, therefore, was to draw on economic 
discussions from earlier accounts, but to adapt this material in order 
to demonstrate that a moderate form of Whig constitutionalism had 
a greater capacity to promote wealth and happiness than any abso-
lutist alternative. Underlying this analysis were a number of basic 
principles: that monopolistic trading companies are detrimental to 
commerce; that taxation is a zero-sum imposition in which the finan-
cial gains secured for the monarch exactly match the losses received 
by the people; and, more generally, that the character and conduct 
of a nation’s monarch determine the level of prosperity enjoyed by 
its people. To an extent such ideas are in line with those of Camden 
and other writers of exemplary history. What distinguished Rapin’s 
work from that of his predecessors, however, were both the Whiggish 
criteria he employed to measure monarchical achievement, and his 
comparative approach to historiography. As noted in the dedication 
to George I, which prefaces the Histoire, the task Rapin set himself 
was to ‘instruct foreigners of the origin and progress of the English 
Monarchy’. Through doing so, he believed he had
furnished [his] readers with an easy means of comparing the reign of 
your Majesty [George I] with the preceding reigns, and the opportu-
nity to observe how attentive Your Majesty is to follow in the footsteps 
of the Kings of England, who were most distinguished by their virtues, 
and by their sincere love for their People, and with what care he 
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distances himself from the false paths, where some have unfortunately 
misled themselves.90
Rapin’s account, therefore, employed a form of exemplary history, 
which encouraged its readers to think about the relationships between 
past and present monarchs. While he was aware that the institutional 
structure of the monarchy had changed over time, by proceeding in 
such a manner Rapin assumed that the essential ‘true’ and ‘false’ paths 
available to kings and queens remained a constant. As a result, for 
Rapin, as for Leclerc and Coke, there were fixed criteria available to 
historians through which they could judge and contrast the effective-
ness of individual rulers.
Somewhat surprisingly, the first writer to question this comparative 
analysis was Rapin’s English translator, Nicholas Tindal. Although 
Tindal accepted and endorsed much of the general historiographical 
framework of the Histoire, through the use of footnotes and marginal 
notes his translation modified Rapin’s analysis in two ways. First, 
Tindal went back to Rapin’s sources and provided a detailed series of 
elaborations and clarifications. As part of this process he rewrote the 
majority of the marginal notes through which Rapin had acknowl-
edged his debts to other scholars, adding numerous ‘new’ attributions. 
For example, whereas the original French edition included thirteen 
references to Bacon in its account of Henry VII, the fourth edition 
of Tindal’s translation had 182, as well as numerous footnotes that 
presented material from Bacon and other sources to correct ‘mistakes’ 
in Rapin’s analysis.91 At times, the employment of such information 
worked to undermine the Whiggish assumptions on which Rapin 
had based his account. To return to Henry VII, the English notes 
contain legal records and data from Bacon concerning the King’s 
economic reforms, and Tindal comments at one point, with reference 
to Hall’s Chronicles, that Henry ‘lent merchants a great deal of money, 
without gain or profit, in order to encourage trade’.92 Such ideas 
are in direct opposition to Rapin’s primary economic argument and 
challenge his assumption that an avaricious and absolutist monarch 
such as Henry would necessarily be a poor manager of the economy. 
Similar issues are at play in relation to monopolies. Rapin, as noted 
above, had avoided any mention of Elizabeth’s role in the establish-
ment of monopolistic trading companies. Tindal, however, utilised 
material from Camden to provide full details of the part she played 
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in setting up monopolies for the Turkey, Barbary and East India 
Companies, and emphasised that the Muscovy Company, whose 
interests the Queen vociferously defended, had an exclusive right to 
trade in Russia.93
Second, Tindal supplemented Rapin’s coverage of economic 
matters with a range of antiquarian material.94 From the second edi-
tion onwards, when dealing with post-Conquest monarchs, Tindal 
placed a footnote after the king or queen’s ‘character’ containing 
illustrations of the coins used during his or her reign, and substantial 
information on the denominations employed and their design and 
metallic composition.95 In the period from William Rufus to Edward 
II, these ‘coin-notes’, as Tindal referred to them, were expanded 
still further by detailed analyses of medieval systems of revenue and 
revenue collection. Tindal’s primary source here is Thomas Madox’s 
1711 work, The History and Antiquities of the Exchequer of the Kings 
of England. He not only extensively paraphrases and quotes from 
Madox, but he also ensures that his work copies its organisation, 
and adheres to its principal thesis that the history of revenue can be 
divided into two distinct periods: the first – from William’s accession 
to the Magna Carta – marking the Court of Exchequer’s period of 
‘Ancient grandeur’; the second – from Magna Carta to Edward II’s 
death – showing its gradual demise into a state of decline.96 At one 
level, these additions can be seen as a product of a growing desire 
among commentators to provide arithmetical and numerical support 
for political forms of analysis.97 More generally, the result of such 
appropriations is the inclusion alongside Rapin’s work of a rather dif-
ferent mode of history. Rapin assumes that the monarch’s ‘character’ 
is the principal determinant of taxation policy. Madox, in contrast, 
presents revenue gathering as a system which, while it is shaped by 
individual monarchs, maintains its own customs and practices across 
different reigns. As a result, it became possible to trace medium and 
long-term advancements within the management of revenue and 
commerce. Such ideas regarding long-term economic change, as we 
shall see in the following chapters, were to be developed substantially 
by later historians.
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Tory history: Thomas Salmon’s 
Modern History
The popularity of Rapin’s Histoire ensured that it generated a large 
number of responses from other historians. Indeed, both Thomas 
Salmon’s Modern History (1724–38), the subject of this chapter, and 
Thomas Carte’s General History (1747–55), the subject of the next, 
provided direct attacks on Rapin’s account. However, whereas Rapin 
had shown little interest in contemporary debates about public credit, 
Salmon’s and Carte’s analyses were structured around criticisms of 
the system of government borrowing developed under William III. 
In dealing with these issues, both writers drew on the economic 
statecraft tradition. Indeed, through some careful deployment of 
material, they were able to use the work of Bacon and Camden 
to provide commentaries on recent innovations in financial prac-
tice. At the same time, however, Salmon and Carte were concerned 
that modern governments had – with disastrous consequences for 
national welfare – lost control of England’s economic institutions. 
Such claims led to the development of what might be labelled an 
anti-economic statecraft analysis; Salmon’s and Carte’s point was 
not so much that finance and commerce were being badly managed 
by monarchs, but that they were not being managed at all. Equally, 
however, the effect of such commentary was to vindicate established 
ideas; the modern era was conceived of as retrograde, and the monar-
chical administration of, and responsibility for, economic activity 
were presented as the desirable norm. My discussion in this chapter 
opens with an outline of the period’s principal financial innovations, 
before looking at how ‘Court Whig’ and ‘Patriot’ writers dealt with 
these developments in their historical commentaries. I then proceed 
to explore the main elements of Salmon’s narrative.
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1. The financial revolution and historical debate
England underwent a financial revolution in the 1690s, as attempts 
by its Whig governments to raise money for the nation’s war efforts 
led to a series of changes in the management of government revenue. 
The most important development was the establishment in 1694 of 
the Bank of England. Its loans allowed government borrowing to 
increase from around £1 million in 1688 to £16.7 million in 1697, 
and £54 million in 1720, and its collaboration with the Treasury 
ensured that interest rates declined from 14 per cent in the early 
1690s to between 6 and 8 per cent in the late 1690s, and 3 per cent 
by the 1730s.1 Such successes were a product of the state-backed 
guarantees that the bank provided, its pioneering use of paper money 
as a mechanism for releasing credit into the economy, and the diverse 
range of investment opportunities it provided.2 Indeed, not only could 
individuals deposit money in the bank itself, but the tickets and tallies 
it issued became tradable commodities. This ensured that existing 
lenders could quickly cash in their loans, and there were ready oppor-
tunities for new investors. As a result, the Bank of England solved 
many of the government’s financial problems through ensuring that, 
in the words of P. G. M. Dickson, ‘debts that were permanent for 
the state [became] liquid for the individual; subject only to the risk of 
capital loss if market prices fell’.3
These changes in England’s financial infrastructure had a number 
of political consequences. Partnered with improvements in the col-
lection of tax revenue, the expansion of borrowing caused a substan-
tial increase in annual government expenditure, which climbed from 
£1.8 million in 1688 to £6.2 million in 1695, and after 1710 remained 
consistently over £5 million.4 Access to such financial resources 
played a vital part in securing British successes in the Wars of the 
Grand Alliance and Spanish Succession, and enabled the English 
and, later, British state to fund larger and more permanent bureau-
cracies and armies. This, in turn, helped to protect the state from 
threats both at home and abroad. At the same time, the transfera-
bility of government bonds, and the market this created, produced a 
shift in the relationship between the populace and the state. As Karl 
Wennerlind has argued, whereas the government’s credit had previ-
ously been ‘dictated by the interactions between the monarch and a 
small number of powerful financiers’, it became increasingly reliant 
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on the public’s perception of the state’s ‘current capacity to service the 
interest payments and its imaginary ability to repay the debt in some 
distant, theoretical future’.5 Public opinion, as a consequence, started 
to function as ‘the arbiter of public credit’, and polemicists responded 
with a series of attempts either to support or undermine confidence 
in the government’s financial management.6
Such patterns of argument did much to shape political debate 
in the Walpolean era. For the Court Whigs, the key task was to 
demonstrate the ways in which, under their management, England’s 
new financial infrastructure had contributed both to the political and 
economic strength of the nation.7 With regard to the former issue, 
writers emphasised the support that the culture of borrowing had 
given to English liberties. As one writer noted, the ‘national Debt was 
contracted […] for the Preservation of our most excellent Constitution 
from Popery and Slavery. This encouraged the best Subjects at the 
Revolution to venture their Lives and Fortunes in maintaining a long 
and expensive War.’8 In relation to economic matters, Court propa-
gandists maintained that it was financial reforms that had helped to 
transform England into a wealthy nation. Thus the London Journal 
argued that bank notes and South Sea bonds had served usefully 
as money, that getting into debt had become a ‘business itself’, and 
that banks supported the circulation of wealth by ‘enabling dead 
money to be gathered into stocks’.9 These arguments were given 
further strength by another strand of Court Whig discourse which 
emphasised that England’s much-celebrated liberties were a rela-
tively modern innovation. Lord Hervey, for example, writing in his 
Ancient and Modern Liberty Stated and Compared (1734), argued that
’Till the Restoration there was no such thing as Liberty; That after 
the Restoration was nothing compared to the Strength it gain’d at the 
Revolution; and the Strength it then acquired, is so far, in my Opinion 
of Things, from being now impair’d, that it never flourish’d in such full 
Vigor as in the happy and prosperous Reign of his present Majesty.10
In making such claims, writers drew on the ideas of Spelman and 
Brady, as well as James Harrington’s Baconian account in Oceana 
(1656) of the changes instigated by Henry VII in patterns of property 
ownership.11 Thus the London Journal rejected Whiggish glorifications 
of Old England, maintaining instead that the ‘Ancient Constitution’ 
was the product of an ‘Over-balance of Lands, vested in the King, the 
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Nobility and the Church’. This ensured that the commons lived the 
lives of ‘Beggars and Slaves’.12 Such a state of affairs had only been 
ameliorated through the actions of Henry VII who, by allowing 
the lords to alienate their land, had started the process whereby the 
balance of property shifted to the people. In the present, the author 
estimated, this latter group held above 17 parts in 20 of the land 
‘besides their vast Wealth in Money, Stock &c.’ and, as a result, ‘by 
the Modern Constitution the People are strong’ and England was a 
nation of ‘Rich Men and Freemen’.13 Hervey, meanwhile, offered a 
similar view of the modern era: ‘[England’s] Possessions abroad are 
unattack’d, and her Commerce so unrival’d, so unobstructed, and 
so flourishing, that the Imports and Exports were never higher, nor 
our Credit in greater Prosperity.’14 The age of public debt for such 
writers, therefore, was also the age of liberty and wealth.
The most prominent critique of this sort of analysis was that 
developed by Lord Bolingbroke. From the mid-1720s onwards, 
Bolingbroke was engaged in a campaign to unite dissident Whigs 
and Tories into an anti-Walpolean Patriot party.15 This was no easy 
task. The sympathy shown by many opposition Whigs for Dissent, 
coupled with the anti-clericalism and Erastian tendencies of some 
Whig propagandists, was anathema for staunchly Church of England 
Tories and made combined action on religious issues impractical.16 
Cooperation was possible, however, in relation to Court financial 
practices, and Bolingbroke developed a series of stinging attacks on 
the national debt, stockjobbing and the nation’s trading companies, 
arguing that these institutions were undermining both the constitu-
tion and England’s commercial interests. Historical analysis played 
a key part in this commentary, most notably through Bolingbroke’s 
Remarks on the History of England (1743), a work assembled from a 
series of essays first published in the opposition journal the Craftsman 
between September 1730 and May 1731.17 For Bolingbroke, 
England’s history was structured around an ongoing conflict between 
the ‘Spirit of Liberty’, which sought to advance the nation’s interests, 
and a ‘Spirit of Faction’, that expressed only ‘personal and private 
Interests’.18 To develop this theme, he drew both on Rapin’s anal-
ysis of the ‘ancient constitution’ and Harrington’s discussion of the 
balance of property. His debt to Harrington is most apparent in his 
account of Henry VII. Here, despite emphasising that the Tudor 
king’s actions were shaped by the ‘Spirit of Faction’, he endorsed 
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the Harringtonian claim that Henry’s reforms had caused the bal-
ance of property to pass from the nobility to the commons. To an 
extent, such a position distanced Bolingbroke from Rapin. Indeed, 
whereas the Frenchman viewed Henry’s influence as entirely perni-
cious, Bolingbroke not only emphasised the long-term benefits of his 
actions, but repeated Bacon’s Tacitean assertion that Henry’s avarice 
made him a highly successful promoter of ‘Husbandry, Manufactures 
[and] general Commerce’.19 Bolingbroke’s key point, however, 
was that reforms enacted by Henry served to re-establish the basic 
‘Principles of Government, which had prevail’d amongst our Saxon 
Ancestors’ and which had been at the heart of Rapin’s analysis.20
Once this argument was formulated, the reigns of Elizabeth and 
James could be dealt with in a relatively straightforward manner. 
Thus, as Harrington had done, Bolingbroke maintained that 
Elizabeth’s awareness of the people’s newfound power led her to 
court their affections, and he went on to demonstrate this through an 
analysis that owed much to Rapin. Ideas of economic statecraft were 
key to his argument, and he emphasised that the Queen’s popularity 
was, in part, a product of her success in promoting commerce, and, 
through eliminating the debts amassed by her predecessors, ‘restoring 
the Credit of the Crown’.21 However, while Elizabeth’s sensitivity to 
the balance of property led to a victory for the ‘Spirit of Liberty’ and 
national affluence, James failed to follow her example. This explained 
a number of Stuart England’s key features, also discussed by Rapin: 
the rise of government debts; the decline of commerce; the return of 
the ‘Spirit of Faction’; and, as a result, the emergence of the political 
crisis that eventually led to the collapse of the monarchy in the 1640s.
For Bolingbroke, both Elizabeth’s successes and James’s failures 
had important consequences for modern politics. English history, he 
argued, produced numerous examples of ‘Causes of the same Kind laid 
again, and producing Effects of the same Nature’.22 Walpole’s regime, 
like James’s, he maintained, was driven by the ‘spirit of faction’. 
Indeed, the Remarks explicitly presented the ‘Spirit of Stockjobbing’ 
that had come to characterise the modern age as a form of faction, 
noting that both worked ‘to advance the Interest of a few worthless 
Individuals, at the Expence of the whole Community’, and that both 
threatened trade and liberty.23 Britain, therefore, was not experiencing 
new forms of wealth and freedom as the Court Whigs maintained, 
but rather old varieties of poverty and  corruption. Moreover, Jacobean 
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history provided a good guide as to what was likely to happen when 
a self-interested and factious government ruled over a nation where 
the balance of property lay with the people: ‘Jealousy, Discontent, 
Tumult’ and, potentially, ‘open Resistance, and [the] Deposition of the 
Prince’.24
2. A Tory history
Thomas Salmon’s Modern History drew on and, in part, synthesised 
elements from the Court Whig and Patriot analyses of England’s 
recent past. Born in 1679 in Meppershall, Bedfordshire, Salmon spent 
the first part of his career as a soldier, serving in both India and, 
during the War of the Spanish Succession, Flanders.25 On his return 
to England he briefly ran a Cambridge coffeehouse, before moving 
to London and gaining employment with the printer John Darby as 
the editor of the volumes eventually published in 1719 as A Compleat 
Collection of State-Tryals.26 A series of historical works with a marked 
Tory bias followed. These included a laudatory history of Queen Anne 
(1721),27 an abridgement and angry critique of the work of the Whig 
historian Bishop Burnet (1724)28 and The History of Great Britain 
and Ireland (1725), a collection of historical excerpts concerning pre- 
Norman history.29 The most controversial of Salmon’s publications, 
however, was A Review of the History of England (vol. 1, 1722; vol. 2, 
1724), his account of the titles to the throne claimed by England’s 
various post-Norman monarchs. In January 1724, just in advance of 
the planned publication of the second volume, the dissenting orator 
John Henley wrote to Lord Carteret, the Minister for the Southern 
Department, warning him that Salmon’s work contained an attack on 
‘ye Ministry and ye Succession’.30 Carteret took these claims seriously, 
and on 1 February copies of the Review were seized by the King’s 
messengers and the printer and bookseller taken into custody.31 In the 
following weeks, seemingly with Carteret’s support, Henley went on 
to produce lists of what he considered the Review’s most ‘offensive’ 
passages. These collections of quotations drew attention to its attacks 
on Whiggish causes – Dissenters, the Dutch and the government’s 
management of the Treaty of Ryswick – and its use of a series of 
inflammatory parallels. Thus Henley transcribed Salmon’s comments 
that King Stephen ‘was not so harden’d in Wickedness as some of his 
Successors, he cd not under a mock shew of justice, put men to death 
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in cold blood, only for doing their duty to their lawfull sovereign’.32 To 
this he added in brackets: ‘This points very plainly at ye late [Jacobite] 
Rebellion.’33 Ultimately, it appears, some sort of deal was done; the 
printer and publisher of the Review appeared in recognisances in May 
1724, and the volume itself was published shortly afterwards.34
His run-in with the government did nothing to dampen Salmon’s 
historical enthusiasm and later in 1724 he embarked upon Modern 
History, a monthly publication which ran from 1724 to 1738 and, 
when completed, filled thirty-one octavo volumes.35 Its remit was 
an ambitious one. Beginning with the ‘Kingdoms in the East’ and 
travelling ‘Westward with the Sun’, Salmon provided an account of 
all the kingdoms of the known world.36 As the preface explained, for 
each territory referred to he sought to include discussion of a wide 
range of issues: ‘Situations, Persons, Habits, Buildings, Manners, 
Laws and Customs, Religion, Policy, Arts and Sciences, Trades, 
Manufactures and Husbandry, Plants, Animals and Minerals’.37 
While such an approach gave Salmon’s work a wide geographical 
scope, he did not ignore domestic issues. Thirteen of his volumes 
were concerned with England, and eleven of these were used to 
provide a detailed, politically oriented history of the country from the 
invasion of the Romans to the death of Queen Anne.
Salmon conceived of these English sections of his account as a 
Tory history of England, and, as such, an explicit attack on the 
ruling Court Whig government. The uncompromising nature of his 
Toryism, however, also served to distance him from much other 
opposition writing of the period. Indeed, whereas Bolingbroke 
maintained that since the Revolution of 1688 there had been no 
real difference in opinion between honest Whigs and honest Tories, 
Salmon launched an aggressive attack on all types of Whiggism, 
drawing particular attention to the dangers it posed to the Church 
of England. He also entirely rejected Rapin’s analysis, and used a 
series of newspaper advertisements to market the English volumes 
of Modern History as being ‘intended chiefly to set such Transactions 
in a true Light as are misrepresented by Rapin, and to point out the 
Fanatical and Republican Notions advanced in [his] Work’.38 Five of 
the Frenchman’s mistakes were highlighted:
1. That the Kings of England do not derive their Authority from the 
People, as Rapin pretends they do.
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2. That their Subjects have no Right to call them to an Account, or to 
dethrone them, on pretence of Male-Administration, as is suggested 
in Rapin’s History.
3. That several of our Kings have carried the Prerogative higher than 
either King James I or King Charles I.
4. That neither of those Kings were the Authors of the Troubles that 
happen’d in theirs or the succeeding Reigns, but the Fanaticks and 
Republicans.
5. That Queen Anne was a glorious Princess, and ever studied and 
contributed to the Happiness of her People, notwithstanding Rapin 
hath taken the Liberty to Libel her Administration.39
Underlying such comments was a broader critique of Rapin’s 
approach to historiography, the outlines of which Salmon had first 
formulated in his introduction to the History of Great Britain. For 
Salmon, Rapin’s principal crime was to use ‘ancient history’, par-
ticularly Saxon history, as an artifice to vindicate modern ideas about 
republican government and Presbyterianism.40 Such an approach was 
fundamentally flawed; given that the Saxons were the ‘most stupid 
Generation that ever this Island knew’, there was no reason to suppose 
that they would happen upon ‘so beautiful a Form of Government, as 
that we enjoy at this Day’.41 At the same time, Salmon accepted the 
Court Whig claim that there was no essential continuity between 
the political institutions of the past and those of the present. English 
government, Salmon argued, had never continued ‘thro’ any one 
Century the same; sometimes the Regal Power has approach’d to Absolute, 
sometimes the Barons, and at other times the Commons, have depress’d, 
and even depos’d their Princes’.42 The ‘Liberties and Properties’ of the 
present, therefore, were not the product of ancient precedent, but 
the ratifications provided by a ‘Thousand Acts and Concessions of our 
Princes’.43 Such ideas directly informed Modern History, and helped 
to ensure that Salmon’s approach to prerogative was fundamentally at 
odds with Rapin’s and Bolingbroke’s. For Rapin, while its legitimate 
limits were set by the Saxon constitution, monarchical prerogative, 
in de facto terms, constituted an unstable element, which periodi-
cally threatened to undermine the constitutional order. Salmon, in 
contrast, argued that the constitutional order had been created and 
maintained by royal prerogative. England’s history, therefore, was 
the story both of the creation of that order and of the series of highly 
pernicious attempts by ‘republican’ elements to undermine it.
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Running alongside such arguments in Modern History, and fre-
quently in tension with them, was a Patriot-style attack – albeit 
one with a marked Tory bias – on the financial institutions that had 
emerged in the wake of the Revolution of 1688. Thus, for Salmon, the 
national debt had its origins in the approach to finance developed by 
the Whigs in the 1690s. Working on the assumptions that ‘The more 
you borrow, the more Friends you make’ and ‘Interest is a stronger Tie than 
Principle’, ministers had borrowed at very high interest rates – ‘thirty, 
forty, and sometimes fifty per Cent’ – to ensure that moneyed men 
‘became […] Friends to the Government’.44 In doing so, the Whigs 
had sacrificed the financial security of the nation in order to enrich 
their friends and selfishly maintain their own position in power. The 
debt was expanded still further as a result of the pernicious influence 
of the Dutch. Whig governments of the 1690s and 1700s, he argued, 
drawing on a standard theme in Tory polemics, had been entirely 
governed by the Dutch to the point where, during the reign of Anne, 
they had sought to ‘interpose and assume an Authority to direct the 
Queen in the Distribution of her Favours’.45 Moreover, as a result of 
the Dutch influence:
We were obliged to take the Burthen of the Low Country War upon 
us, and throw away our People against stone Walls at a vast Expense, 
chiefly to enlarge the Territories of our Allies, and gratify the Ambition 
and Avarice of some of their Friends, without stipulating for a single 
Town we should conquer, or to receive any Benefit from the Revenues 
of the conquer’d Countries; while we engaged much beyond our annual 
Revenues, and contracted more Debts in the Quarrel, than all our 
Allies put together.46
Rather than functioning as a true sovereign state, therefore, England 
had become a cipher for Dutch territorial and commercial ambitions. 
This situation was only rectified when the Tories entered into gov-
ernment in 1710. During their four years in office they had defended 
Britain’s trading interests, extricated the nation from the war with 
France and begun the process of paying off the national debt. As 
a result, and despite dire Whig warnings regarding the effect of a 
change in government on the nation’s financial security, ‘the Publick 
Credit was never higher than when the Alteration of the Ministry 
was made’.47
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3. Salmon, Elizabeth I and Henry VII
Salmon’s attacks on both Rapin and the Court Whigs did much to 
shape his analysis of Queen Elizabeth. In relation to the former, 
Salmon drew attention to the unreliable and partisan nature of the 
Frenchman’s account. Rapin, Salmon noted, had drawn extensively 
on Camden’s Annales when discussing Elizabeth. However, in doing 
so, he had deliberately ignored Camden’s detailed accounts of the 
plots of the Presbyterians – referred to by Salmon as Rapin’s ‘Brethren 
of the Geneva Stamp’ – to reduce ‘the whole Kingdom under their 
Tyranny’.48 Modern History responded by putting these plots centre 
stage and, through a series of borrowings from Camden and the 
Church historian John Strype, provided full details of the Puritans’ 
pernicious activities and Elizabeth’s courageous and successful attacks 
upon them.49 Such a move then enabled Salmon to emphasise the 
political distance between Rapin and the Queen. Indeed, as Salmon 
presents matters, Elizabeth was the key Tory bulwark against the 
selfish Whiggish sect whose interests Rapin sought to advance.50 
Underpinning this analysis was a rejection of the Histoire’s analysis of 
Elizabeth’s motivations. Rapin, as we have seen, sought to show that 
Elizabeth’s achievements in domestic policy were a product of her 
weak position; it was her need for popular support to maintain her 
‘tottering’ crown that led her to follow a frugal, low-tax approach.51 
Salmon, while acknowledging the Queen’s popularity, rejected these 
claims entirely. The Queen was not led by the people, but rather ruled 
over them. Indeed, the successes she enjoyed were a product of the 
care she took to keep ‘a due Distance between the Subject and the 
Soveraign’ and the fact she ‘never suffer’d her People, either without 
Doors or within, to grow upon the Prerogative’.52 Her actions, mean-
while, were in no sense the products of self-interest, but emerged, 
as Camden had argued, from a genuinely virtuous desire to protect 
Protestant and English interests.
Ideas about self-interest, of the sort that characterised much exem-
plary history, also directly influenced Salmon’s approach to economic 
affairs. Connecting together the various strands of Modern History 
was an account of the rise and subsequent decline of English national 
greatness. In the preface to the first volume, Salmon, in a manner 
which mirrors Bolingbroke’s analysis, noted that the ‘Genius of the 
People […] for maritime Affairs, new Discoveries, and a Zeal to 
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Extend their Commerce through every part of the habitable World’ 
had ensured that England reached the zenith of its success in the 
reign of ‘the glorious Queen ELIZABETH’.53 Nevertheless, in 
subsequent years, as a result of the pernicious influence exerted by 
the interconnected activities of Republicans, Presbyterians and the 
Dutch, the ‘publick Spirit’, which had upheld England’s imperial and 
commercial greatness, had vanished.54 As a result,
Private Interest, inglorious Sloth and Ease, and a fond Care of our 
worthless selves are now deem’d Marks of the most consummate 
Wisdom; and the Man would be accounted frantick who should 
hazard his Person or his Fortune abroad in the Advancement of Trade, 
or gaining new Acquisitions to the British Empire.55
Salmon’s treatment of Elizabethan trade and finance was shaped 
by this narrative. In relation to the former, he sought to present 
Elizabeth’s reign as a period of nationally beneficial commercial 
endeavour. This was partly a product of the Queen’s own meas-
ures which, Salmon argued, drawing heavily on Camden, included 
the running of the Muscovy Company, the commercially beneficial 
decision to allow Huguenot refugees to settle in England, and the 
successful establishment of sumptuary laws.56 Equally significantly, 
however, she had been supported by the selfless actions of her people. 
Thus attention was drawn to England’s Elizabethan adventurers, 
among them Captain James Lancaster and Sir Thomas Randolph. 
The former navigated the Cape of Good Hope and, despite finding 
his ship ‘miserably shatter’d in a Tempest of Thunder and Lightning’, 
proceeded on to Sumatra, ‘from whence the Ship return’d very richly 
laden to England, but with only seven Hands on Board’.57 The 
latter, as is noted in an account drawn from Camden, journeyed 
from Archangel to the Caspian Sea, ‘traded with the Persians and 
Indians’, and ‘propos’d to have open’d a Trade with China that way’.58 
Ultimately, Randolph’s plans came to nothing, but they demon-
strated, Salmon argued, this time moving beyond the arguments 
made in the Annales, ‘the Genius of our Ancestors in that Age for 
making new Discoveries, and extending their Commerce’.59
Selfless action was also key to Salmon’s analysis of Elizabethan 
finance. Following Camden closely, he argued that the root of 
Elizabeth’s success lay in her frugality, which had ensured that the 
money ‘other Princes lavish’d away upon Favourites and greedy 
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Courtiers, and in Shews and Festivals, [Elizabeth] apply’d to the 
Support of the Government’.60 Such practices enabled the Queen to 
repay the debts acquired by her ancestors, which Salmon estimated 
were worth four million pounds, and to rearm the nation. Moreover:
Though she had, great part of her Reign, all the Powers of Europe to 
contend with, and a Party of Catholics and Puritans ever preaching up 
Sedition and Rebellion at home, it does not appear that her Majesty 
ever contracted a Debt that was not paid off in a Year or two, or left 
the Nation burthen’d with one extraordinary Tax; for which, Posterity 
must ever celebrate her Memory.61
The Queen’s achievement, therefore, was to have protected the 
nation’s domestic and financial interests without imposing any finan-
cial burdens on its people.
This image of Elizabeth had a good deal of polemical value. 
On occasion, Salmon explicitly used Elizabethan achievements to 
highlight the magnitude of Whig failures. In his discussion of the 
events of 1702, for example, he argued that the Whigs had mas-
sively increased the levels of debt in order to fund wars that wasted 
English lives and did nothing to advance English interests. This 
conduct, his commentary concluded scathingly, was ‘very different 
from that observ’d in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth’.62 Elsewhere, 
Salmon used ‘positive’ assessments of Elizabeth to develop a series of 
polemically useful contrasts between the Queen’s reign and those of 
her various predecessors and successors. With regard to Henry VII, 
this was a relatively straightforward task. Henry, for Salmon, simply 
provided further evidence of the ‘long observ’d’ political dictum ‘that 
nothing can be more destructive to England than for the King and 
his Ministers to entertain private selfish Views, opposite to the true 
Interest of the Nation’.63 In expanding on this theme, Salmon sought 
to show how the avarice that shaped the first Tudor king’s reign, and 
the equally self-interested profligacy that characterised that of his 
son, both contrasted with the selfless actions of Elizabeth and had 
caused the financial problems from which she had rescued the nation.
Such an analysis had a good deal in common with that of Rapin 
and, as the Frenchman had done, Salmon constructed his account 
by paraphrasing those sections of Bacon’s History that were most 
critical of Henry. In doing so, however, Salmon developed not just 
a general critique of pernicious forms of statesmanship, but also a 
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specific commentary on contemporary political events. This can be 
seen particularly clearly in Modern History’s account of Henry’s use 
of taxation. At the time Salmon published his account – February 
1733 – the standard theme of opposition writers was the corrup-
tion of the ministry. Specifically, polemicists sought to demonstrate 
that Walpole was using places and pensions to bribe Members of 
Parliament, in a move that threatened the constitution and the lib-
erties it upheld. The key issue of the day, meanwhile, was the Excise 
Bill announced by Walpole at the very end of 1732.64 Under the 
terms of the proposed reform, duties on wine and tobacco would be 
switched from customs duties, which were paid at import, to excise 
duties which were paid when goods were released from a warehouse 
on to the domestic market.65 These measures were vigorously and, 
ultimately, successfully resisted by the opposition, in part through 
a series of attempts to demonise excise officers.66 Such individu-
als, it was argued, were pernicious hirelings whose powers to act as 
‘Prosecutors, Evidence and Judges in their own Cause’ undermined 
the right to trial by jury and made it possible for ‘unjust Sentences’ to 
be given against ‘particular Men, in Order to gratify the Malice, or 
Avarice, of a corrupt Minister’.67 The power officers had ‘of entering 
into a Person’s House […] as often as they please’ and whenever they 
please, meanwhile, constituted a threat to the liberty and property of 
merchants, especially as officers stood to benefit in financial terms 
from any seizures they made.68 Even more worryingly, the influence 
that the Crown would gain from an increase in its income and a rise 
in the number of officers it had at its disposal would shift the balance 
of power away from the people, and undermine their liberties.
Salmon clearly had such issues on his mind when composing his 
account of the events of 1504. The first part of his discussion stayed 
close to his source material. He began by paraphrasing Bacon’s list of 
the various extortions through which the King had enriched himself 
that year, before noting that Henry’s successes meant that, as ‘says 
the Lord Bacon’, ‘Golden Showers […] pour’d down upon the King’s 
Treasury all at once’.69 From here, however, Salmon proceeded 
to conjure up a series of images that owed more to contemporary 
accounts of excise officers than to any work of Tudor history. Thus the 
people’s misery was a consequence of their being ‘perpetually pilfer’d 
and prosecuted by an Army of Tax-gatherers and Informers’.70 As a 
result, ‘no Man enjoy’d his Fortune in quiet, it was well if he could 
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redeem his Person from Prison, by sacrificing his Estate’.71 Henry’s 
relationship with Parliament was also described in distinctly ‘modern’ 
terms. Any hope of relief for the people from the King’s exactions 
was eliminated, ‘as the Parliament were either aw’d or brib’d into a 
Compliance with the Court’.72 The phrasing here is key. The idea that 
Parliament were ‘aw’d’ to support the King is broadly in line with 
Bacon’s claim that, by this point in his reign, the King enjoyed ‘abso-
lute’ power over his Parliament. However, the suggestion that Henry 
might bribe individuals at Westminster makes no sense at all in 
relation to Bacon’s analysis; why would a king as powerful and avari-
cious as Henry seek to pay money to his own Parliament? Hinting at 
such practices, however, enabled Salmon to conflate Henry’s actions 
with Walpole’s and, by doing so, to use Bacon’s critique of Henry’s 
selfishness and avarice to attack Walpolean corruption.
4. Salmon and James I
Salmon’s account of James I is a good deal more complex. On the 
one hand, as was conventional in Tory writing of the period, he 
sought to defend James from the various accusations that had been 
levelled at him by Whiggish commentators. Thus he denied sugges-
tions that James had attempted to subvert the political and religious 
status quo,73 emphasised the continuities between Elizabeth’s reign 
and her successor’s, and argued that James’s financial problems 
were a product of debts acquired by Elizabeth rather than personal 
extravagance. The economic achievements of the period, meanwhile, 
as they had been in earlier pro-Stuart accounts, were seen as evi-
dence of James’s success as a monarch. Brief descriptions, derived 
from Howes’s account, were provided of a number of economic 
innovations, including the commencement of alum manufacture, 
improvements in shipping and the establishment of the plantations 
in America. These developments, particularly the latter, ensured 
that ‘our foreign Trade […] was vastly extended and enlarged in 
most Parts of the World, especially in America’.74 As a consequence, 
and contrary to Rapin’s suggestions, it was not James’s failures that 
were responsible for the unrest of the period. Indeed the King was 
only blameworthy in the sense that, having ‘slacken’d the Reigns 
of Government on his Accession’, he ‘suffer’d the People to dis-
pute against the Constitution in Church and State (which Queen 
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Elizabeth would never bear) and thereby encourag’d the Puritans and 
Republicans to encroach upon him’.75
Running alongside and, on occasion, working in direct tension 
with these arguments was an attempt to develop a series of parallels 
between James’s reign and modern Britain. Two issues were of par-
ticular significance here. First, Salmon sought to emphasise the sim-
ilarities between the situation that James found himself in, as a Scot 
ruling over an English kingdom, and the position of the Hanoverian 
monarchs. James might, Salmon noted, ‘have enjoy’d a perpetual 
Calm during his Reign’ had his ‘Favours’ not ‘been so unbounded 
towards his Countrymen, the Scots’.76 Through ‘squandering away his 
Money upon that People, [he] also brought his Treasury low’ and 
this ‘with the Perverseness of the Puritans, were the Sources of most 
of the Misfortunes that happen’d afterwards’.77 The King’s actions 
were a product, Salmon emphasised, of the differences between the 
relative prosperity of the two kingdoms. James came
from a poor barren Country, to a Kingdom where Wealth abounded 
more at that time than in any Nation in Europe perhaps, and he met 
with a People whose Professions of Loyalty and Submission, accompa-
nied with Offers of their Lives and Fortunes, were as unlimited as his 
Expences and Gratuities to his Countrymen are said to have been.78
In case any of his readers had missed the association that he was seek-
ing to develop, Salmon concluded with some general comments on 
non-native monarchs. ‘Allowances’, he argued, ‘are to be made for his 
[James] being a Foreigner and a Stranger to the Constitution; such 
Princes always lie under great Disadvantages.’79 ‘Nor’, Salmon con-
tinued, ‘wou’d I pass over his too great Indulgence to his Favourites 
and Prime Ministers, which was certainly very prejudicial to the 
Kingdom and himself.’80 Ultimately, however, such practices demon-
strated not so much the failings of James/George, but the hypocrisy 
of the Whigs. As Salmon noted: ‘I can’t help observing, that Princes 
who have been guilty of the same Failing, have met with much better 
Quarter from the Party who charge King James with this Weakness.’81
Second, Salmon sought to emphasise that James’s reign had seen 
the emergence of the sinister Dutch conspiracy which currently 
threatened English interests. The aims of the Hollanders, he argued, 
were twofold: ‘the Encouragement of their Sect, and the ingrossing 
the Trade of the World’.82 This led them to embark on a series of 
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attempts to ‘ruin the Trade of their Benefactors [the English] in all 
Parts of the World; drive them from their Settlements; murder their 
Merchants and Factors, and deprive them of their Fisheries’.83 In 
the international sections of Salmon’s analysis, these ideas were used 
to develop a comparison between English and Dutch approaches to 
trade and empire. The Dutch’s insatiable desire for power had led 
them to acquire an empire through force. English settlements, in 
contrast, were ‘fairly purchased, or voluntarily transferred to them’.84 
Indeed, the English had never ‘attempted to encroach on the natives, 
or enlarge their territories by force in any one instance; and those who 
live under their governments, enjoy greater privileges than they did 
under their former princes’.85 There was, however, one area where 
the Dutch were superior to the English: the state management of 
commerce. Thus, whereas the Dutch had made their East Indian and 
African trades ‘a national concern’ and had ‘supported them by the 
power of the states’, ‘ours is under the care of a few merchants, who 
have seldom any views beyond their present gain, and scarce ever 
consider the general interest of their country’.86 That the Dutch had 
been allowed to develop connections in these areas, however, was 
presented as a result of James’s inadequacies as a monarch. Indeed, 
describing the expansion of Portuguese and Dutch influence in India 
the 1610s, Salmon observed:
Thus were the subjects of Britain, the greatest maritime power then in 
being, insulted and interrupted in the most valuable part of their com-
merce, by two [sic] the most despicable nations in Europe. Heavens! 
what a soul must that Prince be endued with who then sat upon the 
British throne: or how exceeding mercenary must his ministers be? 
those who pretend to account for this stupid conduct say, that the 
Dutch actually purchas’d our leading men, who sold the nation, and 
voluntarily suffer’d the Dutch to run away with all the valuable branches 
of our trade. When they could not effect their ends this way, their good 
friends, the presbyterians, were incited to create a civil war amongst 
us, and take off our attention to trade by our pretences of further 
reformation.87
These ideas were repeated and developed in Salmon’s account of 
English history. During James’s reign, it was argued, ‘the Dutch were 
endeavouring to beat us out of the Trade of the fine Spices; which 
they accomplished […], our Merchants not being protected by the 
Government as they ought to have been’.88 In making such claims, 
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Salmon sought both to emphasise the parallels between James’s reign 
and contemporary practices – when once again a failure to stand up to 
the Dutch had proved catastrophic – and to develop a causal connec-
tion between past and present. From Jacobean times onwards, it was 
argued, the Dutch had supported a ‘Faction in our Bowels’ that ‘bids 
Defiance to our Constitution’.89 This group, as Salmon presented 
matters, was responsible for many of England’s problems; indeed, the 
failings of English commerce, the national debt and the Civil War 
were all products of a malign Dutch interference. As a consequence, 
the pro-Dutch Whiggish faction had a substantial history of its own, 
and had already done much to undermine monarchical power and 
cripple England’s financial and commercial interests.
Taken in sum, such comments ensured that a fundamental tension 
ran through Modern History’s discussion of James. On the one hand, 
as part of his attack on Rapin, Salmon provided a conventional Tory 
account, which celebrated James’s achievements as a manager of 
the nation’s economic interests and praised him for continuing the 
work of Elizabeth. On the other hand, however, Salmon’s desire to 
develop a critique of Walpole’s ministry made it strategic for him, on 
occasion, to present James as a bad foreigner whose actions, or rather 
inaction, paralleled that of George II and helped to bring about 
the culture of borrowing on which the Whig regime relied. Indeed, 
James’s failures are seen as a symptom and a cause of a wider process 
of long-term decline in which debt, foreign influences and increas-
ingly self-interested forms of behaviour had undermined England’s 
commercial and financial fortunes. Ironically, both the celebratory 
and critical elements of Salmon’s account of James were the product 
of a consistent adherence to the Tory cause. Salmon, an opponent 
of all forms of Whiggism, was attempting a narrative critique of 
Court and Patriot forms of Whig history. As the ambivalences that 
characterise Modern History testify, this was no easy task.
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7
Jacobite history:  
Thomas Carte’s General History
A more far-reaching critique both of Rapin’s History and Whiggish 
ideas of credit was developed by the Oxford historian Thomas Carte 
in the 1740s and 1750s.1 Carte was a diligent and able scholar, and 
the author of a series of well-documented historical works including a 
three-volume History and Life of James Duke of Ormonde (1735–36) and 
the four-volume General History of England (1747–55).2 He was also a 
Non-Juror and an active Jacobite conspirator. In the 1720s he worked 
as an agent for the Court of the Pretender and was secretary to Francis 
Atterbury at the time of his unsuccessful 1722 ‘plot’.3 Following this, 
a warrant was issued for Carte’s arrest and he fled to France, only 
returning after a pardon from Queen Caroline in 1728. Once back in 
England, Carte continued to act as a go-between for various Jacobite 
groups, wrote a series of polemical pamphlets and authored a scheme 
to coordinate Tory party action in elections. In 1739 he personally 
passed a letter from the Pretender to Walpole, after being persuaded 
that the latter might be sympathetic to the former’s restoration.4 The 
scheme was not a success. Walpole showed no interest in the letter, 
threatened Carte with arrest, and proceeded to interrogate him on his 
knowledge of Jacobite plans. Although Carte avoided prosecution, 
he remained an object of interest to the authorities, and was briefly 
incarcerated in 1744 on suspicion of concealing arms.
Carte’s Jacobitism also contributed to the commercial failure of 
the General History. The project had begun promisingly. In 1737 
Carte published a proposal calling for a new history of England and 
emphasising the inadequacies of Rapin’s account; the Frenchman, 
Carte claimed, had simply not had the knowledge of the constitution 
or the relevant primary material to produce a competent work. To 
 JACOBITE HISTORY 135
ensure the success of his own attempt, Carte advocated the estab-
lishment of a society ‘to encourage the writing of an History of England ’ 
which through subscriptions would be able to fund the procurement 
of the requisite archival material.5 This suggestion was greeted with 
enthusiasm, and by the end of the year Carte had achieved pledges 
for £600 per annum.6 Subscribers were to include Oxford colleges, 
the Church, City Companies and the Corporation of London, as 
well as both Jacobite grandees and senior Whigs.7 On its publication 
in 1747, however, Carte’s history gained immediate notoriety as a 
result of a footnote in its first volume, which repeated the story of 
Christopher Lovell, a Bristol labourer who, in 1716, had supposedly 
been cured of scrofula by the touch of the Pretender. Such claims 
were widely derided and Carte was attacked by a distinguished cast 
of critics including Josiah Tucker, Edward Gibbon, Horace Walpole 
and Henry Fielding. Indeed, Fielding, writing in the Jacobite’s Journal, 
conducted a mock ‘trial’ of Carte’s work, ultimately convicting its 
author of ‘a very high Offence; no less than that of perverting the 
Intent of History, and applying it to the sordid and paltry Use of a 
Party’.8 Although Carte continued to work on the history until his 
death in 1754, he never recovered either his public credibility or the 
interest of the reading public.
Modern historians of historiography have been rather more gen-
erous. Laird Okie praised the General History for its use of archival 
sources and observed that, at its publication, Carte’s work constituted 
the ‘most ambitious attempt to date to produce a definitive history 
of England’.9 More recently, Paul Kléber Monod has labelled it one 
of the ‘great neglected texts of the eighteenth century’, and argued 
that its account of the druids of ancient Britain provided a significant 
example of a Jacobite vision of British nationalism.10 Of equal impor-
tance to Carte’s notion of Britishness, however, was his understand-
ing of European feudalism. Indeed, through an analysis of Europe’s 
shared feudal origins Carte developed an account that both rejected 
the analyses of finance and commerce that underpinned the works of 
Rapin and provided a distinctive critique of modern ideas of credit.
1. A Jacobite polemic: Carte’s critique of Corbyn Morris
The origins of Carte’s analysis of economic affairs are to be found 
in his work as a Tory/Jacobite pamphleteer in the early 1740s. A 
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key task for government polemicists was to show that the system of 
public credit and the military and political innovations of the period 
worked in partnership to secure liberty and prosperity. The version 
of this argument which attracted Carte’s ire was that developed by 
the Court Whig propagandist Corbyn Morris in A Letter from a 
Bystander to a Member of Parliament (1742).11 Morris’s pamphlet 
sought to defend Walpole’s use of a standing army by emphasising 
its importance not just to England’s military, but also to its finan-
cial security. Underlying this latter claim was a conception of public 
credit as ‘the Pulse of the Nation’: a force that was difficult to restore 
to health when upset and uniquely sensitive to rumours of foreign 
invasion.12 The fickle qualities of credit could, however, be offset by 
the army which, through allaying fears regarding the security of the 
Hanoverian regime, served ‘to keep our Properties from continually 
fluctuating, to preserve our Trade, and to give Strength and Stability 
to the Government’.13 Given, therefore, that England was a nation 
awash with ‘Riches and Plenty’, and that the terror and confusion 
caused by a run on the Bank of England had the capacity to lose ‘forty 
or fifty Millions of [pounds of] Property’ from government securi-
ties, it made sense to maintain the existing force.14 Morris was also 
careful to emphasise that the modern military did not pose a direct 
threat to liberty. While a standing army undoubtedly augmented 
the power of the Crown, the constitutional innovations secured by 
the Revolution of 1688 meant that the balance of power lay with the 
people. Prior to William III’s accession monarchs had possessed ‘an 
absolute uncontrollable Power’ over the standing revenue, a state of 
affairs that had been particularly abused by the Stuart kings.15 Now, 
however, the King’s private revenue had been restricted to the Civil 
List and the public revenues were ‘entirely under the Command of 
the Parliament’.16 Such control, coupled with the increase in trade 
that had enriched the wider population, meant that the income of the 
Crown had, in relative terms, decreased, and ‘our Tendency at present, 
unless it be rightly moderated, lies much stronger to Democracy, than 
to absolute Monarchy’.17
Carte responded to these claims with A Full Answer to the Letter 
from a By-Stander (1742), a point-by-point rejection of Morris’s 
argument and a direct attack on the Whigs’ management of 
England’s economic interests. For Carte: ‘A Man must be an utter 
Stranger to this City, that does not know the Decay of Trade, and to 
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the Kingdom, if he does not see an universal Face of Poverty upon 
the common People.’18 Morris’s claims about the dangers to public 
securities, meanwhile, were nonsensical; Carte confessed himself 
unable to ‘conceive how the Nation in general could be a loser by 
one Englishman’s selling and another’s buying Stock at lower Rates 
than usual’.19 Equally fallacious was the Bystander’s account of tax-
ation. As Carte demonstrated through a brief narrative account of 
the history of revenue, until the Revolution of 1688 the spending of 
the Crown had been closely monitored by Parliament and its income 
had been relatively small. Key to this had been the system of feudal 
military tenure, whereby vassals were given land in exchange for per-
forming predetermined duties to a lord or king. Often, Carte argued, 
these duties took the form of ‘knight-service’ rather than a pecuniary 
payment.20 Where ‘Scutage’ – a payment in lieu of knight’s service – 
had been required, the amounts demanded were low. In recent years, 
however, military tenures had been abolished and taxation had been 
transformed.21 Charles II, for example, had received, Carte argued, 
an average of £1,353,000 a year during a reign dominated by a series 
of expensive wars.22 In contrast, over the twenty-eight years preced-
ing the publication of Carte’s Answer, a period ‘in which we have had 
no Foreign War’, the average rate of taxes was ‘above Four Millions 
a Year’.23 Even this sum, however, had been insufficient to meet 
government spending, as shown by the nation continually labouring 
under a debt ‘of about Fifty Millions’.24 Such high levels of debt and 
taxation, Carte contended, did much to explain the woeful state 
of commerce and manufacture, and provided stark evidence that, 
contrary to Morris’s claims, the power of the Crown had increased 
since the Revolution. Indeed, whereas military tenures had created
Leaders that understood the Art of War, and that of their own Vassals 
had Followers enough to make up a Body of Men sufficient to encour-
age others to resort to it and form an Army: Now there is no such 
Thing, no warlike Leader, no great Man with such a following in all 
the Kingdom.25
The liberty of the people, therefore, was at risk, as they lacked any 
means to balance the extensive powers held by the Crown.
The debate between Morris and Carte provides a useful example 
of the ways in which credit, commerce and finance could provide 
the terrain for battles between Court Whigs and Tory/Jacobite 
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polemicists. What is perhaps most interesting about their confron-
tation, however, is the shared assumptions they took into it. Both 
were concerned with the relationship between property and power 
and accepted Harrington’s dictum that ‘Dominion is founded only 
in Property’ – indeed, Morris quoted directly from Harrington to 
this effect.26 Equally, however, they were in agreement that, for a 
monarch, it was not so much land that determined dominion, but 
rather income. As a consequence, prerogative without dominion was 
not, as Harrington suggested, a mere ‘phantom’; rather, they agreed, 
a monarch could use prerogative to extract income from his or her 
people, thereby augmenting the Crown’s property. Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, there were some similarities between their 
historical narratives. Both accepted the suggestion that England’s 
financial infrastructure had been transformed by the events of 1688 
and that the roots of this shift lay in the reigns of the first two Stuarts. 
Their analyses, as such, constituted contrasting reactions to what they 
conceived of as an epoch-defining structural shift in government’s 
economic foundations.
The analysis of credit which Carte advanced in his polemical 
works was to form an integral part of the General History. Indeed, 
by developing his previous account, he was able to provide a critique 
of two broad trends in historiography. On the one hand, he sought 
to reject the claims of both Tories such as Salmon and Court Whigs 
such as Morris regarding the poverty, political backwardness and 
barbarism of pre-modern societies. Rather, and in a similar manner 
to Rapin, he maintained that despite the beneficial institutional 
changes that had taken place over the course of England’s history, a 
series of ancient political structures were key to the nation’s political 
life and underpinned its happiness and prosperity. On the other 
hand, however, Carte unambiguously rejected Rapin’s analysis of 
these structures. The Frenchman, and those opposition writers who 
drew on his work, had argued that England’s constitution was based 
on the Saxon principle that popular consent was required to change 
laws or raise taxes. Carte, in contrast, sought to show that monarchs 
had a natural right both to determine laws and to raise revenue 
independently of any public assembly. Key to the General History’s 
treatment of these claims was an expanded version of the narrative 
of English financial history which Carte had outlined in his response 
to Morris. Thus he used his discussion of the nation’s early history to 
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trace the emergence and operation of the system of feudal military 
tenures, and his account of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to 
narrate the events surrounding its eventual demise. His discussion of 
the administration of Ireland in the seventeenth century, meanwhile, 
served to show that a modern version of the feudal system had the 
potential to bring real commercial and financial benefits. These ele-
ments of Carte’s analysis will now be examined in turn.
2. Colonies and commerce in England’s ‘early’ history
Carte’s discussion of the emergence of political societies was based 
on the ideas of the seventeenth-century theorist of absolutism, Sir 
Robert Filmer. For Filmer, the origins of government lay in God’s 
decree that Adam should rule over his wife and her desires be subject 
to his.27 This power was then passed through Adam’s body to his pos-
terity, thereby maintaining a monarchical system through the flood 
to ‘the confusion of Babel’.28 ‘When kingdoms were first erected, 
planted or scattered over the face of the world’, Filmer continued,
we find [Genesis X, II] it was done by colonies of whole families, over 
which the prime fathers had supreme power, and were kings, who 
were all the sons or grandchildren of Noah, from whom they derived a 
fatherly and regal power over their families.29
Such an account served to demonstrate both that patriarchal power 
was directly sanctioned by God and, as a result of the role played by 
Noah’s descendants in settling European territories, that there was 
a direct historical link between sacred history and modern govern-
ments. Carte accepted this analysis and, in order to provide a narra-
tive of the precise genealogical origins of England’s monarchs, turned 
to the account of early Celtic history developed by the Breton abbé 
Paul-Yves Pezron. As Pezron had done, Carte opened his account 
with a discussion of Noah’s eldest son, Japhet. In accordance with 
God’s blessing and aided by an ‘antediluvian vigour’ that enabled 
extraordinarily lengthy lifespans, Japhet’s progeny had increased 
rapidly in number.30 As a result, two hundred years after the Deluge, 
men ‘found themselves in a condition to send out colonies […] into 
the different parts of the earth, to divide it among them, and as their 
families increased, to form many distinct nations’.31 The first colo-
nisers of Europe were Japhet’s children, Jaones or Iones, and Tiras 
140 COMMERCE, FINANCE AND STATECRAFT
or Tirax.32 The former occupied Attica and parts of Italy, while the 
latter, after settling in Phrygia, sent an ‘amazing’ number of colonies 
abroad, planting out territories in Poland, Russia, Germany, Gaul 
and later Spain. The dominance of these Phrygians was brought to 
an end by the Gomerians – also known as the Titans and Celtae – of 
Greater Asia, the descendants of Japhet’s eldest son, Gomer. This 
group, led by their kings Saturn, Jupiter and Mercury, had defeated 
the Phrygians in battle and incorporated them into their numbers. 
Tempted by Britain’s good air, fruitful soil and secure position, the 
Gomerians/Phrygians had travelled over from Gaul and populated 
and planted the empty territory.
The subsequent history of the island was characterised by violence 
and instability in the form of invasions from the Belgic-Celts, the 
Picts and later the Romans and Saxons. However, while each of 
these groups was socially and culturally distinctive, they had all, Carte 
argued, acted as colonisers of British lands, and with the exception 
of the Romans, had a common Gomerian/Phrygian heritage. This 
helped to ensure a shared approach to colonisation. On acquiring 
new territory, the head of a colony or clan – for Carte, the latter 
word was derived from the former – would divide up the land, taking 
what he wanted for himself and allotting to others distinct portions 
which they were to ‘cultivate and improve’.33 These lands became the 
property of their new proprietors ‘with some dependence however, 
or subordination to the chief of the family’.34 The core relationship 
was that between the ‘vassal’ and his clan leader, whereby the former 
received land from the latter in exchange for services and payments. 
Over time, the benefits and ‘credit and glory’ which attached itself to 
particular leaders as a result of territorial expansion led to the devel-
opment of a hereditary royalty, whereby not just sovereignty of the 
clan but of the whole kingdom descended lineally.35 Moreover, as the 
land acquired through conquest became too large to be managed by 
the king’s personal followers, he was required to distribute territory to 
‘other adventurers’.36 After a few generations, both these ‘sorts of vas-
sals’ being blended together ‘became equally obliged to pay to their 
common sovereign that obedience, which his own clan was always 
obliged to by the law of nature’.37 What resulted, therefore, was a 
system of feudalism, and the effect of Carte’s analysis, as Pocock has 
argued, was ‘to telescope feudal kingship with patriarchal’.38
The most significant shift in this landholding system was that 
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which followed the Norman invasion. Carte’s analysis of William’s 
reign, however, is by no means a straightforward one. On the one 
hand, the overthrow of England’s rightful monarch by an invading 
foreign army made it difficult for a Jacobite like Carte to avoid paral-
lels with England’s more recent history. Indeed, when Carte describes 
the feudal law as having exposed the populace to ‘various hardships, 
payments, and forfeitures unknown before’, and reduced them ‘to a 
state of more absolute dependence on the crown’, he clearly has post-
1688 events in mind as much as those that followed 1066.39 On the 
other hand, however, Carte was anxious to stress that the feudal law 
itself was ‘nothing but a collection of customs observed in the German 
and other nations with regard to the tenures of land’.40 Indeed, under 
the Saxons, the populace still had to provide various military and 
monetary offerings to their lords and monarchs, and many of the 
customs associated with the Normans ‘prevailed in England during 
the Saxon times’.41 Consequently, the Norman invasion did not rep-
resent an absolute break in the system of landownership, and the 
ongoing survival of feudalism ensured that there was a broad political 
continuity both to English and European history.
In tracing this continuity, Carte sought to emphasise that the 
emergence of feudal government had coincided with the develop-
ment of commerce. The key figure here was Mercury, the ‘heathen’ 
‘god of gain, of commerce and of merchandise, and […] the patron 
of merchants and travellers’.42 For Carte, Mercury was not a deity, 
but an ambitious and able Celtic ruler. The ‘encouragement’ of trade 
was one of his principal concerns, and he sought to link together his 
various kingdoms, which stretched from Asia to Spain, ‘in society 
and friendship by a mutual intercourse in the way of merchandise’.43 
Such an approach brought considerable prestige, as commerce con-
stituted ‘the never-failing means of making a people rich, and a state 
powerful’.44 Indeed, the period of Mercury’s government, and that of 
his father Jupiter and his uncle Pluto, constituted one ‘of industry, 
of plantations, and of commerce’.45 Further discussion of commerce, 
meanwhile, is to be found across Carte’s account of pre-Norman 
England. Thus while the Britons are presented as commercially 
backward, the Belgae who colonised England’s southern maritime 
provinces are described as having knowledge of ‘arts, wealth, and 
plenty of all things, the usual consequences of commerce, and a 
civilized manner of living’.46 The skills of monarchs in economic 
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statecraft are also noted. Athelstan, for example, is praised for having 
‘particularly encouraged’ the commerce of his subjects, while Alfred 
is said to have built new trading vessels ‘more commodious for com-
merce’, thereby helping to ensure that wealth ‘abounded in his realm; 
and gems, spices, with other oriental goods, were imported from the 
East-Indies’.47
A key effect of such analyses was to reduce the qualitative differ-
ences between ancient and modern history; indeed, monarchs such 
as Mercury and Alfred are shown to be ambitious, Stuart-style rulers 
committed to maintaining order and advancing the commercial 
interests of the nation and its people. Such an approach constituted a 
rejection of Whiggish claims about the deep historical roots of pop-
ular government, and served to demonstrate the historical priority 
both of feudal government and the political rights claimed by the 
Stuart kings and their Tory apologists. Equally significantly, through 
his discussion of commerce Carte supplemented these arguments by 
emphasising that feudal government was not a backward remnant 
of an oppressive age, but a system of political and social relations 
entirely compatible with the ambitions of a modern-style trading 
state. As a consequence, feudalism was vindicated by both its de jure 
historical status and the de facto benefits it was capable of generating.
3. Credit, commerce and modern history
In his discussion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Carte 
sought to trace the chain of events that had led to the breakdown 
of the monarchy in the 1640s. The most significant feature of his 
analysis in historiographical terms was its sophisticated account of 
the relationship between acts of statesmanship and social and eco-
nomic change. Thus, on the one hand, Carte assumed that the shifts 
in property relations that took place in the period were products of 
specific actions on the part of monarchs. On the other, however, 
changes in the balance of property, and the gradual erosion of the 
relationship between property and power, were shown to restrict the 
capacity of individual monarchs to shape their own financial and, 
ultimately, political affairs. As such, England’s economic foundations 
came to determine the character of its political superstructure.
Carte argued that the initial cause of these developments lay in 
a shift in the attributes of the landowning nobility. ‘The old heroic 
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race of nobility’ had been characterised by their ‘great qualities, 
noble sentiments, military glory, large estates, number of vassals, 
and unbounded hospitality’.48 This group, however, had in a manner 
been ‘extinguished by the civil wars between the houses of York and 
Lancaster’.49 The few families who survived, meanwhile, had seen 
the material basis of their power undermined. Henry VII introduced 
legal reforms that weakened the lords’ control over their vassals and 
permitted them to alienate their land. Later, they were attacked by 
Henry VIII, excluded from counsels by Elizabeth and debased by 
James, who, through ennobling a series of favourites and moneyed 
men, undermined the credibility of noble distinctions. As a result, a 
new type of nobility emerged distinguished by a very different spirit 
than their predecessors. As Carte observed:
zeal for the publick good and the glory of their country, gave way to 
private interest: and the lust of power, the quest of profitable offices, 
and beneficial grants, the amassing of wealth by projects oppressive to 
the people, got the better of those generous sentiments, which a course 
of military service, and an emulation of the glory of great ancestors, 
seldom failed to inspire.50
It was, therefore, the demise of the old race of nobility, themselves 
the physical and spiritual successors of the feudal clan leaders, which 
had allowed the rise of a new class of individuals and a new and 
pernicious value system.
This shift was accompanied by a series of alterations in England’s 
political infrastructure. While Carte conceived of the Commons as 
a recent addition to England’s political infrastructure, he acknowl-
edged its value and maintained that it needed to represent both 
landed and moneyed forms of property. However, in the current 
Parliament, whereas the landed interest was represented by 92 mem-
bers ‘and the trading or moneyed interest by about an hundred’, 
there were ‘300 representatives of small, inconsiderable, and many of 
these beggarly, burroughs’.51 The origins of this development could 
be traced back to the seventeenth century; while there had been no 
‘ill proportion’ of representation in the reign of James, the Puritans 
had been able to wheedle their way into power at the 1640 election 
by corrupting the ‘little freeholders of 40 shillings a year’.52 The effect 
of this, meanwhile, was to render England an international laughing 
stock. As Carte noted,
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Foreigners, that know and reflect on this inequality in the representa-
tion, which cannot reconcile to common sense, stand amazed at hear-
ing us brag of the excellency of our constitution, when it labours under 
so fundamental a defect: and are apt to doubt, whether the sense of 
parliament be really the sense of the nation.53
These developments, Carte argued, had had catastrophic conse-
quences for the Stuart monarchy, the most significant of which was a 
debilitating credit crisis. Underpinning his analysis was the assump-
tion that ‘MONEY is necessary in all great undertakings’ and, as a 
consequence, ‘NOTHING hurts the affairs of a prince so much as 
indigence: it takes off from the influence of his authority, and is the 
ruin of his reputation’.54 Such ideas meant that financial credit was 
of the utmost importance, and led Carte to provide a comparative 
history of the successes and failures of various monarchs in securing 
credit from their people. Key to this analysis was a paradigm shift in 
systems of credit which had taken place after Elizabeth’s death. Under 
the Tudor monarchs, Carte showed, bad financial management had 
led to the demise of credit, just as good financial management had 
served to advance it. Mary I, for example, through confiscating estates 
and failing to pay the money she owed, lost the confidence of her 
people and, as a consequence, ‘no body cared to trust her’.55 This ‘want 
of credit’, Carte noted, ‘proved the source of great inconveniences’.56 
Such conduct contrasted sharply with that of both her predecessor and 
her successor. Thus Edward was ‘careful to pay his debts and maintain 
his credit’.57 Similarly, it was, Carte argued, the City of London’s 
perception of Elizabeth’s ‘œconomy’ which ‘kept up [her] credit’.58
The situation with regard to the Stuarts, however, was more com-
plicated. Carte was by no means uncritical of James, and acknowl-
edged that he lacked the frugality of his predecessor. Equally, 
however, as was conventional in Royalist/Tory accounts, the General 
History argued that James’s approach to government was in line with 
Elizabethan precedents and that his financial problems had their 
origin in the debts he had inherited from Elizabeth and the necessary 
costs of funding the Court. James’s inability to navigate his way out 
of this situation, meanwhile, was a product of the Puritan faction 
who ‘wanted to keep the king necessitous, that they might the easier 
carry their point in depressing the royal prerogative’.59 The result was 
a series of confrontations between the Stuarts and the Commons in 
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which James and Charles always had right, conceived of in feudalistic 
terms, on their side. Thus taxation in the forms of ‘fifteenth and 
tenths’ was not a ‘free gift’ from the Commons, but rather
a commutation for those services, and duties annexed to their tenures, 
in consideration whereof, their lands had been originally granted, and 
which being as much due to the king, as rent is from a lessee to a 
landlord, their estates would have been forfeited for want of payment 
and breach of covenants.60
As such, the Commons could not legitimately withhold taxation 
from their monarch. Similarly, forced loans to the monarchy were ‘a 
seigniorial right, due to them in their necessities, from their tenants 
or vassals’.61 These loans ‘were due, by common right, to all lords 
of fiefs, according to the feudal law, which prevailed in all parts of 
Europe’.62 Similarly, in his various discussions of taxes on commerce, 
Carte invoked the work of the legal scholars Sir Henry Finch and 
Sir John Davies to argue that it was the ‘law merchant’ which gave 
the king the right both to levy impositions on his merchants and 
to decide the level of those impositions.63 This area of law, he con-
tended, formed part of the ‘law of nations’ and was of ‘equal force in 
all countries’.64 As a result, the attempts by both supporters and crit-
ics of the Stuarts to justify or condemn commercial taxes by reference 
to specific precedents in statute and common law were fundamentally 
misguided; James’s and Charles’s right was grounded in a universal 
code, not a local one.
Such claims were the product of an absolute rejection of the ideas 
of English exceptionalism that had underpinned Rapin’s analysis, 
and they allowed Carte to present resistance to the taxes of James 
and Charles from Parliament as a rebellion against both established 
practice and the natural order of things. However, while the Stuarts 
had right on their side, it was not de jure, but de facto material factors 
that determined events. Through their success in restricting the royal 
income, the Puritans, Carte argued, were able to impoverish the 
Crown. The consequences of this were catastrophic. James’s ‘want 
of money […] was universally known; and […] encouraged discon-
tented persons at home [and] lessened his reputation and influence 
abroad’.65 As a result, the King’s ‘royal dignity could not keep him 
from falling into a general contempt’.66 By the time Charles suc-
ceeded to the throne, the monarchy was already doomed. The King, 
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Carte emphasised, had a range of enviable virtues, among them a ‘love 
of order and oeconomy’ and a ‘constant application to business’.67 
Had he succeeded Elizabeth, he might, therefore, have preserved 
the prerogative.68 However, ‘this was now impracticable’.69 Lacking 
the credit to raise money, ‘his necessities laid him at the mercy of a 
parliament’.70 This body, dominated as it was by a Puritan faction, 
secured ever more demeaning concessions from the King, among 
them the abandonment of the feudal duties that had previously been 
key to government finances.71 As a result, the financial foundations 
on which the monarchy depended broke down, virtue and credit 
became entirely disassociated, and it became impossible for even a 
good monarch like Charles to hold on to power.
Such an argument enabled Carte, with rather more success than 
Salmon, to develop a Tory attack on Whiggism. This critique had 
two core elements. On the one hand, he provided a conventional, 
Tory-style defence of the Stuarts, which presented them not as 
the perpetrators but as the victims of unconstitutional practices. 
In doing so, he entirely rejected the Old Whig assumptions that 
underpinned the work of both Rapin and the Patriot opposition. On 
the other, his work contained a new version of his previous attack 
on the Court Whigs. Thus, whereas his response to Morris had 
been structured around a schematic comparison between pre- and 
post-1688 approaches to government revenue, the General History 
provided a narrative of the events that had led one set of practices 
to be replaced by the other. His account, however, retained a clear 
polemical focus. Carte’s key point was that a system of property and 
power relations which was in line with both English and European 
historical practices and which brought real benefits to the nation had 
been unjustly and unwisely abolished. In its place had emerged an 
approach that severed the links between property and power, had 
no historical precedents, and served only to forward a self-interested 
Whiggish faction.
The General History’s defence of the old feudal system was further 
supported by its discussion of the growth of trade under the Tudors 
and Stuarts. Indeed, for Carte, while the first two Stuart kings had 
been unable to secure a workable level of income for themselves, their 
statecraft had, like that of their Tudor predecessors, played a central 
role both in advancing the nation’s mercantile interests and bringing 
prosperity to its people. Showing how monarchs with very differ-
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ent characters and interests had, over an extended period of time, 
contributed to economic improvements was, however, no straight-
forward task. And, in forwarding such a thesis, Carte developed 
a complex and, at times, contradictory analysis of the commercial 
aspects of economic statecraft.
The tensions in his discussion can be seen particularly clearly in 
relation to Henry VII. Carte based his account of the King, which 
formed the closing section of the General History’s second volume, 
on the Tacitean principle that ‘the vices of a man, and the neces-
sity of his affairs, sometimes produce a conduct, which virtue would 
inspire into others’.72 And while for Carte, Henry’s ‘insatiable’ avarice 
ensured that ‘never was prince so utterly devoid of all sentiments of 
honour, good-nature, generosity, and magnanimity’, this vice had 
also been behind some of his key achievements in law and, perhaps 
most importantly, trade.73 Thus Henry is said to have ‘encouraged 
commerce, as it improved his customs, and brought money in to 
his subjects, which he could squeeze out at his pleasure’.74 A rather 
different argument, however, emerges in the first pages of Volume 3 
when Carte contrasts Henry VIII’s approach to statecraft with that 
of his father. The use of ‘divers heavy and illegal tolls and exactions’ 
meant that the government of the first Tudor king had worked ‘to the 
great discouragement of trade’.75 It was only when his successor lifted 
these restrictions, Carte continued, that merchants began ‘to resume 
with vigour the foreign commerce which they had been forced to 
interrupt’.76
The core contradiction here cannot be easily resolved; it is diffi-
cult to see how Henry VII could have simultaneously ‘encouraged’ 
and acted ‘to the great discouragement’ of commerce. Indeed, the 
consistency of Carte’s analysis appears to have been weakened by, 
on the one hand, his respect for Bacon’s History, from which he 
quotes frequently, and, on the other, his desire to emphasise that 
Henry VIII’s government represented a complete departure from 
that of his father. As a result, a tension emerges between a Tacitean 
analysis concerning the potential benefits of vice and a Livian-style 
commentary on exemplary public-spirited achievement.
A similar combination of approaches is employed in relation to 
Elizabeth. Carte is more disparaging about the Queen than many of 
his contemporaries, and pays particular attention to her dissimula-
tion. However, while this dissimulation is, on occasions, criticised, it 
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is also seen as the root of many of Elizabeth’s achievements. Indeed, 
Carte presents her much-celebrated ‘prudence’ as ‘in many cases 
the effect of low cunning, and of the diffidence or jealousy of her 
nature’.77 In relation to commerce, however, the analysis is rather 
more conventional. Thus he emphasised that the ‘encouragement of 
commerce’ and ‘the reformation of the coin’ were among the glories 
of her reign, and he paraphrased the Annales’ accounts of, among 
other things, the Muscovy Company, the Turkey Company, coinage, 
the copper trade and the role played by Huguenot manufacturers.78 
In his commentary on the Queen’s motivations, meanwhile, Carte 
attributed her interest in economic affairs to her desire to increase the 
trade of her subjects, and went on both to endorse and, on occasion, 
extend Camden’s analysis. Thus he repeated the Annales’ claim that 
the Queen’s recall of debased money could not have been done with-
out ‘a very great loss to her’.79 Carte, however, supplemented these 
remarks by adding that ‘she gladly suffered that loss for the good of 
her subjects, and for retrieving the glory of the nation’.80
In relation to James, these ideas were given a polemical twist. 
‘Never prince took more pains for [the good of his people]’, Carte 
noted, ‘or was more truly desirous to promote their happiness, and 
advance their interests, particularly in the point of commerce.’81 In 
demonstrating this, the General History made extensive use of the 
work of Howes, paraphrasing, for example, his accounts of James’s 
role in establishing an English silk industry,82 and drawing on his 
discussions of the East India trade83 and England’s Atlantic colo-
nies.84 The establishment of the latter, it was emphasised, constituted 
‘the almost onely advantageous trade, which exorbitant taxes and a 
general corruption have left us, that of our American colonies; all, 
except, Jamaica’ had been ‘planted by [James’s] care’, and throve 
as a result of his ‘continual encouragement’.85 What made such 
achievements in commercial statecraft particularly impressive were 
the difficult financial circumstances in which James operated. As 
Carte emphasised: ‘The care, which the king was forced to take for 
his own subsistence, did not take off from his constant attention to 
the commerce of his subjects.’86 This sort of analysis enabled Carte to 
develop a comparison between the approach of the King and that of 
his Puritan critics. Whereas James worked purely to protect the inter-
ests of his people, the Puritans, who were undermining his finances 
and authority, employed ‘an arbitrary and tyrannical [approach]; as 
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might naturally be expected from a sect, whose views were selfish, 
and whose chief aim was power’.87 At the same time, Carte’s account 
of commercial statecraft served to emphasise the unjustified nature 
of the rebellion against the Stuarts. By the time of Charles I’s reign, 
‘the English were’, he argued, ‘in an happier state than any nation 
in Europe’.88 Indeed, anyone who considered the state of the nation 
would have noted
the plenty that reigned in every part of it, the impartial administration 
of justice, the lightness of the publick charge, […] the flourishing con-
dition of her trade, the credit of her merchants in all foreign exchanges, 
greater than that of any others in Europe, [and] the daily increase of her 
manufactures.89
The Puritans, therefore, had, for no good reason, dismantled a suc-
cessful, natural and commercial mode of government.
4. Carte and Ireland
An examination of the ways in which this mode of government had 
collapsed forms the bulk of Carte’s discussion of the seventeenth 
century and, as a result, the tone of his narrative is mournful and, on 
occasions, angry and despairing. A more positive form of analysis, 
however, emerges in relation to Ireland. Before James’s reign, Carte 
argued, the territory was in a chaotic state. Its troubles had their 
origins in the actions of Henry II who, when England gained control 
of the island, granted vast tracts of Irish land to English ‘adventur-
ers’.90 Free from direct monarchical control, these noblemen entered 
into a series of violent quarrels with one another, and treated the 
native population as slaves.91 Moreover, despite a series of later land 
redistributions, the size of individual holdings remained far too large 
for individual undertakers, and this, in combination with the wars 
which ravaged the territory, reduced it to ‘a desolate condition’.92 The 
people of Ireland, meanwhile, were accustomed to simple food that 
cost them no labour and, as a result, had little motivation to work.93
To resolve these problems, James introduced a series of land 
reforms. Across the territory, he ensured that tenants were ‘charged 
only with certain rents in lieu of all uncertain Irish exactions’, thereby 
undermining the power and influence of the ‘old chieftains’ while 
giving the tenants increased independence.94 More dramatic reforms 
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took place in Ulster, where James embarked on an ambitious scheme 
of land improvement, dividing the northern counties into a series 
of plantations of 2,000, 1,500 and 1,000 acres.95 To an extent, the 
aim of such a division was similar to Henry VII’s attempts to pre-
vent depopulation – as described by Bacon and Harrington – in the 
sense that it broke up large tracts of land into smaller, more easily 
cultivatable portions. However, whereas Harrington had seen such 
measures as leading to the demise of feudalism, Carte conceived 
of James’s actions as a return to feudalistic first principles. Indeed, 
like the clan leaders who had first colonised Europe, James allotted 
‘distinct portions and dividends of land’ to various individuals who 
were then charged with the task of cultivating and improving it, but 
who retained a ‘subordination’ to the chief.96 This subordination was 
expressed in part through a series of services that were due to the 
monarch and that Carte described using the standard terms of feudal 
land tenure. Thus those with the largest territories held ‘immedi-
ately of the crown in capite [, …] those of 1500 by knights service’ 
and the smaller grants ‘in common soccage’.97 The results of such 
reforms were dramatic. As a consequence of James’s actions, Carte 
argued, Ulster was ‘at present, perhaps, the best cultivated country in 
Europe’.98 The rents he was able to obtain, meanwhile, ensured that 
it became a source of considerable government revenue and this, in 
turn, enabled him to instigate and, in part, to fund a series of reforms 
to support the clergy. These initiatives were accompanied by a scheme 
to introduce commerce through granting charters for markets and 
fairs in all ‘the considerable towns’.99 While such charters, Carte 
noted, were inconvenient for more advanced societies, they were 
necessary for a territory ‘in infancy of trade’ and were calculated to 
‘keep [the Irish] in subjection to the crown, and advance the interests 
of peace and commerce’.100 Taken in sum, James’s actions, Carte 
concluded in his character of the King, had reduced Ireland to ‘a state 
of peace, order, civility, and industry’ and laid ‘the first foundation of 
that flourishing condition, to which it is now arrived’.101
This discussion of Ireland served as an important counterpoint to 
his analysis of England. The erosion of feudal values in England had 
created disorder and a system of public credit in which virtue was 
no longer able to determine credit. The restoration of a quasi-feudal 
system of land holdings in Ireland, meanwhile, was shown to have 
brought order to the territory and wealth to both its people and 
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its monarch. At one level, therefore, Ireland represented a rejection 
of ‘modern’ approaches to finance and commerce. James’s actions 
served to ground the funding of the Irish government not in large-
scale borrowing and a system of public credit based on ‘opinion’, but 
rather in wealth derived directly from the land. As such, his state-
craft had rather more in common with the actions of Mercury and 
England’s Briton and Saxon chiefs than it did with the Robinocracy. 
For Carte, however, such an approach did not entail a retreat into a 
 pre-commercial idyll; rather, its merit lay in its capacity to support 
a nation’s trading and financial interests more effectively than any 
‘modern’ alternative.
Conclusion
Thomas Salmon’s Modern History and Thomas Carte’s General 
History are rooted in the economic statecraft tradition. Their key 
sources on early modern finance and commerce were Bacon, Camden 
and Howes and, like these writers, Salmon and Carte provided nar-
rative accounts of how England’s monarchs had shaped the nation’s 
economic successes and failures. Through doing so, they developed 
a series of examples of good and bad practice, which emphasised 
that successful government was a product of a monarch’s capacity to 
ensure that his or her actions were shaped by the public’s interests 
rather than any private desires for self-enrichment. In this sense, 
therefore, both writers offered moralistic and didactic analyses. 
Discussions of borrowing and credit could be slotted neatly into this 
framework. Indeed, both Salmon and Carte used their accounts of 
Tudor government to provide commentary on the ways in which 
public credit was boosted by virtuous statesmanship and destroyed 
by corruption and selfishness. Equally significantly, however, what 
distinguished their analyses from earlier accounts was a conception 
of modernity as an era in which conventional economic statecraft 
had broken down. For Salmon, the ongoing problems England had 
with debt were a symptom of this. Rather than being ruled by its 
own monarchs, the nation had become prey to a series of pernicious 
Genevan, Scottish and, most damagingly, Dutch influences. These 
groups had corrupted the people, led governments to act against the 
nation’s interests, and through their influence encouraged a damag-
ing programme of borrowing. In contrast, for Carte, it was debt that 
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had caused the nation’s problems. The difficult financial situation in 
which James found himself, and the failure of Parliament to pro-
vide the levies which were due to the King, served to undermine 
monarchical prerogatives. This ensured that, despite the commercial 
successes of James and Charles, by the start of the latter’s reign the 
monarchy had lost the power to shape its own financial future. What 
unites Salmon’s and Carte’s work, therefore, is the idea that a signif-
icant shift had taken place both in the attitudes of the populace and 
the structure of England’s economic institutions. For Salmon, there 
was some hope; a Tory government, free from Dutch influence, was 
shown to be capable of reviving, in part at least, England’s fortunes. 
Carte, however, assumed that economic problems could no longer 
be solved simply through good statecraft; rather, a more far-reaching 
series of property reforms were required in order to return the consti-
tution to first principles.
In developing such narratives, we see the beginnings of a new 
approach to historiography. The economic statecraft tradition 
assumed that a statesman’s performance as a manager of the nation’s 
financial and commercial interests would be determined by his or her 
character. Historians were, of course, aware that monarchs inherited 
kingdoms in varying degrees of affluence and poverty. However, even 
a debt-ridden kingdom such as that taken over by Elizabeth was 
shown to be revivable; as such, it provided further evidence of the 
power of skill and virtue to restore a nation’s fortunes. In contrast 
to this, Salmon and Carte’s discussions of Stuart England provided 
analyses of long-term economic changes, which had undermined 
the power of character to determine events. Indeed, Carte’s account 
sought to show that in the modern era, the actions of monarchs 
were shaped by, rather than shaping, financial affairs. For the Tory 
historians with whom the last two chapters have been concerned, 
such a state of affairs was a highly troubling consequence of a loss 
of monarchical prerogative. Other writers, however, as we shall see, 
were to view these developments as evidence of the increasing success 
of England’s commercial endeavours.
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Economic statecraft 
and economic progress: 
William Guthrie’s General History
The middle years of the eighteenth century saw the emergence of 
a new, enlightened approach to history. Underpinning this mode 
of writing was the assumption that the level of progress achieved 
in modern-day Europe distinguished it from any previous histor-
ical period.1 To an extent, the novel qualities of the present were 
conceived of in political terms. With regard to England in particu-
lar, there was support for the Tory/Court Whig argument that the 
nation’s much-celebrated liberty had its origins not in Saxon or pre-
Saxon history, but rather in the constitutional and cultural shifts pro-
duced by the tumultuous events of the seventeenth century. Equally, 
there was a growing belief that a range of intellectual and cultural 
fields – among them technology, manufacture, the arts and sciences, 
and, perhaps most importantly, manners – had been transformed 
over the past hundred years and that, in some sense, these devel-
opments were interconnected.2 Incorporating such diverse subject 
matter into a conventional narrative posed considerable challenges, 
and some writers, most famously the Scottish conjectural historians, 
dispensed with the chronological approach altogether.3 Neoclassical 
conceptions, however, as Philip Hicks’s account of the subject has 
shown, continued to shape the ways in which British writers and 
readers viewed history.4 Consequently, there was a desire to provide 
an account that conformed to the conventional understanding of 
history as ‘a continued Narration of things True, Great and Publick’, 
but that was able to explain and narrate the recent shifts which had 
transformed Europe’s nation states.5 Such ideas served to alter the 
emphasis of English narrative history in two important ways. On the 
one hand, they expanded the genre’s thematic range. And although 
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politics remained the primary subject, England’s political history was 
shown to have shaped and been shaped by a range of non-political 
developments. On the other hand, history’s narrative focus tightened. 
The desire of post-Civil War party-political histories to show the 
benefits of government of a particular ideological hue led them to 
present the character and conduct of the monarch as the key force 
determining the character of a particular era. As a result, English his-
tory was conceived of as the site of a series of abrupt transformations 
in the nation’s fortunes, as good and bad monarchs succeeded one 
another in rapid succession. While later writers did not necessarily 
ignore the character of individual statesmen, the impact of character 
was shown to be restricted by a wider set of institutional and ide-
ological considerations. Attention, meanwhile, came to be focused 
around a single epoch-defining shift: the decay of a medieval, feudal 
society and the emergence of a modern, commercial one.
These ideas ensured that commerce acquired a unique degree of 
importance within historical narratives as both a significant agent 
in bringing about the demise of feudalism and the defining charac-
teristic of the system that replaced it. An enlightened society, it was 
assumed, was necessarily a commercial one and it became a key task 
for historians to trace the causes and trajectory of England’s economic 
progress. In giving commerce these roles, however, historians came 
to conceptualise it in new ways. It was not, in its modern form at 
least, simply an activity that could be promoted with varying degrees 
of effectiveness by a monarch. Rather it was a complex system of 
exchanging goods and services that had evolved over a substantial 
period of time and that, despite its dependence on government and 
the law, was partially independent from them. As such, commerce 
had its own history, and this history had a complex and frequently 
shifting relationship with political events.
The final part of this book examines the consequences of these 
developments for economic statecraft. Chapter 9 will show that 
David Hume’s History of England used such an approach as the basis 
for an out-and-out attack on the record both of England’s monarchs 
and previous historians as, respectively, managers and chroniclers of 
the nation’s economic interests. This chapter, meanwhile, explores 
how the Scottish historian William Guthrie constructed a narrative 
of political and economic progress through drawing on and devel-
oping the ideas that underpinned the economic statecraft tradition.
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1. Guthrie as a political journalist
The sophisticated account of the relationship between government, 
commerce and liberty that Guthrie developed in his General History 
(1744–51) had its origins in his career as a political journalist. Born 
in Forfarshire in around 1708, Guthrie moved to London in the early 
1730s to become, as James Boswell described him, ‘an Authour by 
Profession’.6 From 1735 to 1740 he was employed by the Gentleman’s 
Magazine as a parliamentary reporter, where he worked in close 
collaboration with his eventual successor, Samuel Johnson.7 It was 
also in this period that he began his involvement in anti-ministerial 
polemic, serving as a writer for Common Sense (1737–44) and, from 
1743 onwards, as co-editor with James Ralph of Old England, or, 
the Constitutional Journal.8 The latter paper was superintended and, 
on occasions, written by the Patriot politician and propagandist 
Lord Chesterfield. Its primary aim was to undermine support for the 
Pelham government by showing how the administration’s support 
for Hanover, particularly its controversial decision to take on 16,000 
German troops, had been highly detrimental to British interests. 
While this line of argument failed to significantly dent Pelham’s par-
liamentary majority, it did provoke excitement among Jacobites and 
considerable disquiet in government.9 In March 1743 a clampdown 
was attempted. Following the simultaneous publication of anti- 
Hanoverian articles in Old England and Common Sense, Guthrie was 
arrested and his papers confiscated.10 Such moves, however, did little 
to circumscribe Old England ’s activities and, following a few days of 
incarceration, Guthrie took up his pen once more. Predictably, per-
haps, the response from the opposition and its supporters contrasted 
sharply with that of the government. Whereas for William Pitt the 
paper was written with ‘a truly British constitutional spirit’, for the 
Marquis of Hartington it was ‘direct treason’ which, unless action 
was taken, would bring about ‘an end of government’.11
Much of Old England ’s invective was expressed through commen-
tary on England’s history, with particular reference to commercial 
and financial issues. The paper’s main strategy was to explore the par-
allels between the most nefarious political figures from ‘Old England’ 
and leading figures in the Pelham administration. In the number 
for 5 March 1743, Guthrie, writing under the pseudonym Jeffrey 
Broadbottom, argued that while both the Stuart kings and Cromwell 
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had made significant mistakes, these had been partially mitigated by 
their achievements.12 James I’s reign, for example, was dominated by 
the King’s ‘timorous cowardly Politics’.13 However, the pernicious 
effects of such practices were counteracted ‘by the Care then taken 
of the Commerce of England and the Establishment of several very 
useful Public Bodies’.14 Similarly, ‘the degenerate Court of the second 
Charles’ was ‘distinguished by several masterly Strokes in Politics, in 
Arms, and in Commerce’.15 In contrast, Guthrie continued, ‘for the 
present [government] what Merit can be pleaded; what Praise can 
even ingenious Adulation bestow upon it?’16
Similar ideas were expressed in an even more direct way in the 
paper’s November 1744 account of Richard Empson. Empson, 
Guthrie observed, was one of the most unpopular ministers England 
had ever seen. By contemporary standards, however, his crimes were 
not of the utmost severity. The money he extorted was distributed 
‘amongst Men of Learning and Merit; and the Royal Coffers were 
always so full that the King was well served, both in his Household, 
Cabinet and Camps’.17 Empson did not, however,
sooth his Master’s Passion for a foreign Interest, dangerous, incompat-
ible with, and dishonourable to that of England. […] He has not dar’d 
to contract with foreign Powers as a general Undertaker for burying, 
in Defence of a lowly Territory, the Commerce, Interest, Money, and 
Glory of Old England.18
Guthrie’s polemical strategy here is, at one level, a straightforward 
one; the paper uses a comparative form of history to show the 
degenerate state of modern England and to highlight the failures 
of Hanoverian governments. What is noteworthy, however, is his 
Tacitean contention that, particularly with regard to economic affairs, 
statesmen with significant moral and political flaws had the capacity 
to advance the nation’s interests. The comparison, therefore, was not 
between the virtue of the past and the vice of the present, but rather 
between the manageable and sometimes publicly advantageous vices 
and malpractices of ‘Old England’ and the modern age’s catastrophic 
and publicly detrimental failings.
On other occasions, Old England developed a quasi-Harringtonian 
form of argument which owed much to the writing of Bolingbroke. 
In the number for 2 March 1745, for example, the paper launched 
an attack on the septennial Act, by providing a general outline of 
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England’s history. Originally, Guthrie argued, the country had been 
an ‘aristocratical’ state in which the balance of the land was held 
by the king, nobility and Church.19 The people joined sometimes 
with the king and sometimes with the nobility ‘as they found either 
inclin’d to favour public Liberty’.20 This balance survived until the 
reign of Henry VII, a ‘designing Prince’ who, using ‘Methods foreign 
to the Design of this Paper’, was able to terminally weaken the ‘great 
Pin’ which, on occasions at least, had linked the people’s interests to 
those of the nobility.21 Through the first part of the Tudor period the 
balance of property shifted from the nobility to the people, thereby 
ensuring that when Elizabeth came to the throne, ‘the Government 
from Aristocratical came to be Popular’.22 The Queen was aware of 
this and ‘found her Government upon its natural Basis, the Affections 
of her People’.23 The first two Stuart kings, in contrast, sought to 
restore aristocratic powers, first through imprisoning members of 
the Commons and later by extending the duration of Parliaments 
in order to render MPs ‘independent of their Constituents’.24 
Guthrie’s polemical point here was a conventional one: that modern 
governments, through extending the length of Parliaments to seven 
years, were behaving in an ‘aristocratical’ manner that resembled the 
Stuarts. Such an approach, however, was viewed as ill-advised not so 
much because it violated the ancient constitution, but rather because 
it unnaturally contravened the modern balance of property. The 
implication, therefore, was that the ‘progress’ achieved with regard 
to property relations rendered aristocratic government anachronistic.
2. The General History
The General History (1744–51) was published in weekly parts, the 
first of which went on sale on 25 February 1744.25 At this time, 
Guthrie was still actively working as a political journalist, and adver-
tisements for the History in Old England were frequently placed 
immediately alongside his articles for the paper. In 1746, however, 
using a time-honoured technique for eliminating troublesome 
polemicists, the government attempted to prise him away from the 
opposition with the offer of a pension.26 The move appears to have 
been a successful one. Guthrie accepted the deal, retaining the £200 
pension for the rest of his life and, as the historian and biographer 
Thomas Birch noted in a letter of July 1747, he went on to affect 
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‘the character of a most zealous subject’.27 To an extent, this change 
of circumstances, coupled with a seemingly genuine desire – even 
before financial inducements were offered – to produce a history 
devoid of a party-political agenda, served to ensure that his formal, 
historical writing was different in character to his journalism. The 
General History was principally concerned with providing a narrative 
of progress, an account of the interconnected development of liberty 
and commerce across England’s history. Entirely absent from the 
work, meanwhile, were the direct commentaries on contemporary 
events, and the politically charged parallels between past and present, 
which had characterised his journalism.
Guthrie did not, however, reject his earlier ideas entirely. Two 
points are of particular significance here. First, underpinning his 
analysis of progress was a version of the Harringtonian thesis that he 
had employed in Old England. This aspect of his work was outlined in 
the General History’s preface where he noted his intention to conclude 
his account with a ‘dissertation’, which would aim
above all things, to mark the progress of the English commerce through 
its several gradations; and to trace the true sources of the necessity 
of that great alteration of property which was then introduced, and 
which, in effect, completed the durable fabric of our constitution as it 
now exists.28
By the time he came to write the dissertation around seven years later, 
however, Guthrie was aware that he had been ‘necessarily obliged, to 
take into the body of the […] history’ so much of this material that 
the dissertation itself was largely redundant.29 Indeed, the General 
History is perhaps best understood as an attempt to transform the 
brief Harringtonian sketches that been mainstays of Patriot prop-
aganda into a complete, classical-style narrative of English history.
Second, Tacitean ideas of statecraft were of central importance to 
Guthrie’s historical work. And, as had been the case in Old England, 
he was particularly concerned with tracing the contribution that 
non-virtuous actions could make to economic affairs. Indeed, the 
General History sought to demonstrate that the self-interested and 
arbitrary practices of England’s monarchs had been supported by 
and played a vital role in generating wise commercial and financial 
reforms. Such arguments, it will be shown, when combined with the 
Harringtonian elements of his analysis, helped to produce a complex 
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and often paradoxical account of the ways in which monarchical 
achievements in economic statecraft could, potentially, both support 
and undermine liberty.
For Guthrie, as for other writers influenced by Harrington, the 
reign of Henry VII constituted a key turning point in England’s 
history. Its chief glory was the King’s programme ‘to raise, to cherish, 
and to support […] the industrious commoners’, a group who ‘not 
living in an abject, despicable dependance on the great, availed them-
selves of the rising arts, and flowing commerce, which began now 
to distinguish England’.30 Henry was aware that the main threat to 
the commoners came from the nobility or barons, who had ‘a strong 
tendency […] to envy and oppress the wealthy merchant and the 
ingenious mechanic’.31 Consequently, he sought to counteract this 
group’s pernicious influence by undermining the system of feudal 
landownership on which their power was based. Guthrie’s phrasing 
in this account is significant. The idea that Henry had supported the 
‘commoners’ or ‘middle people’ in order to diminish the power of the 
nobility and advance his own authority was a standard theme in his-
torical writing. As we have seen, this mode of analysis had its origins 
in the work of Bacon and had shaped the property-based analyses 
of Harrington and the neo-Harringtonian writers who followed in 
his wake, Bolingbroke among them. At the same time, discussion of 
Henry’s successful management of England’s commercial interests 
was a feature of much post-Baconian history. Guthrie’s key move, 
however, was to fuse these elements together by arguing that Henry’s 
support for the ‘commoners’ explicitly involved defending the inter-
ests of merchants and tradesmen. Indeed, Henry’s aim, as was noted 
in the dissertation at the conclusion of the General History, was to 
‘put the industrious and trading part of the nation into a method of 
becoming proprietors in the soil’.32
To provide an account of the specific measures that Henry had 
employed, Guthrie turned to Rymer’s Foedera, contemporary legal 
records and, most importantly, Bacon. Thus, he paraphrased Bacon’s 
commentaries on the laws to counter depopulation and eliminate fines 
on the alienation and mortgaging of land, and repeated the former 
Lord Chancellor’s account of Empson and Dudley.33 All of these 
measures were presented as part of the King’s grand plan to transfer 
property to the commons. At the same time, the Scotsman offered 
a full Baconian vindication of Henry’s management of England’s 
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commercial interests. Guthrie accepted, therefore, Bacon’s analy-
sis of avarice, arguing that the King ‘pursued many […] measures 
for advancing the trade of his subjects, as being the most effectual 
manner of filling his own coffers’.34 Finally, the General History’s 
principal verdict on Henry’s economic statecraft was derived directly 
from Bacon: Henry’s successes, it was noted, were a product of his 
ability to prioritise ‘power’ over ‘plenty’.35
These Baconian borrowings were then used to support the stand-
ard Harringtonian conclusion on Henry’s reign. During his lifetime, 
Guthrie noted, Henry had been an oppressive ruler who had brought 
a good deal of suffering to his people. However,
the moment that [he] left the stage, and the curtain was dropped, 
the tricks of his cunning vanished, while the effects of his wisdom 
remained. His people, no longer oppressed by his craft, found them-
selves happy in his art; government then gave way to law, and justice 
succeeded to rigour.36
Underpinning this account, meanwhile, was a highly ambivalent 
view of the relationship between liberty and commerce. It was 
Henry’s success in managing commerce and promoting the interests 
of the trading population, Guthrie argued, that had ensured that 
‘wealth and liberty’ emerged during his reign from the ‘pressure of 
corruption, oppression and prerogative’.37 However, the wealth that 
commerce generated was also shown to have had a soporific effect 
on the populace. The fact that England, ‘as an independent, trading 
state, was now in a higher pitch of happiness than perhaps it had 
ever known before’ explained why the people were unwilling to resist 
the incursions Henry had made on popular liberties.38 For Guthrie, 
therefore, as for Bolingbroke, ‘drops of Manna’ from trade had the 
capacity to soften any murmurs of complaint from the populace, and 
to ease the way for arbitrary forms of government.39
These arguments regarding property and commerce were devel-
oped further when Guthrie came to discuss the reign of Elizabeth. 
His key move – one that would have been rejected vociferously both 
by Whigs such as Rapin and Tories such as Salmon – was to pres-
ent Elizabeth as continuing the approach to government developed 
by Henry. With regard to property, this link was made explicitly. 
Whereas the reigns of her predecessors had seen power slip back to 
the nobility, Elizabeth followed the plan of her ‘wise grandfather’ 
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and took ‘every opportunity to add to the growing property of the 
commons’.40 In relation to economic issues the link was implicit, with 
Guthrie praising Elizabeth’s measures in a similar manner to those of 
Henry. His key source here was Camden, and despite offering some 
criticism of the Annales, he used it frequently. Thus for Guthrie, as 
for Camden, the root cause of Elizabeth’s success was her ‘oecon-
omy’, which ensured that she swiftly repaid any loans she took out, 
and administered her revenues frugally.41 More generally, through 
summarising material from the Annales, he was able to present the 
Queen as a highly able manager of England’s commercial interests. 
Indeed, Guthrie’s discussions of the positive effect of Huguenot 
immigration on the textile trade,42 his accounts of the establish-
ment of the Turkey and East India Companies,43 and his detailed 
commentary on Elizabeth’s support for the Muscovy Company44 
all paraphrased Camden’s work. What is noteworthy, however, is 
Guthrie’s tendency to emphasise, even more directly than Camden 
had done, Elizabeth’s personal responsibility for acts of economic 
statecraft. For example, while Camden had noted the role played 
by Elizabeth’s negotiations with the Russian Tsar in ensuring that 
the Muscovy Company received trading privileges, he did not imply 
that she had directly managed Russian commerce.45 For Guthrie, 
however, it was the Queen who personally ‘improved’ this line of 
trade.46 Similarly, describing the commercial treaty with Portugal of 
1571, Camden noted that Francis Gerard, the Portuguese ambas-
sador, ‘struck up a League with the Queen’.47 Guthrie, however, 
maintained that Elizabeth was the active party, and had ‘made a 
treaty of commerce with Portugal, by which she cut off a clandestine 
trade which the English had long carried on with the Portuguese 
settlements in Africa’.48 The implication of such accounts – and this 
suggestion was to be developed in Guthrie’s discussion of James 
I – was that the Queen’s power and prerogative had supported the 
growth of English commerce.
Ideas about prerogative were also of importance to the General 
History’s discussion concerning the effects of Elizabethan commercial 
growth on English liberty. As had been the case in his account 
of Henry VII, Guthrie presented commerce’s influence as work-
ing in two seemingly opposite directions. For example, the reforms 
that Elizabeth effected with regard to commerce and property were 
shown to have altered the people’s relationship with government. In 
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1066, Guthrie noted, the Normans had only to defeat ‘a few great 
Lords’ to achieve a conquest; if they had landed in 1588, however, 
the Spanish would have faced a far more difficult task.49 The shift 
in the balance of property meant that ‘the spirit of national freedom 
would have disputed every foot of ground’, as the commoners sought 
to defend all they ‘had painfully earned by trade, by agriculture, 
by manufactures, or by the rising arts’.50 Through spreading wealth 
among the populace, therefore, changing patterns of property own-
ership are shown to have protected liberty by giving a wider section 
of the population an interest in resisting arbitrary forms of power. 
However, while commerce and the arts may have helped to prevent 
dramatic affronts to liberty, the wealth they generated could also, as 
Guthrie had shown in his discussion of Henry VII, dull the senses 
of the populace to more minor incursions on their rights. Elizabeth, 
it was noted, had exercised ‘high prerogative’ in her management 
of domestic affairs.51 But the fact that ‘poverty [had] its protection, 
nobility its respect, religion its reverence, and commerce its encour-
agement’ meant that ‘the people thus happy, unattacked in property, 
and unloaded with taxes […] almost lost sight of those constitutional 
rights, which alone distinguish a land of freedom’.52 Ultimately, it 
was only the responsible way in which Elizabeth exercised her power 
that prevented popular liberties from being completely destroyed.
By the time Guthrie reached the Stuarts, the tensions in his 
accounts of property and commerce had become acute. On the one 
hand, he argued that the property held by the middling sort meant 
that the people’s minds were now turned to ‘foreign commerce and 
domestic freedom’ and that they would not accept the oppressive 
precedents of former reigns.53 It was this attitude and the arbitrary 
policies pursued by James and Charles that were responsible for the 
conflict between Parliament and the monarchy, and ultimately the 
Civil Wars of the 1640s. On the other hand, and far more provoca-
tively, Guthrie sought to apply Bacon’s and Bolingbroke’s Tacitean 
arguments concerning Henry VII’s management of commerce to the 
reign of James I, and to show that James’s absolutist approach to gov-
ernment had benefited trade. Thus for Guthrie, the much-derided 
Italian and Spanish trading company that James established in 1605 
was not a destructive monopoly, but a means to encourage commerce 
and a ‘good effect’ of the King’s profligacy.54 Similarly, James’s need 
for finance, and his inability to obtain it from the landed classes 
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in Parliament, made him dependent on the ‘mercantile interest’.55 
This in turn led him to embark on a number of measures designed 
to support trade, including the promotion of commerce to the East 
and West Indies,56 the enlargement of the East India Company’s 
charter57 and a series of contributions towards ‘naval architecture’.58 
Such actions and the King’s pacifistic foreign policy meant that it 
was James who had ‘laid the foundation of those great schemes of 
commerce, that now both enrich and ennoble England’.59 Moreover, 
while Guthrie saw the King’s absolutist approach to government as 
politically reprehensible, he acknowledged that it had played a useful 
role in promoting economic efficiency. As is noted in the ‘character’ 
of James that concludes the General History’s discussion of his reign:
The great increase of the commerce and manufactures of England 
under Elizabeth and James, could not have been effected but by force 
of prerogative, which was usefully and sometimes beneficially applied; 
especially by erecting companies, which, in the then, almost, infant 
state of commerce, was necessary for improving and extending it.60
The measures pursued by James also had important consequences 
for his successor. While the various customs and excises that Charles 
imposed were unpopular, the massive growth in trade that previous 
monarchs had helped to produce meant that such impositions were 
‘scarcely felt’ by traders themselves.61 The people, Guthrie notes, 
simply wanted to enjoy the sweets of commerce in peace and ‘would 
willingly have indulged [Charles] in his arbitrary principles, which 
endangered both [liberty and property], if he had proved no more 
immoderate than theretofore’.62
At times Guthrie’s position on commerce with regard to the 
Stuarts is paradoxical, if not outright contradictory, and he appears 
to argue that the wealth of the populace simultaneously both sup-
ported and undermined liberty. It is, however, possible to see how 
the two claims might work together, most notably in the General 
History’s discussions of the attempts by Charles to levy ship money.63 
The people, Guthrie argued, made a distinction between occasional 
arbitrary impositions on trade, which it was prudent for the affluent 
merchant class to pay, and attempts to turn – without parliamentary 
consent – such taxes into law, and use legal measures to enforce 
them. This, they were aware, would create a legal precedent, thereby 
ensuring that such impositions could be made in perpetuity. Charles, 
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with disastrous consequences, failed to comprehend this position and 
assumed that the supine behaviour of the people in the face of his 
earlier impositions meant that they were losing their ‘high sentiments 
of liberty’.64 For Guthrie, therefore, the changes effected by Henry 
VII did not, as Bolingbroke had argued, ensure that a monarch 
would be forced to court the affections of his subjects; rather, while 
strengthening the monarch’s prerogative and ability to raise revenue, 
they created a firm legal line over which a monarch could not cross 
without alienating his people.
However, what is perhaps most significant is that the consequences 
of crossing this line are presented as political rather than economic. 
Charles had rejected the constitution, shown contempt for the com-
mercial classes, and had little interest or aptitude for the management 
of trade, thereby causing the merchant classes to enter into rebellion 
against him. However, the nation itself, it is emphasised, continued 
to prosper. As he noted:
The increase of England’s riches was such, that, with the Roman 
emperor, he might have said, “I received an empire of brick, but I leave 
it of marble.” The use of plate became now common in the houses of 
artizans and peasants. Improvements were daily making in all the ele-
gancies and luxuries of life; immense sums were expended in importing 
antique statues, fine paintings, and in erecting magnificent edifices in a 
much finer taste than had ever been known in England before, and in 
some respects, than she has ever known since.65
Guthrie’s claim, therefore, was that the relentless promotion of com-
merce by Tudor and Stuart statesmen had ensured that, by the time 
of Charles I, a commercial spirit had entered into the English people, 
and, as a consequence, they no longer required direct ‘encourage-
ment’ from the state.
Conclusion
Guthrie’s position on issues of commerce and revenue marks a 
considerable departure from the other post-Civil War historians 
discussed in this study. Key to the historical writing of the period 
was the assumption that a public-spirited monarch was required in 
order to bring the nation economic success. It was this approach, 
moreover, which gave accounts of economic statecraft their polemical 
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force. Through celebrating the virtues and commercial achievements 
of some monarchs and condemning the vices and failures of others, 
historians could provide a vindication of a particular political per-
spective, be it Republican or Royalist, Whig or Tory. There were, of 
course, a number of attempts to adapt this basic framework. Some 
Tory writers, most notably Carte, had argued that in certain retro-
grade circumstances even a virtuous monarch could fail. Bolingbroke, 
meanwhile, had acknowledged that Henry VII’s self-interested man-
agement of commerce had brought some benefits to the public. Such 
achievements, however, were conceived of as an exception to the 
general pattern of English history. A ruler would, it was assumed, 
be far better off following the virtuous ‘oeconomy’ of Elizabeth than 
the manipulative avaricious politics of Henry. For Guthrie, however, 
such issues were rather less clear cut. His analysis presented Henry 
VII’s reign – as described by Bacon – less as an exception to, and more 
as an exemplification of, good economic practices. As a consequence, 
he rejected the idea that a necessary relationship existed between 
virtue, good government and commercial and financial achievement. 
Moreover, he maintained that Henry VII, Elizabeth I and James I 
had succeeded in commercial terms, not in spite of their self-interest 
and absolutism, but because of them.
Two qualifications need to be provided for such an argument. 
First, Guthrie is not claiming that every selfish absolutist will be 
adept at promoting commerce. Rather, the point being made was 
that economic statecraft was a skill that required knowledge of the 
often complex workings of trade and finance. Self-interest might 
drive a statesman to seek this sort of expertise, but this would not 
always be the case. Second, and even more importantly, Guthrie 
was not calling for a commercially adept absolutist to take control of 
modern Britain. While he maintained that this sort of approach had 
helped commerce ‘in its infant state’, the implication of Guthrie’s 
account is that it would be of no value in maturity. Such a conclusion 
is a product of his use of Harringtonian ideas. His key point was that 
the shifts in property that had taken place rendered the sort of state-
craft that promoted commerce in the past undesirable and impossible 
in modern England. In this sense, the General History, despite its 
extensive use of ideas of economic statecraft, marked a move away 
from this tradition of historical analysis. For all the writers discussed 
thus far, a monarch is inevitably something of a merchant, and the 
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prosperity of the nation is a direct consequence of his or her ability 
or inability to negotiate treaties with foreign powers and to provide a 
body of laws and regulations capable of advancing trade. Nevertheless, 
the implication of Guthrie’s account is that the monarchical manage-
ment of commerce represents a stage in the evolution of the English 
economy, not, as it had done for earlier writers, an inevitable feature 
of commercial life. England’s continuing commercial success in the 
face of Charles’s inept economic management demonstrated that, in 
the modern age, the desire of merchants and tradesmen to protect 
and advance their property was the key driver of national wealth. As 
a result, while the General History is a work of commercial statecraft, 
it is one that, in its latter pages, narrates the demise of the power 
relations on which that mode of writing had been based.
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The end of economic statecraft: 
David Hume’s History of England
The chronologies of David Hume’s career as a political economist and 
his career as a historian are closely intertwined.1 Political Discourses, 
the collection of essays containing his principal contribution to polit-
ical economy, was published in January 1752.2 The work went on 
to secure Hume a Europe-wide reputation as a writer on economic 
affairs and was, as he noted in his autobiography, his only book 
‘successful on the first publication’.3 A second edition emerged later 
in 1752, and further versions – now forming the final section of his 
Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects – were issued in 1754, 1757, 
1758, 1760, 1764, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1772 and 1777. Revisions, 
some minor, others more substantial, were included in each of these 
publications, and a new economic essay, ‘Of the Jealousy of Trade’, 
was attached to later versions of the 1758 text and all subsequent edi-
tions. At the same time, Hume continued to elaborate on and clarify 
the essays’ arguments in his correspondence, entering into a series 
of exchanges with some of Europe’s foremost economic thinkers, 
among them Josiah Tucker, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, André 
Morellet and Adam Smith.4
The idea for a history, meanwhile, had first been mooted by Hume 
in the second half of the 1740s. Work began in the late summer of 
1752 and the first volume, covering the reigns of James I and Charles 
I, was published as The History of Great Britain in the autumn of 
1754.5 Hume added a second volume in 1757, extending the narra-
tive up to the Glorious Revolution, while 1759 saw the publication 
of the two-volume History of England under the House of Tudor.6 The 
project was completed with two further volumes, published in 1761 
and 1762, covering the period from the Roman invasion to the Battle 
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of Bosworth Field.7 The entire narrative was then republished as a 
single work later in 1762 under the title The History of England from 
the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688.8 New editions, 
each containing significant revisions, followed in 1770, 1773 and 
1778.9
Alongside the chronological coincidence between Hume’s writings 
on history and political economy are, perhaps unsurprisingly, a series 
of intellectual links. This chapter explores these connections and 
provides an account of the relationship between the historical and 
economic facets of Hume’s work.10 My approach is, in a sense, analo-
gous with that of a number of scholars, among them Duncan Forbes, 
Nicholas Phillipson and James A. Harris, who have discussed the 
relationship between Hume’s historical and political writing.11 For 
these commentators, the History formed part of Hume’s career-long 
enterprise to, in the words of Forbes, develop a ‘programme of polit-
ical education’.12 Only through such an endeavour, Hume assumed, 
could the disruptive influence of political factionalism be countered, 
and ‘the established, Hanoverian regime’ be provided with a ‘a proper 
intellectual foundation’.13 Running parallel with this project, and 
stretching across the Political Discourses, the Essays and the History, 
I argue, was an attempt to give England’s commercial and financial 
interests – which were in Hume’s estimation of vital importance to 
government – a similar grounding.14 Such a programme contained a 
number of elements: an analysis of the conditions on which economic 
life in England depended; an account of the processes through which 
those conditions had been established; and commentary on the role 
that England’s statesmen had played in its commercial and financial 
history. In discussing these matters, Hume developed a damning 
critique of the economic statecraft tradition; indeed, it was, in part, 
the misunderstandings of economic affairs committed by previous 
generations of historians that he sought to warn his readers against 
and correct.
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one provides an 
account of Hume’s views on history, commerce and finance as devel-
oped in his essays. Section two gives a general introduction to the 
History of England. Sections three, four and five look respectively 
at his discussion of Stuart, Tudor and pre-Tudor England. Section 
six investigates the changes Hume made to the History in its later 
editions.
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1.1 Essays: ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’
Hume’s approach to the histories of commerce and finance has its 
roots in the account of causality first advanced in A Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739–40) and subsequently adapted in the Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding (1748). His underlying claim in these works 
was that human perception of causality is rooted not in any necessary 
connection between objects, but rather in experience; it is the regular 
conjunction of events that leads individuals to the attribution of a 
causal relationship. In the opening section of the 1742 essay ‘Of the 
Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, Hume used this idea as 
the basis for an account of the epistemology of historical causation.15 
His aim here was to establish the types of events that are attributable 
to causes and, consequently, potential sites for the discovery of pro-
found knowledge, and those that are a product of chance and thus not 
susceptible to further enquiry. The argument proceeded through two 
stages. In the first, Hume outlined his core thesis: events arising from 
a great number of people can be accounted for by ‘determinate and 
known Causes’, as the presence of a large sample provides the observer 
with the regular conjunction of events required to attribute causa-
tion.16 In contrast, events that depend on a few people do not provide 
a large enough sample for such a judgement, and may ‘be ascrib’d to 
Chance, or secret and unknown Causes’.17 Such arguments led Hume 
to conclude that some subjects were more suitable for ‘general’ analysis 
than others. ‘The domestic and the gradual Revolutions of a State’ – 
such as the ‘Rise of the Commons in England ’ and the ‘Increase of 
Trade and Industry’ – depended on the passions of many and were, 
therefore, ‘a […] proper Subject of Reasoning and Observation’.18 
In contrast, ‘the foreign and the momentary’ revolutions, ‘which are 
commonly produc’d by single Persons, […] are more influenc’d by 
Whim, Folly, or Caprice, than by general Passions and Interests’.19 
‘For the same reason’, Hume continued, ‘tis more easy to account for 
the Rise and Progress of Commerce in any Kingdom, than for that 
of Learning.’20 The former relied on ‘Avarice, or the Desire of Gain’, 
which was ‘an universal Passion, that operates at all Times, in all 
Places, and upon all Persons’.21 The latter was dependent on curiosity, 
or the love of knowledge, which has ‘but a very limited Influence, and 
requires Youth, Leisure, Education, Genius, and Example, to make it 
govern any Person’.22
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In the second stage of his argument, Hume considered the rela-
tionship between ‘chance’, particular occurrences, and ‘caused’ or 
‘general’ ones. The historian of the arts and sciences, Hume warned, 
needed to proceed with caution; the small number of people who 
cultivate these subjects and the limited, delicate nature of their pas-
sion mean that chance must always play a significant part in their 
development. However, Hume continued, there was a sense in which 
general causes did influence scientific and artistic endeavour.
Tho’ the Persons, that cultivate the Sciences with such astonishing 
Success, as to attract the Admiration of Posterity, be always few, in all 
Nations, and all Ages; ’tis impossible but a Share of the same Spirit and 
Genius must be antecedently diffus’d thro’ the People among whom 
they arise, in order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their earliest 
Infancy, the Taste and Judgement of those eminent Writers. The Mass 
cannot be altogether insipid. […] The Question, therefore, concerning 
the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, is not altogether a 
Question concerning the Taste, Genius, and Spirit of a few, but con-
cerning those of a whole People; and may, therefore, be accounted for, 
in some Measure, by general Causes and Principles.23
For Hume, therefore, ‘chance’ and ‘causation’ were not mutually 
exclusive categories. General causes, he acknowledged, do not have 
the capacity to explain specific individual events, such as the existence 
of Homer at a particular time or place.24 Equally, though, as the 
‘Arts and Sciences’ require certain conditions to prosper, an analysis 
of general causes has the potential to offer a partial explanation even 
for seemingly ‘chance’ occurrences. Given such an approach, a key 
task for the historian was to select an appropriate form of analysis for 
the phenomena being described. Certain events required a ‘general’ 
form of cultural history, which looked at changes in the behaviour of 
large groups and sought to identify clear patterns of causation. Other 
occurrences demanded the use of a ‘particular’ mode of analysis con-
cerned with the actions of specific individuals. Moreover, the use of 
this latter approach obliged the analyst to distinguish between those 
historical phenomena that were a product of the general cultural 
 context – and thus subject to causal analysis – and those that were 
not.
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1.2 Essays: Political Discourses
Hume’s comments on the development of commerce in ‘Of the Rise 
and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, brief as they are, raise a 
number of important questions. His analysis presents avarice as the 
root of all commercial activity. However, while Hume assumed that 
avarice is a universal human phenomenon, one which ‘operates at all 
Times, in all Places, and upon all Persons’, commerce is not; rather, 
its emergence is a subject on which ‘Reasoning and Observation’ have 
the potential to shine some light.25 Given such assumptions, what 
was it that enabled human beings’ innate avarice to take a commercial 
turn?
An answer to this question was to be formulated in ‘Of Commerce’, 
the first essay in the Political Discourses. For Hume, there were sig-
nificant differences between the behaviour of the populace in soci-
eties where manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated and 
those where they are. In the former, a habit of indolence prevails, as 
individuals have no motivation to produce more than they need. In 
the latter, proprietors of land and farmers have the opportunity to 
purchase a range of desirable commodities. Consequently, they ‘study 
agriculture as a science […], redouble their industry and attention’, 
and, as a result, produce more from the land than they need for 
mere survival.26 In most societies, Hume explained, the emergence 
of manufacturing was a consequence of the development of foreign 
trade and, more specifically, the introduction of luxury goods. The 
power of such products lay in their sudden entry on to the market; 
whereas domestic manufactures ‘advance by slow degrees’ and lack 
the capacity to ‘affect us by their novelty’, foreign commodities are 
experienced as something entirely new.27 At the same time, the profit 
available through trading abroad is high, as goods that are unwanted 
and cheap in one country can be non-reproducible, highly desirable 
and consequently expensive in another locale. This ensured that it 
was overseas commerce that had provided the objects that could 
attract people’s previously latent avarice. Through it ‘men become 
acquainted with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; 
and their delicacy and industry, being once awaken’d, carry them to 
farther improvements, in every branch of domestic as well as foreign 
trade’.28 What is particularly significant is that the historical narrative 
that Hume develops here is a ‘general’ history; as such, it depends not 
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on the actions of particular elite individuals, but rather on a ‘general’ 
cause – the introduction of luxury goods – which exerts an influence 
on the passions of the multitude.
This ‘general’ approach to commercial history helped Hume to 
define his place within existing economic debates. Despite being 
the most important aspect of public affairs, he argued, commerce 
and finance were ‘commonly treated in the loosest and most careless 
manner’, with writers building their analyses on a series of ‘ground-
less’ assumptions.29 In contrast to this, Hume emphasised, his own 
work would be concerned with a ‘multitude of cases’ and ‘universal 
propositions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of 
individuals’.30 These would then be used, albeit with extreme cau-
tion and an awareness of possible exceptions, to establish ‘general 
principles’.31 Such a ‘refin’d’ and ‘subtile’ method, Hume argued, 
was ‘uncommon’ and ‘out of the common road’.32 It served, how-
ever, to highlight the magnitude of the errors committed by previous 
economic commentators. Underpinning their conceptions of finance 
and commerce was an understanding of ‘plenty of money’ as the 
cause of national prosperity.33 To an extent, this idea was simply 
misguided; as Hume forcefully demonstrated, the level of money 
in a country would naturally adjust itself to the level of industry, 
thereby ensuring that any sudden acquisition or loss of specie had no 
long-term consequences. Equally, however, attempts to retain money 
could be highly pernicious, as they led nations to adopt ‘bars, obstruc-
tions, and imposts’ on the movement of goods, which served to 
‘check industry, and rob ourselves and our neighbours of the common 
benefits of art and nature’.34 The point being made here, it should be 
emphasised, was not that such regulations were wrong per se. Indeed, 
Hume endorsed a tax on German linen as it encouraged ‘home man-
ufactures, and  thereby [multiplied] our people and industry’, and 
supported the tax on brandy, noting that it increased the sale of rum 
and supported the southern colonies.35 In ‘Of Taxes’, meanwhile, 
he showed that the general effect of a moderate increase in taxes on 
commodities was to increase the industry of the poor by obliging 
them to work harder to maintain their standard of living.36 Hume’s 
contention, therefore, was that the needs of commerce and industry, 
phenomena that could only be understood through a knowledge of 
people’s natural passions and desires, provided the criteria for assess-
ing economic policy.
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2. Hume’s History of England
The History of England was anchored in the broad historiographical 
framework that Hume had established in ‘Of the Rise of the Arts and 
Sciences’. The result, as Pocock has argued, was a work written in ‘the 
double key of political narrative and sociological generalisation’.37 On 
the one hand, therefore, Hume conceived of his history in classical 
terms as a narrative of the deeds performed by particular individuals.38 
Indeed, as the letters he wrote in the period surrounding the publica-
tion of the History demonstrate, his aim was to overcome the failings 
in ‘style, judgement, impartiality, [and] care’ of previous historians 
of England by mimicking the practices of classical historiography.39 
Party polemics, transcribed documents, pedantic footnotes and the 
trivial and frivolous were all avoided and replaced by what Hume 
referred to as a conciseness ‘after the manner of the Ancients’.40 
On the other hand, however, Hume provided a general ‘cultural’ 
history, an account of the various shifts in manners and opinions 
experienced by the general mass of England’s population as they 
moved from a state of barbarism to one of civilisation.41 And it was, 
for Hume, manners and opinions that determined the character of a 
particular age, shaping its approach to matters such as government, 
military affairs, learning and commerce. To an extent, and in the 
manner Hume had anticipated in the Essays, these different ‘keys’ of 
history are integrated. Indeed, Hume’s main point is that the political 
upheavals of the seventeenth century cannot be understood without 
a knowledge of England’s changing social and economic structure.
In structural terms, however, the ‘general’ cultural analysis is often 
separated from the main narrative. Sometimes this simply involves 
inserting a paragraph of contextual material into the discussion 
or an explanatory note. Elsewhere, the treatment of such issues is 
attached to the ‘characters’ of monarchs given after the narration of 
their deaths; as a consequence, these sections come to deal as much 
with the disposition of the age as they do with that of a particular 
king or queen. On four occasions, with regard to Norman, Saxon, 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England, Hume devotes a complete chap-
ter to such issues. These sections are conceived of as, in a sense, 
separate from the ‘main’ historical project. In the first edition of the 
Stuarts’ volume, Hume introduced his Jacobean chapter as a ‘pause’ 
in his account, which departed ‘a little from the historical style’.42 
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This phrase was deleted in later versions of the text, but the labelling 
of the four ‘cultural’ chapters as ‘appendices’ in all editions from 
1762 onwards served, perhaps more effectively, to emphasise their 
distinctiveness from the rest of the text. Equally, however, while 
such sections may not have quite been ‘history’, they were of vital 
importance to it. In relation to the Stuarts’ volume, Hume noted that 
without ‘cultural’ information ‘history can be very little instructive, 
and often will not be intelligible’.43 A similar point was made in a 
more forceful manner before the non-narrative section concerning 
Charles I and the Interregnum, when Hume observed that ‘The chief 
use of history is, that it affords materials for disquisitions of this 
nature; and it seems the duty of an historian to point out the proper 
inferences and conclusions.’44
Commerce and finance occupied a complex place within this 
schema. The narrative section of Hume’s account is concerned with 
commercial and financial issues in so far as they directly shaped or 
provided a context for political events. Indeed, one of Hume’s key 
aims was to show that the Civil War was, in part, a consequence of 
‘general’ changes in England’s social structure produced by the rise of 
commerce. His discussion of commerce in the non-narrative sections, 
meanwhile, accomplished three principal tasks. First, he outlined 
the organisation and extent of government revenue and commerce 
at particular moments in time. To provide a sense of perspective, 
particularly in relation to commerce, English approaches were then 
contrasted both with those of other European nations from the same 
period and contemporary practices. Second, he sought to account for 
changes in England’s economic infrastructure. In doing so, Hume 
developed the analysis of luxury he had forwarded in ‘Of Commerce’, 
fusing it with the account of changes in property ownership advanced 
by, among others, Bacon, Harrington and Bolingbroke. The result 
was a cultural history of commerce that conceived of England’s com-
mercial development over the longue durée as a product of a shift in 
the way in which the passions of the multitude functioned. Third, 
and in spite of this, Hume continued to believe that commerce had 
a political history made up of the specific commercial and financial 
measures pursued by individual monarchs. As an account of ‘the 
few’ – individual monarchs and, on occasion, the small cabal of min-
isters who surrounded them – this history was shaped by chance or 
unknown causes. ‘General’ principles, however, were also important 
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to such an endeavour. As Hume had demonstrated in his discussion 
of the arts and sciences, to be fully understood the actions of the few 
needed to be placed in the wider context of ‘general’ cultural history. 
Moreover, the ‘general’ principles concerning commerce that Hume 
had established in Political Discourses provided the criteria by which 
he judged the successes, and more commonly failures, of England’s 
monarchs in the History.
The next three sections explore the way in which these ideas were 
developed in Hume’s account. My treatment of the material here 
will be chronological by order of publication, and thus begins with 
discussion of the Stuarts, before moving on to the Tudor and then 
pre- Tudor volumes. To reflect the structure of Hume’s analysis the 
accounts of the Tudors and Stuarts will be divided into two sub- 
sections. The first will look at the narrative part of Hume’s analysis, 
where the economic material is primarily concerned with issues relat-
ing to finance. The second will be concerned with the non-narrative 
appendices and focus on their analyses of commerce. The less detailed 
discussion of pre-Tudor economic issues will be dealt with in a single 
section.
3.1 The Stuarts: narrative
The primary importance of Jacobean history, as Hume conceived of 
it, lay in its capacity to explain the origins of the conflict between 
‘Privilege & Prerogative’ which had generated the modern party 
system, and which, as such, continued to shape English political 
life.45 Hume was aware, as many previous historians had been, that 
disagreements regarding James’s handling of revenue had played 
a key part in determining the period’s emerging battle lines. His 
approach to the antagonists, however, as discussed in the narrative 
part of the first volume of his History, was at odds with that of both 
Whig and Tory accounts. Key to these analyses, as we have seen, 
had been an attempt to attribute blame. Thus for Whig writers, 
James’s absolutist designs had led him to embark on a programme 
of  revenue-raising that went against established constitutional 
precedents and threatened the liberties of the populace. For Tory 
historians, meanwhile, responsibility for the conflict lay with a group 
of power-hungry Presbyterians and Republicans who, in order to 
advance their own selfish agenda, had used Parliament to reject the 
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monarch’s  legitimate requests for revenue. Hume had no sympathy 
with this sort of polemic. Indeed, rather than viewing the conflict 
as the product of an unwarranted power seizure from either king or 
commons, he sought to show how disagreements had emerged from 
a series of complex shifts in England’s ‘general’ circumstances.
The key context for Hume was, in a sense, intellectual. In the first 
years of the seventeenth century, he argued:
the minds of men, thro’out all Europe, but especially in England, seem 
to have undergone a general, but insensible revolution. Tho’ letters 
had been revived in the preceding age, they had been little cultivated 
beyond the limits of the college; nor had they, till now, begun to 
spread themselves, in any degree, among men of the world. Arts, both 
mechanical and liberal, were every day receiving great improvements. 
Navigation had extended itself over the whole globe. Travelling was 
secure and agreeable. And the general system of politics, in Europe, 
was becoming more enlarged and comprehensive.46
However, just as the force of this revolution was different in England 
and mainland Europe, so were its effects. In the former, it was argued:
the love of freedom, which, unless checked, flourishes extremely in 
all liberal natures, acquired new force, as well as more enlarged views, 
suitable to that cultivated understanding, which became, every day, 
more common, among men of birth and education.47
On the Continent, however, ‘where the necessity of discipline had 
begot mercenary armies, the prince commonly established an unlim-
ited authority, and overpowered […] the liberties of the people’.48 For 
Hume, the actions of the commons, specifically their increasing desire 
to defend their ‘privileges’, were a direct product of the English form 
of this ‘general revolution’. The King’s behaviour, meanwhile, was 
shaped by his contrasting understandings of English and European 
developments. ‘Happily’, Hume noted, he was entirely ignorant of 
the transformation taking placed in England, possessing ‘neither 
sufficient capacity to perceive the alteration, nor sufficient art and 
vigour to check it in its early advances’.49 Equally, however, he had 
full knowledge of the powers exercised by other European princes, 
even if he was unaware of how recently they had been acquired. It was 
this that led him to claim, even though he lacked the military backing 
of his fellow monarchs, the same kind of rights that they enjoyed and 
to assume, as they did, that his power was divine in origin.
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The tensions between monarch and people created by such devel-
opments were further exacerbated by England’s economic situation. 
The discovery and conquest of the West Indies in the 1490s, Hume 
argued, had produced a rise in the price of goods that served to 
reduce the relative wealth of the monarch. As a result, not only did 
the royal income fail to rise in proportion to that of his subjects, 
but the pressure for expenditure increased as improvements in ‘art 
and industry’ raised the expectations and financial demands of royal 
servants, courtiers and ministers.50 At the same time, however, the 
very gold that had undermined the King’s position also turned the 
populace against him. As Hume noted, ‘riches’, in association with 
the ‘increasing knowledge of the age’, produced in the people ‘a spirit 
of freedom and independence, [disposing] them to pay little regard, 
either to the entreaties or menaces of their sovereign’.51 Drawing on 
Harringtonian ideas about the relationship between property and 
power, Hume went on to attribute the origins of this ‘spirit’ to an 
alteration in landownership.52 The ‘increase of commerce’ and regu-
lations permitting the barons to alienate their lands had shifted the 
‘ballance of property’ from the lords to the commons.53 This devel-
opment initially served to strengthen the influence of the monarchy, 
as free from the threat of the peers, sovereigns were able to expand 
their prerogative to the point where it threatened the survival of the 
constitution. Ultimately, however, the commons ‘recovered from 
their lethargy’ and, no longer tied to the monarch by a shared fear 
of the disruptive barons, sought ‘to secure liberty by firmer barriers, 
than their ancestors had hitherto provided for it’.54
For Hume, it was the simultaneous presence of a necessitous 
monarch, with only a limited understanding of the contemporary 
economic situation, and an increasingly wealthy, knowledgeable and 
rebellious commons that had generated the period’s disputes about 
revenue. The King, Hume emphasised, desirous of raising his ‘pomp 
and splendor’ to the levels enjoyed by previous English monarchs and 
contemporary European ones, sought to enlarge his revenue.55 The 
newly acquired ‘spirit and judgement’ of the House of Commons, 
however, led it to protect what it considered its privileges, and attempt 
a series of economic reforms.56 Constitutional precedent, meanwhile, 
provided only limited help in adjudicating between conflicting claims. 
On occasions, the problem here was a lack of clarity. Describing 
James’s attempts to increase his income through raising customs and 
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levying new impositions on goods, Hume noted that ‘the precedents 
for so dangerous an exercise of power were neither very recent nor 
very numerous’.57 However, the fact that there were precedents in 
the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth served ‘to throw a kind of doubt 
and ambiguity on this question, which was of so great moment to 
the constitution’.58 Elsewhere, measures advanced by the King and 
opposed by the Commons – for example monopolies – were sup-
ported by ‘many and recent precedents’.59 They remained, nonetheless, 
both ‘diametrically opposite to all the principles of a free government’ 
and highly damaging to the nation’s growing commercial interests.60
Hume’s account, therefore, was premised on the notion that the 
origins of the struggle between privilege and prerogative could not 
be understood without an account of the ways in which general, 
contextual factors shaped action. This is not to claim, it should be 
emphasised, that his account was rooted in a form of economic 
determinism. As he made clear though a series of counterfactual 
speculations, war was not inevitable. If the King had possessed ‘a very 
rigid frugality’ or if the Commons had acted ‘with more generosity 
and kindness’, events would have unfolded in a very different way.61 
Moreover, as the History consistently emphasised, the conflict would 
not have taken the direction it did without the pernicious influence 
of religious enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it was through giving ‘general’ 
factors a much more significant role than other writers that Hume 
was able to reduce the culpability of both the Commons and the 
King. Thus, despite accepting the argument of Salmon and Carte 
that the Commons were an innovating force, by presenting the lower 
house’s actions as part of a wider, intellectual and economic shift, 
Hume was able to account for and justify their actions. Similarly, 
while Hume’s discussion of changes in the balance of property has 
something in common with Bolingbroke’s equally Harringtonian 
account, there is an alteration of emphasis. Bolingbroke had used 
James’s failure to act in a manner appropriate for a ‘popular’ polity as 
evidence of his fundamental demerit, emphasising both that the con-
duct of his predecessor and the ‘constitution’ provided clear markers 
of the sort of conduct required.62 Hume, in contrast, maintained that 
the King’s only crime – if it could be so labelled – was his failure to 
fully comprehend a series of complex and highly novel circumstances. 
What James lacked, therefore, was not virtue, but knowledge and 
understanding of economic and intellectual change.
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3.2 The Stuarts: non-narrative
Ideas regarding knowledge and understanding were also key to 
Hume’s account of commerce in the non-narrative sections of the 
Stuarts’ volume. James’s reign, Hume sought to demonstrate in the 
first of the Stuart ‘appendix’ chapters, was a time of rapid economic 
development. Indeed, ‘during no period of English history, was there 
a more sensible increase […] of all the advantages, which distinguish 
a flourishing people’.63 When judged in relation to other European 
countries of the time and modern standards, however, the nation’s 
commerce appeared rather less successful. The Dutch, it was noted, 
possessed three times more shipping, and ‘all the more elaborate 
and curious arts were only cultivated abroad, particularly in Italy’.64 
Similarly, ‘a catalogue of manufactures, for which the English were 
then eminent, would appear very contemptible, in comparison of 
those, which flourish among them at present’.65 Fine linen manu-
facture was ‘totally unknown’, silk manufacture ‘had no footing’ and, 
because of a lack of expertise, wool, which accounted for nine-tenths 
of the commerce of the kingdom, had to be exported to be dyed and 
dressed.66
This general picture of English economic development was then 
placed alongside an account of James’s performance as a manager 
of the nation’s financial and commercial interests. While a range of 
material is drawn upon, including Rymer’s Foedera and the Journal 
of the House of Commons, Hume’s greatest debt was to Howes, who 
Hume, under the misapprehension that a single author had written 
the whole of the Annales, referred to as ‘Stowe’.67 Thus Hume utilised 
the Annales as a source, quoted at length from the ‘honest’ historian’s 
work in a footnote, and endorsed his arguments about the increase in 
commerce that had taken place under James, arguing that:
Not only the peace, which he procured, was favorable to industry and 
commerce: His turn of mind inclined him to promote the peaceful 
arts: And trade being as yet in its infancy, all additions to it would be 
the more evident to every eye, which was not blinded by melancholy 
prejudices.68
What distinguished Hume’s account from Howes’s, however, was its 
analysis of James’s role in these changes. Indeed, whereas the English 
chronicler provided numerous examples of the King’s economic 
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 successes, the Scottish historian struggled to find any. A procla-
mation that James issued against exporting undressed cloth, Hume 
noted, was deeply unpopular and quickly retracted. His attempt to 
introduce silk manufacture was defeated by the English climate and 
he failed to protect English interests in the Spice Islands.69 Moreover, 
when James did recommend wise measures, such as ‘greater freedom 
of trade and an exemption from the restraint of exclusive companies’, 
the opposition he faced from ‘men […] imprisoned by their own 
prejudices’ made him, understandably in Hume’s estimation, reluc-
tant to force the issue.70
Similar differences are also apparent in Hume’s and Howes’s treat-
ment of the North American colonies. Howes would surely have 
endorsed Hume’s pronouncement that it was the commencement 
of the American colonies which ‘chiefly renders the reign of James 
memorable’.71 For Hume, however, this achievement was only 
indirectly attributable to the reigning monarch. The colonies had 
been ‘peopled’, he argued, by a group of ‘necessitous and indigent’ 
individuals, who were discontented with the established Church and 
monarchy and who had done little to increase the wealth or the 
population at home.72 Possessed of ‘the spirit of independency, which 
was reviving in England’, in America it was these individuals, not the 
monarch, who ‘promoted the navigation, encouraged the industry, 
and even multiplied the inhabitants of their mother-country’.73 His 
views, meanwhile, are made even clearer in his concluding comments. 
Outlining the relative progress of commerce and learning in the 
Jacobean era, Hume noted: ‘the endeavours of James, or more properly 
speaking, those of the nation, for the promotion of trade, were attended 
with greater success than those for the encouragement of learning’.74
Hume’s conception of the relationship between ‘general’ and ‘par-
ticular’ history here is a complex one. To an extent, while he moves 
rapidly between the two modes, they remain causally unconnected; 
James may well have been an ineffective manager of the nation’s 
commercial interests, but commerce, agriculture and manufacture 
continued to improve at an expeditious rate. Equally, however, there 
was a sense in which ‘general’ factors shaped ‘particular’ actions. 
Underlying Hume’s analysis is a conception of economic affairs as 
a discrete area of knowledge. In James’s reign, however, a series 
of ‘general’ factors had prevented this knowledge from making any 
headway. Self-interested tradesmen, seeking to protect their own 
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monopolies, had resisted reforms successfully, and, as a result, the 
King’s wiser actions had been defeated by the prejudice of the times. 
Consequently, knowledge had exerted little influence on policy.
These ideas shaped the rest of the Stuarts’ volume. The whole 
period, Hume maintained, was one of rapid and accelerating economic 
growth. During the ‘peaceable’ part of Charles’s reign, ‘commerce 
and industry […] encreased extremely’ and, although trade met with 
some ‘convulsions’ as a result of the Civil War, ‘it soon  recovered after 
the establishment of the Commonwealth’.75 Commerce,  meanwhile, 
‘did never, during any period, encrease so fast as from the restoration 
to the revolution’.76 Such developments are explained as products of 
three principal triggers. First, the ongoing persecution of religious 
minorities both in England and abroad is shown to have produced a 
series of beneficial economic consequences. The severities exercised 
by Laud ensured that by the start of the Civil War, 25,000 people 
were resident in New England, while the oppression of the Catholics 
following the Civil War helped to populate Maryland.77 Later, the 
restraints imposed on Dissenters served to further expand the colo-
nies and helped to ensure that England’s shipping doubled between 
the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution.78 At the same time, 
knowledge of dyeing woollen cloth, an innovation that saved England 
‘great sums of money’, was brought to England by a Dutchman, who 
fled the Low Countries fearing a French invasion.79
Second, English commerce had benefited from a series of for-
tuitous military conflicts. Hume’s position here was by no means a 
straightforward one. He believed, in general, that peace was nec-
essary for commerce.80 At the same time, he was unconvinced that 
war against a trading rival would necessarily, as was widely assumed, 
bring commercial benefits. As he argued in relation to the Anglo-
Dutch conflicts:
even were the naval force of Holland totally annihilated, the acquisition 
of the Dutch commerce to England could not be relied on as a certain 
consequence; nor is trade a constant attendant of power, but depends 
on many other, and some of them very delicate, circumstances.81
Despite such observations, however, Hume maintained that, in 
England’s case, war had proven to be advantageous. The conflicts 
with the Dutch during the Interregnum, ‘by distressing the commerce 
of so formidable a rival, served to encourage trade in England’.82 
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Similarly, the two Dutch wars waged under Charles II, ‘by disturbing 
the trade of that republic, promoted the navigation of this island; and 
after Charles had made a separate peace with the States, his subjects 
enjoyed unmolested the trade of Europe’.83
Finally, Hume argued that the ascendancy of ‘democratical prin-
ciples’ following the regicide produced an important cultural shift 
in English views on trade, as country gentlemen became willing to 
apprentice their sons to merchants, and commerce became ‘more hon-
ourable in England than in any other Europæan kingdom’.84 England’s 
commercial ascendancy, therefore, is presented as an unforeseen and 
unintended consequence of three of Hume’s principal bugbears: 
religious intolerance, war and republicanism. In no sense was it the 
product of a deliberate strategy pursued by the nation’s monarchs. 
Indeed, it is not until the reign of James II that Hume was able to find 
examples of a Stuart encouraging trade in a ‘judicious’ manner.85
4.1 The Tudors: narrative
Writing to the physician John Clephane in September 1757, Hume 
announced his plans to extend his history to cover the reigns of the 
Tudor kings. ‘I wish, indeed’, he observed,
I had begun [with the reign of Henry VII]: For by that means, I should 
have been able, without making any digression, by the plain course of 
the narration, to have shown how absolute the authority was, which 
the English Kings then possessed, and that the Stuarts did little or 
nothing more than continue matters in the former tract, which the 
people were determined no longer to admit.86
In the narrative sections of his account, Hume developed this thesis 
by emphasising that arbitrary measures were a consistent feature of 
the financial practices of the Tudor monarchs. With regard to Henry 
VII, Hume paraphrased Bacon’s discussion of the various perversions 
of the law through which the King, aided by his ‘instruments of 
oppression’ Empson and Dudley, raised his income.87 Attention is 
also drawn to Henry VIII’s attempt to arbitrarily impose taxes on his 
people in 1525, and his more successful schemes for seizing goods and 
land from the monasteries, and demanding loans and benevolences 
from his subjects.88 In relation to Elizabeth, meanwhile, Hume used 
material from the transcripts assembled by the antiquarian Simonds 
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D’Ewes to provide some detailed discussion of parliamentary debates 
that had taken place concerning the Queen’s various monopolies.89 
The arbitrary programme of the Tudors, he argued, had serious eco-
nomic consequences for England’s populace. Henry VII is presented 
as ‘enriching himself with the spoils of his oppressed people’, while 
Elizabeth’s monopolies are said to have put ‘invincible restraints upon 
all commerce, industry, and emulation’.90 As a consequence, these 
latter measures constituted grievances that were ‘the most intolerable 
for the present, and the most pernicious in their consequences, that 
ever were known in any age or under any government’.91
Hume’s primary interest, however, was less in the economic 
consequences of such incidents than their significance for Tudor 
politics. Arbitrary monarchical impositions, he maintained, were an 
unintended consequence of the populace’s ancient privileges. These 
privileges ensured, as was noted with regard to Henry VII, that 
the English were secured ‘from all taxations and impositions, except 
such as were levied by their own consent’.92 ‘Had the King’, Hume 
continued, ‘been empowered to lay on general taxes at his pleasure, 
he would naturally have abstained from these oppressive expedients, 
which destroyed all security in private property, and begot an univer-
sal diffidence thro’ the nation.’93 Similarly, Elizabeth’s limited income 
ensured that she lacked the financial means to reward those persons 
who had distinguished themselves in military and civil employments, 
and, consequently, had turned to monopolies to raise revenue.94
However, while such measures may have had their origins in 
financial weakness, that monarchs were consistently able to employ 
them demonstrated both the strength of the Crown and the supine 
nature of Parliament. Henry VII, for example, had such power over 
his parliamentarians that they were willing to make Dudley, ‘the very 
man who was the chief instrument of [the King’s] oppressions’, their 
speaker.95 Henry VIII, meanwhile, through his use of prerogative, 
imprisonment and extorted loans, became ‘in a manner, absolute 
master of the person and property of every individual’.96 Hume’s 
most detailed discussion of parliamentary weakness, however, came 
in his account of monopolies, which he presented as a corrective for 
those who ‘are prepossessed with an idea of the antient privileges of 
the people, and of the liberty enjoyed under the administration of 
Elizabeth’.97 In the 1601 debate about monopolies, the Commons 
asserted that:
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The Queen possessed both an enlarging and a restraining power: by her 
prerogative she might set at liberty what was restrained by statute or 
otherwise, and by her prerogative she might restrain what was other-
wise at liberty: That the royal prerogative was not to be canvassed nor 
disputed nor examined; and did not even admit of any limitation: That 
absolute princes, such as the sovereigns of England, were a species of 
divinity: That it was in vain to attempt tying the Queen’s hands by laws 
or statutes; since, by means of her dispensing power, she could loosen 
herself at her pleasure […].98
Hume went on to summarise the Commons’ reaction to Elizabeth’s 
decision to cancel the most grievous of the patents, drawing on mate-
rial from D’Ewes:
A member said, with tears in his eyes, that, if a sentence of everlasting 
happiness had been pronounced in his favour, he could not have felt 
more joy than that with which he was at present overwhelmed. […] 
And it was farther remarked, that in the same manner as the Deity 
would not give his glory to another, so the Queen herself was the only 
agent in their present prosperity and happiness.99
What is perhaps most noticeable about Hume’s account here is the 
information he does not include. Specifically, no mention is made 
of the sections of the debate, covered at length in his source mate-
rial, where speakers, among them Sir Francis Bacon and Sir Walter 
Raleigh, defended the social and economic efficacy of some types 
of monopoly. Indeed, Hume’s account assumed that there was an 
agreement concerning the pernicious nature of patents. As a result, 
Hume was able to use the monopolies debate to emphasise the shared 
sentiments that underlay the comments made by the various speakers, 
and to show that these sentiments were ‘more worthy of a Turkish 
divan than of an English house of commons, according to our present 
idea of this assembly’.100 Such a methodology served two purposes. 
On the one hand, it supported the claim that Hume had made in 
his letter to Clephane. As he presented them, the Stuart kings were 
not the unconstitutional innovators of Whiggish accounts, but were 
acting in accordance with well-established and widely supported ideas 
about English government. On the other hand, however, it served to 
emphasise the historical distance that lay between the mid- eighteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. For Hume, the Elizabethan world he 
was describing, with its sycophantic and lachrymose parliamentari-
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ans, was one that was alien to the present to the point of absurdity. 
To comprehend the politics of the period, however, it was necessary 
to acquire some sort of understanding of the opinions and ‘general’ 
values on which government had been based.
4.2 The Tudors: non-narrative
Such an approach ensured that, while the tone of Hume’s discus-
sion of Tudor financial practices was sometimes supercilious, he also 
exhibited a good deal of sympathy for the actions both of monarchs 
and Parliament. Both, after all, were acting in conformity with 
established practices. When he came to deal in more detail with 
the  government’s management of commerce in the non-narrative 
sections of his discussion, however, he was a good deal more critical.
In his discussion of Henry VII, Hume provided both an account of 
the origins of English and European commercial development during 
the King’s reign, and an analysis of Henry’s skills in the management 
of commerce. With regard to the former issue, the History built 
directly on the argument advanced in ‘Of Commerce’, maintaining 
that an influx of luxury goods had transformed commerce and man-
ufacture in England, and later, as a consequence, its social structures 
and political institutions. However, whereas in his essay Hume had 
offered a historical generalisation – ‘in most nations foreign trade has 
preceded any refinement in home manufactures’ – in the History he 
outlined the specific events that had caused these developments to 
take place in fifteenth-century Europe:
It was during this reign, on the second of August 1492, a little before 
sun set, that Christopher Columbus, a Florentine, set out from Cadiz 
on his memorable voyage for the discovery of the western world; and 
a few years after, Vasquez de Gama, a Portuguese, passed the cape of 
Good Hope, and opened a new passage to the East Indies. These great 
events were attended with the most important consequences to all the 
nations of Europe, even to such as were not immediately concerned in 
those naval enterprizes.101
The most significant of these consequences, as Hume argued, was a 
change in the spending habits of the nobility; rather than using their 
income to fund an army of retainers, they spent their money, and 
sometimes exhausted it entirely, on luxury goods.102 Such actions 
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ensured that the common people were no longer ‘maintained in a 
vicious idleness’ and ‘were obliged to learn some calling or indus-
try’.103 At the same time, merchants and tradesmen directly benefited 
from the spending habits of their social superiors, and ‘both acquired 
a share in the landed property, and created to themselves a consider-
able property of a new kind, in stock, commodities, art, credit, and 
correspondence’.104
These developments meant that, for Hume, as for other historians 
operating in the Baconian/Harringtonian tradition, Henry VII’s 
reign constituted a key axis in English history. However, while Hume 
acknowledged the role played by Henry in fomenting beneficial polit-
ical change, his contributions to commercial policy are presented as 
a good deal less successful. The reasons for this distinction lay in the 
nature of the subjects:
The more simple ideas of order and equity are sufficient to guide a 
legislator in every thing that regards the internal administration of 
justice: But the principles of commerce are much more complicated, 
and require long experience and deep reflection to be well understood 
in any state.105
To an extent, Hume’s comments here echo his earlier statements 
concerning the difficulties inherent in commercial affairs. Their 
function, however, was rather different. In ‘Of Commerce’, Hume 
had sought to prepare his readers for an approach to commerce and 
finance that was ‘refin’d’, ‘subtile’ and ‘out of the common road’.106 
Here, however, Hume’s concern is with the pre-history of this 
understanding of commerce. As he observed, these matters were 
‘often misunderstood’ during Henry’s reign, and ‘even in the age of 
Lord Bacon, very imperfect and erroneous ideas were formed on that 
subject’.107
It is this conception of Tudor and Stuart ignorance concerning 
commerce that shaped Hume’s engagement with the work of Bacon 
and Camden. In relation to Henry VII, Hume repeated and endorsed 
Bacon’s account of the King’s character. It was, therefore, avarice 
that shaped Henry’s conduct and led him, ever anxious to increase 
his customs revenue, ‘to encourage commerce’.108 However, whereas 
Bacon had seen this encouragement as producing a series of benefi-
cial regulations, for Hume ‘trade and industry were rather hurt than 
promoted by the care and attention which were given to them’.109 In 
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demonstrating this, Hume did not use Bacon as a source, but rather 
followed his methodological lead by turning to the statute book and 
basing his analysis on the King’s record as a lawmaker. To give a 
sense of the general approach Hume took, a series of examples have 
been transcribed below:
Severe laws were made against taking interest for money, which was 
then denominated usury. Even the profits of exchange were prohibited, 
as savouring of usury, which the superstition of that age zealously 
proscribed. All evasive contracts, by which profits could be made from 
the loan of money, were also carefully guarded against. It is needless to 
observe how unreasonable and iniquitous these laws, how impossible 
to be executed, and how hurtful to trade, if they could take place.110
Laws were made against the exportation of money, plate, or bullion: 
A precaution, which serves no other purpose than to make more be 
exported.111
Horses were forbid to be exported; as if that exportation did not 
encourage the breed, and render them more plentiful. To promote 
archery, no bows were to be sold at a higher price that [sic] six shillings 
and four pence, reducing money to the denomination of our time. 
The only effect of this regulation must be either that the people would 
be supplied with bad bows or none at all. Prices were also affixed to 
woollen cloath, to caps and hats. And labourers wages were regulated 
by law. It is evident, that these circumstances ought always to be 
left free, and must be trusted to the common course of business and 
commerce.112
There is a law of this reign, containing a preamble, from which it 
appears, that the company of merchant adventures in London, had, 
by their own proper authority, debarred all the other merchants of the 
kingdom, from trading to the great marts in the low countries, unless 
each trader previously payed them the sum of near seventy pounds. It 
is surprising that such a by-law (if it deserves that name) could ever be 
carried into execution, and that the authority of Parliament should be 
requisite to abrogate it.113
Hume’s concern in these examples, as Bacon’s had been, was not with 
the specific empirical consequences of Henry’s legislation, and neither 
writer provided evidence to explore the ways in which legal changes 
had affected England’s fortunes. Rather, the laws themselves are the 
sole source material referred to, and an assessment of the King’s  success 
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is made by measuring his actions against a normative conception of 
good economic practice. Where the two writers differed, however, 
was in their conception of these norms. Bacon conceived of commerce 
as a powerful, unruly force that required careful regulation if it was 
to advance national interests. Prices, wages, interest rates, naviga-
tion and the organisation of individual trades and markets could, he 
argued, all benefit from legal control. Hume, in contrast, maintained 
that people’s natural avaricious desires were the key shaping factor in 
producing the world’s economy, something that he conceived of as a 
large, complex, but highly propitious economic system. Legislators, 
for Hume, still had a significant role to play in maintaining the order 
and justice that commercial exchange required, and in establishing a 
series of mechanisms for equitably collecting government revenue. 
At the same time, government could encourage industry, as Henry 
VII had done, by providing loans for his people.114 However, matters 
such as prices, wages, interest rates and the organisation of individual 
trades and markets should emerge naturally as products of interac-
tions between sellers and consumers. For Bacon, therefore, a history 
of economic development was necessarily an elite history, a narrative 
of how politicians had regulated commerce. Hume, however, as he 
had argued in ‘The Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, and 
demonstrated in ‘Of Commerce’, saw ‘the Increase of Trade and 
Industry’ and the ‘Rise and Progress of Commerce’ as developments 
requiring general analysis.115 Nevertheless, within Hume’s schema an 
elite account had a role to play either in showing how legislators had 
supported such ‘general’ developments or, as was the case with Henry 
VII, by examining how their actions had impeded them.
Bacon and Hume also conceived of the function of their analyses 
in contrasting ways. The former was careful to establish the basic eco-
nomic principles contained within Henry’s actions. For example, the 
law preventing wines being imported in anything but English ships 
was said to have arisen from the King subordinating plenty to power, 
while his regulation of the price of cloth was based on the notion not 
of ‘prescribing prices, but stinting them not to exceed a rate’.116 The 
implication here, in line with standard humanist ideas about history, 
was that these principles were still relevant, and that the reader might 
learn from the wise acts performed by historical figures. Hume also 
traced the ideas underlying Henry’s actions, but, in rejecting them, 
did not seek to justify his own economic principles. No attempt was 
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made, therefore, to explain why restricting exports of specie caused 
more to be exported, or why wages and prices ‘must be trusted to 
the common course of business and commerce’.117 Similarly, it was 
‘needless to observe’ the negative consequences that resulted from 
prohibitions on usury.118 The interested reader could, of course, find 
ample support for these principles both in Hume’s essays and in a 
range of other works of political economy. However, the key feature 
of Hume’s polemical strategy was, in a sense, his failure to develop 
his argument further. The ostensible assumption of the passages is 
that, while these principles may have been entirely alien to those 
such as Henry and Bacon living in Tudor and Stuart England, for his 
polite eighteenth-century readership they were obvious to the point 
of being self-evident.
Similar ideas underlay Hume’s account of Elizabeth’s management 
of commerce. The Queen’s awareness that England was dependent 
on its naval power made her, Hume argued, ‘desirous to encourage 
commerce and navigation’.119 Some success was achieved in this area, 
and Hume provided details of the Queen’s role in expanding the 
number of ships and protecting the interests of English merchants 
in the face of aggression from the Hans Towns.120 Nevertheless, 
‘the general train of her conduct was very ill calculated to serve the 
purpose at which she aimed’.121 The key problem was the Queen’s 
monopolies, which worked to ‘extinguish all domestic industry’ and 
acted as ‘an immediate check on foreign trade’.122 Hume went on to 
argue that ‘the spirit of the age was strongly bent on naval enterprizes’, 
and proceeded to examine the profitable trade links that England 
forged over the course of Elizabeth’s reign.123 However, his point 
here is that these developments were achieved in spite of, not because 
of, monarchical support. With regard to the East Indies and Turkey, 
Hume simply noted the Queen’s role in granting patents and, as a 
consequence, confining trade.124 In relation to Russia, however, a 
more extended analysis was provided which, paraphrasing Camden’s 
Annales, discussed the founding of the Muscovy Company and its 
acquirement of an exclusive patent for Russian trade; the successful 
attempt by the Tsar John Basilides (‘a most furious tyrant’) to obtain 
an alliance with Elizabeth; his unsuccessful attempt to secure an 
English wife; the trading of the Muscovy Company in Russia; and 
the attitude of Basilides’ successor Theodore to trade.125 Within these 
discussions, Hume acknowledged that the exclusive patent granted 
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by John Basilides had encouraged the English trade. Ultimately, 
however, his conclusion drew attention to Elizabeth’s failings:
After the death of John Basilides, his son Theodore revoked the patent, 
which the English enjoyed for a monopoly of the Russian trade; and 
when the Queen remonstrated against this innovation, he told her 
ministers, that princes must carry an indifferent hand, as well between 
their subjects as between foreigners; and not convert trade, which by 
the laws of nations ought to be common to all, into a monopoly for 
the private gain of a few. So much juster notions of commerce were 
entertained by this barbarian, than were practised by the renowned 
Queen Elizabeth!126
A comparison between Hume’s account of this incident and that 
of other historians is instructive. Camden passed over this incident 
without comment. Rapin and Salmon, seemingly unwilling to 
acknowledge that a tyrant might lecture Elizabeth on trade, ignored 
it. Guthrie, focusing on the resolution of the crisis, saw it as further 
evidence of Elizabeth’s skills as a statesman.127 Carte, meanwhile, 
drew attention to the fact that, in defending liberty of trade, the 
Tsar argued the case ‘very reasonably’.128 Hume would clearly have 
endorsed such a verdict. However, it is noteworthy that, uniquely 
among the sources discussed, he used the incident to develop a 
direct criticism of the Queen’s commercial policy. Indeed, as his 
jaunty exclamation mark implies, Hume revels in demonstrating that 
Elizabeth’s reign was not a glorious age of monarchical commercial 
endeavour, but rather, in economic terms, a period of sub-barbarian 
ignorance.
5. The early history of England
The concluding part of Hume’s discussion of economic affairs in the 
pre-Tudor volumes of the History performed two principal tasks. 
First, he developed an explanation of the reasons why commerce had 
been unable to prosper in England until the latter part of the period. 
Second, he provided an analysis of the changes that had ultimately 
enabled a successful trading culture to emerge. The result was both 
a direct challenge to the approaches of Rapin and Carte and the 
development of a pre-history to the analysis he had advanced in ‘Of 
Commerce’.
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For Hume, the avaricious desires of the populace functioned as the 
key motor driving economic development. While, as had been the 
case in the Essays, he treated these desires as innate, certain conditions 
were shown to be required to direct individuals towards economically 
useful forms of industry. In England’s early history these conditions 
were entirely absent. Economic activity, Hume maintained, required 
a stable and equitable legal system with the capacity to protect private 
property; without this, individuals could not have confidence that they 
would receive any benefits from their work. The precariousness of prop-
erty within both Saxon government and the feudal system that emerged 
under the Normans served, as a consequence, to reduce the potential for 
profit from trade and manufacture, and fundamentally inhibited these 
activities.129 At the same time, the period’s primitive bellicosity was 
incompatible with labour and commerce. The habitual plundering of 
the Danes, for example, rendered them ‘incapable of industry’.130 Under 
feudalism ‘every profession was held in contempt but that of arms’ and 
any merchant or manufacturer who acquired a degree of opulence ‘found 
himself but the more exposed to injuries, from the envy and avidity of the 
military nobles’.131 A few exceptional individuals, foremost among them 
Alfred the Great, had been able to transcend the values of their time 
and successfully promote England’s commercial interests.132 Ultimately, 
however, the long-term effects of such actions were negligible. Deprived 
of the peace and order it required to prosper, England’s commerce 
remained in a consistently ‘low’ and ‘languishing’ state.133
To explain how this commercial backwardness was overcome, 
Hume provided both a general and a more specific argument. The 
general argument was built on the assumption that the upshot of 
encounters between relative refinement and relative barbarity would 
be the civilising of the latter by the former. A key example of this 
process came in Hume’s discussion of the spread of Christianity from 
the conquered ancient Britons to the conquering pagan Saxons. The 
hostilities between the two peoples ‘naturally’ indisposed the Saxons 
against the faith of the Britons.134 Nonetheless, he continued,
however limited in their views [the Saxons were], they could not but 
have perceived a degree of cultivation in the southern counties [of 
Britain] beyond what they themselves possessed; and it was natural 
for them to yield to that superior knowledge, as well as zeal, by which 
the inhabitants of the Christian kingdoms were even at this time 
distinguished.135
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Similarly, when the English Court became filled with Normans 
during the reign of Edward the Confessor, the fact that the new 
arrivals were ‘distinguished, both by the favour of Edward, and by 
a degree of cultivation somewhat superior to that of the English in 
those ages, soon rendered their language, customs and laws fashion-
able in the kingdom’.136
These developments were aided by a specific alteration in English 
government. The demise of the feudal system in the thirteenth cen-
tury, Hume argued, had caused a diminution both of the power 
and revenue of English monarchs. In order to restore their position, 
therefore, monarchs sought inspiration abroad:
During the course of two centuries, the kings of England, in imita-
tion of other European princes, had embraced the salutary policy of 
encouraging and protecting the lower and more industrious orders of 
the state; whom they found well disposed to obey the laws and civil 
magistrate, and whose ingenuity and labour furnished commodities, 
requisite for the ornament of peace and support of war.137
Initially, this encouragement took the form of a series of measures 
that enabled citizens to ‘enjoy unmolested the fruits of their industry’, 
including ‘liberty of trade’ and permission to farm their own tolls 
and customs.138 Later, to facilitate the raising of revenue, Edward 
I had initiated a system where local boroughs sent two deputies to 
Parliament, with the power to consent, on behalf of those they rep-
resented, to measures forwarded by the King and his council. These 
reforms laid the foundation for a ‘free and equitable government’ and 
resulted, in time, in the emergence of the third estate.139 ‘And by this 
means’, Hume concluded, a section of the population, ‘formerly so 
abject in England, as well as in all other European nations, rose by 
slow degrees to their present importance; and in their progress made 
arts and commerce, the necessary attendants of liberty and equality, 
flourish in the kingdom.’140
To an extent, the effect of Hume’s analysis was to emphasise 
the fundamental remoteness of medieval history. For Hume, as for 
writers such as Brady, Salmon and the Court Whig authors, this was 
a period in which the economic features that defined modern society 
existed only, at best, in primitive form and were little understood 
by contemporary observers. As a consequence, the History was not 
exemplary in the manner of earlier accounts. There was little that 
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a modern politician could learn about commerce by observing the 
workings of a society that was entirely different to his own, and 
in which economic knowledge was grossly inferior to the present. 
Despite this, however, there remained an important didactic com-
ponent to Hume’s analysis. By tracing the transition from a non- 
commercial society to a primitive commercial one in the medieval 
volumes, he provided an account of the preconditions necessary for 
economic activity. Like government, it was emphasised, commerce 
was dependent on opinion. A tradesman needed to have confidence 
that property would be respected, and he needed to feel valued within 
the society of which he formed a part. Hume was, of course, aware 
that commerce had evolved a good deal since these foundations were 
established. Equally, however, as foundational values, these patterns 
of opinion played a fundamental role in holding up the commercial 
edifice on which English prosperity was based. As a consequence, 
his account provided both a powerful demonstration of the need to 
preserve England’s commercial foundations, and a warning regarding 
the consequences – essentially a return to the barbarism of the early 
medieval period – of not heeding history’s lessons.
6. Revisions to the History of England
While Hume was initially disappointed both by the critical recep-
tion and sales of his history, particularly with regard to its first two 
volumes, the work was to be a considerable success, spawning a 
successful French translation and multiple further editions in his 
lifetime. In preparing these new editions, Hume made a number of 
changes to the text, correcting errors, revising the phrasing and, on 
occasion, adding whole new paragraphs and sections.141 The most 
significant of these alterations were to the sections of the History 
concerning the Stuarts where, as previous commentators have noted, 
Hume adapted his analysis in the wake of his concerns about popular 
unrest both in England and the North American colonies.142 Equally 
importantly, however, these later editions saw Hume rework and 
expand his commentary on England’s financial history.
The key changes he made concerned James’s approach to taxation. 
In the first edition of the Stuarts’ volume, as we have seen, Hume 
had argued that the attempts James made to levy impositions on mer-
chandise had been based on precedents ‘neither very recent nor very 
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numerous’.143 The research he completed on the Tudors, however, 
led him to substantially revise this verdict. In the 1762 edition of the 
text, the comment on the lack of precedents was deleted, and instead, 
after noting the existence of the impositions, Hume observed: ‘This 
exercise of power will naturally, to us, appear arbitrary and illegal; yet, 
according to the principles and practices of that time, it might admit 
of some apology.’144 Hume went on to provide just such an apology, 
explaining that the fact that Parliament had gifted the duties of 
tonnage and poundage to Henry V and all succeeding monarchs ‘for 
life’ led monarchs to consider these sources of income as their ‘own 
proper right and inheritance’.145 Equally, it was natural for the King 
to question the rates of poundage, given that these rates had been 
determined before the discovery of the West Indies. He also revised 
his comments on previous approaches to taxation, noting that ‘The 
King was supported […] by two direct precedents, one in the reign 
of Mary, another in the beginning of Elizabeth.’146 These comments 
were then further strengthened in the 1773 edition, when Hume 
once again rephrased his account, this time arguing that the King 
had been supported by ‘direct precedents, some in the reign of Mary, 
some in the beginning of Elizabeth’.147 An extended footnote was 
provided to justify this assertion. The overall effect of such changes, 
and similar alterations made to the non-narrative sections of the text, 
was to reduce still further James’s personal culpability for the arbi-
trary practices followed during his reign.148 Indeed, given the specific 
situation in which the King found himself and the extent to which 
his actions were supported by precedent, it is difficult to see, Hume 
shows, how he could have acted otherwise.
These revisions concerning James’s financial management, it should 
be emphasised, were not accompanied by any changes to Hume’s 
essential argument regarding the King’s handling of commerce. As a 
result, the gap between his often sympathetic attitude to the monar-
chical administration of revenue and his critical approach to the com-
mercial aspects of statecraft becomes even more marked in the later 
editions of the text. In part this was a methodological issue. Hume 
tended to view matters of revenue as products of a particular context. 
Commercial schemes, in contrast, were assessed using the sort of 
‘general’ and seemingly universal principles that Hume had laid out 
in Political Discourses. The reasons for such a distinction are hinted 
at in the final set of revisions that Hume made to the History shortly 
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before his death. As part of his remarks on the civil government in 
England in the Jacobean appendix, Hume had argued that on the 
accession of the Stuarts, kings of England possessed ‘an authority, in 
the judgement of all, not exactly limited; in the judgement of some, 
not limitable’.149 However, he continued, this authority had its roots 
not in ‘money’ or ‘force of arms’, but rather ‘merely on the opinion of 
the people, influenced by antient precedent and example’.150 It was 
this that explained the extreme jealousy of monarchs towards their 
prerogative. In the 1778 edition, Hume added the following sentence 
to his analysis:
And it seems a necessary, though perhaps a melancholy truth, that, in 
every government, the magistrate must either possess a large revenue 
and a military force, or enjoy some discretionary powers, in order to 
execute the laws, and support his own authority.151
Such comments provide a useful gloss on Hume’s contrasting 
approaches to finance and commerce. For Hume, the power of 
monarchs to alter impositions on goods formed a part of their pre-
rogative. The ways in which they used this prerogative in the past 
had, by contemporary standards, been arbitrary and crude. However, 
they had been rooted in precedent – the key force in maintaining 
the authority of government – and they had helped government to 
fulfil its basic function: the maintenance of order. As such, while 
Tudor and Stuart monarchs clearly had no conception of the sort of 
advanced ideas about finance that Hume had discussed in ‘Of Taxes’, 
when evaluated using political criteria their actions were justifiable. 
In relation to commerce, however, an area which for Hume required 
more complex types of knowledge, the fundamental ignorance of 
the Tudors and Stuarts meant they had achieved little of real value. 
Hume’s analytical approaches reflected, therefore, the nature of the 
subjects he discussed. The administration of finance, at its most basic, 
only required a knowledge of precedent. To manage commerce suc-
cessfully, however, statesmen needed a sophisticated understanding 
of a broad range of ‘general’ material.
Conclusion
Taken in sum, Hume’s History of England constitutes a rejection of 
the economic statecraft tradition as outlined over the course of this 
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book. Three points are of particular significance here. First, in so far 
as previous generations of historians had dealt with economic history, 
they had conceived of it as the study of economic policy. ‘Exemplary’, 
Livian accounts maintained that, just as virtuous monarchs produced 
good policies and commercial success, so self-interested rulers pro-
moted unsuccessful measures and damaged a nation’s commercial 
interests. For more Tacitean historians it was not a monarch’s virtue 
that made him or her successful, but skill and cunning. Nevertheless, 
the assumption was still that the individual qualities of a statesman 
were the decisive factor in determining the advancement (or not) of 
trade and national prosperity. Hume disagreed. Despite the incom-
petence and ineffectiveness of England’s monarchs with regard to 
economic affairs, in the Tudor and Stuart periods trade and com-
merce had flourished. There was, therefore, no necessary connection 
between economic statecraft and economic development.
Second, historians of economic statecraft emphasised the close 
connection between the management of economic policy and other 
aspects of a statesman’s role. The sort of virtue or skill that enabled 
a monarch to produce success in commerce, it was assumed, would 
naturally bring about political and military achievements, and ensure 
that he or she was a competent protector of the Church. For Hume, 
however, the differences between politics and commerce as fields of 
knowledge meant that it was very possible – as the reign of Henry VII 
demonstrated – for a ruler to have success in the former area and be 
an abject failure in the latter. Commerce remained dependent on a 
government’s capacity to provide justice and order; nevertheless, the 
lower order political skills required to maintain the basic conditions 
for commercial life were not the same as the more subtle and refined 
approaches necessary for its successful management.
Third, and largely as a consequence of this, Hume rejected pre-
vious ideas regarding the function of historical writing. Authors 
working in the economic statecraft tradition had assumed that the 
past had provided examples of both successful and unsuccessful eco-
nomic management. As a consequence, through studying English 
history, one could learn about both the approaches to commerce and 
finance which could be fruitfully imitated, and those which needed 
to be avoided. For Hume, however, history fulfilled a rather different 
didactic function. His historical narrative of commercial ineptitude 
demonstrated the need for modern statesmen to, in a sense, turn 
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away from the past, and engage with the sort of modern programme 
of commercial analysis that he had developed in Political Discourses. 
At the same time, however, an account of the steps through which 
England had become a commercial power served to illustrate the 
patterns of opinion on which successful economic activity relied. 
Maintaining these conditions, Hume sought to demonstrate, would 
be a considerable challenge, but one of vital importance to the nation’s 
future prosperity.
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Conclusion
The Monthly Review for September 1790 contained a lengthy 
discussion of the final volume of John Sinclair’s The History of the 
Public Revenue of the British Empire (1785–90). While appreciative of 
Sinclair’s work, the anonymous reviewer opened his discussion with 
some general, and rather less positive, comments on the treatment of 
financial issues by previous English historians:
History, till of late, was chiefly employed in the recital of warlike 
transactions. […] The people were not known; the circumstances 
that affected their domestic prosperity and happiness were entirely 
overlooked; and the records of many ages might have been perused 
without obtaining the least information concerning any fact that led 
to a knowledge of the internal economy of the state, or the private sit-
uation of individuals. Thanks, however, to the more enlightened spirit 
of modern times, things are much altered in this respect. Readers now 
expect to find, not only the warlike exploits, but the civil transactions, 
of princes, recorded in the historic volume.1
Such ideas are in many ways an eighteenth-century commonplace. 
The historian Robert Henry, for example, noted that English histori-
ans had given us ‘only a detail of our civil, military, and ecclesiastical 
affairs’; not one of them had ‘pretended or designed to give, any thing 
like a history of learning, arts, commerce, and manners’.2 Thomas 
Carte, meanwhile, complained that much previous historical writing 
contained little other than the ‘relations of battles, sieges, and other 
warlike exploits’.3 What the nation required, however, was a faithful 
history of its ‘Constitution, Laws, Affairs, Commerce, and Situation 
in all Ages’.4 Similar ideas underpinned Hugh Blair’s discussion of 
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history in his 1783 work Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. ‘I 
cannot’, Blair observed,
conclude the subject of History, without taking notice of a very great 
improvement which has, of late years, begun to be introduced into 
Historical Composition; I mean, a more particular attention than was 
formerly given to laws, customs, commerce, religion, literature, and 
every other thing that tends to show the spirit and genius of nations. 
It is now understood to be the business of an able Historian to exhibit 
manners, as well as facts and events; and assuredly, whatever displays 
the state and life of mankind, in different periods, and illustrates the 
progress of the human mind, is more useful and interesting than the 
detail of sieges and battles.5
For many commentators, therefore, commerce and ‘the internal 
economy of the state’ were, in historiographical terms, new subjects.
This book constitutes a rebuttal of such arguments. As has been 
shown, from the first years of the seventeenth century onwards 
writers engaged with economic issues: they examined monarchical 
approaches to the regulation of trade; they discussed the emergence 
of international trading companies and debated their value to the 
nation; they reflected on the relationship between commerce and 
war; and they offered detailed analysis of the ways in which kings and 
queens had managed their revenues. Moreover, these analyses were 
not in any sense peripheral to the period’s historiography. The extent 
of England’s trade, the management of its finances and the prosperity 
of its people, at particular points in time, were important flashpoints 
in historical debates, and the subject of extensive commentary.
It would, however, be wrong to conclude that writers such as Blair 
were simply ill-informed. Rather, his comments should be seen as 
the product of a particular conception of economic issues that was 
to achieve increasing popularity over the course of the eighteenth 
century. When discussing commerce and finance, earlier generations 
of historians were primarily concerned with economic policy and, as 
such, the specific actions performed by monarchs. This ensured that 
they treated trade and finance as part of their discussion of what Blair 
referred to as ‘facts and events’. Blair himself, however, considered 
commerce to be something entirely different: an aspect of ‘manners’ 
and a product of the ‘progress of the human mind’. As a conse-
quence, whereas Bacon’s and Camden’s views of economic activity 
Conclusion
The Monthly Review for September 1790 contained a lengthy 
discussion of the final volume of John Sinclair’s The History of the 
Public Revenue of the British Empire (1785–90). While appreciative of 
Sinclair’s work, the anonymous reviewer opened his discussion with 
some general, and rather less positive, comments on the treatment of 
financial issues by previous English historians:
History, till of late, was chiefly employed in the recital of warlike 
transactions. […] The people were not known; the circumstances 
that affected their domestic prosperity and happiness were entirely 
overlooked; and the records of many ages might have been perused 
without obtaining the least information concerning any fact that led 
to a knowledge of the internal economy of the state, or the private sit-
uation of individuals. Thanks, however, to the more enlightened spirit 
of modern times, things are much altered in this respect. Readers now 
expect to find, not only the warlike exploits, but the civil transactions, 
of princes, recorded in the historic volume.1
Such ideas are in many ways an eighteenth-century commonplace. 
The historian Robert Henry, for example, noted that English histori-
ans had given us ‘only a detail of our civil, military, and ecclesiastical 
affairs’; not one of them had ‘pretended or designed to give, any thing 
like a history of learning, arts, commerce, and manners’.2 Thomas 
Carte, meanwhile, complained that much previous historical writing 
contained little other than the ‘relations of battles, sieges, and other 
warlike exploits’.3 What the nation required, however, was a faithful 
history of its ‘Constitution, Laws, Affairs, Commerce, and Situation 
in all Ages’.4 Similar ideas underpinned Hugh Blair’s discussion of 
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were political – they conceived of it as an aspect of statecraft – Blair’s 
was not. Indeed, he conceptualised commerce as an emanation of a 
particular age’s ‘spirit and genius’ and, as such, an activity that existed 
far beyond the Court and Westminster. Given such assumptions, 
Blair’s verdict on previous historical writing seems fair; with the 
notable exception of Howes, the accounts of commerce and finance 
discussed in this book tell us almost nothing about the specific lived 
experience of individuals outside the higher echelons of power.
The sort of ideas that underpin Blair’s comments did much to shape 
approaches to historical writing in the second part of the eighteenth 
century. Indeed, what we see in this period is a new desire to capture 
the nature and extent of the nation’s economic activity. A useful 
bellwether for such shifts can be found in the various additions that 
Hume made to his accounts of commerce in the seventeenth-century 
volumes of his History. While these changes did little, if anything, 
to alter his argument, they provided a mass of extra information. 
Much of this material sought to quantify commercial activity. In 
his Jacobean appendix, Hume included precise figures concerning 
England’s imports and exports and the volume of its coinage, while 
the Caroline and Commonwealth non-narrative chapter was sup-
plemented with details about customs, the postal service and more 
discussion of coinage.6 On occasion, readers were invited to compare 
these figures with more modern experiences. Elsewhere, Hume aug-
mented his analysis with information about changes in the fabric of 
everyday life:
The planting of hops encreased much in England during this reign.7
The first mention of tea, coffee, and chocolate, is about 1660. 
Asparagus, artichoaks, colliflower, and a variety of sallads, were about 
the same time introduced into England.8
Such accounts are hardly the material of a grand political narrative. 
They provided, however, a series of intimations for Hume’s readers 
of the tiny, incremental steps through which the ‘ancient’ world had 
receded, and the modern world – replete as it was with exotic vegeta-
bles, decorative tableware and beverages – had emerged.
Running alongside such developments was a shift in attitudes 
regarding the relationship between political and economic activity. 
Earlier writers, particularly those influenced by Livian conceptions 
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of exemplary virtue, had assumed that just as a good monarch could 
be expected to produce an expansion of trade, a bad one would 
initiate a period of commercial decline. Such approaches both ena-
bled economic statecraft to function within a conventional humanist 
framework and allowed it to fulfil a polemical, political function. By 
mid-century, however, other ideas were coming to the fore. Indeed, 
even a self-consciously political historian such as Catharine Macaulay 
argued that while the actions of a monarch such as James I had done 
much to undermine the constitution, English trade had ‘increased 
much in [his] reign’.9 As such, in Macaulay’s work, the histories of 
political statecraft and economic activity were not directly connected. 
This partial separation of the commercial and the political also 
shaped the organisation of historical narratives. Bacon and Camden 
had both been able to integrate discussion of finance and trade into 
their chronological narratives of statesmanship. Later writers came to 
organise their work differently. Hume, as we have seen, placed much 
of his discussion of commerce and finance in a series of appendi-
ces. Macaulay pursued the same approach. Even more innovatively, 
Robert Henry’s History of Great Britain (1771–93) was divided into 
seven parallel narratives, each of which engaged with a different 
theme. The effect of such a move was to ensure that ‘civil and military 
history’ (theme 1) was separated from the ‘history of commerce, of 
shipping, of money or coin, and of the prices of commodities’ (theme 
6).10
This period also saw the publication of a series of historical accounts 
concerned exclusively with economic concerns. Sinclair’s History of 
the Public Revenue was an important example of this sort of writ-
ing.11 Another key text was Adam Anderson’s hugely ambitious An 
Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce (1764), 
a two-volume account that traced the development of trade from the 
earliest time to the present, ‘comprehending therein the Discoveries, 
Inventions, and Improvements, in Navigation, Colonization, 
Manufactures, [and] Agriculture’.12 Such subjects were, Anderson 
stressed, of the utmost importance, as it was ‘to the instrumentality of 
Commerce alone, the Britannic Empire is most peculiarly indebted; 
for its Opulence and Grandeur; – its Improvements in Arts and 
Knowledge; – and in general, for the great Bulk of its solid Comforts 
and Conveniencies’.13 As a result, Anderson concluded, commerce 
clearly deserved its own history.
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In the face of such developments, what happened to ideas about 
economic statecraft? In the short term, discussion of the cultural 
aspects of commerce did not bring about an end to reflection on gov-
ernment’s commercial and financial roles. Historians continued to 
provide accounts of the economic ‘events’ of the Tudors and Stuarts 
and to assess their successes and failures as managers of England’s 
commercial interests. Equally, in dealing with these issues, they 
remained reliant on the works of writers such as Camden, Bacon 
and Rymer. Indeed, it notable that Anderson not only used Bacon’s 
History of the Reign of Henry VII as one of his principal sources, but 
also endorsed, in a way that Hume did not, aspects of its positive 
verdict on the King’s commercial achievements.14 In this sense, 
therefore, what we see is not so much an elimination of interest in 
the political aspects of commerce and finance, but rather the addition 
into historical narratives of a semi-autonomous economic sphere. 
As a consequence, the task for historians was no longer simply to 
trace the ways in which monarchs shaped commerce and finance. 
Rather they needed to examine a series of complex and multifaceted 
interactions between commercial and political spheres, each of which 
could affect the other, but neither of which was necessarily dominant.
Over the longer term, however, a different approach to economic 
affairs, albeit one shaped by Hume’s analysis, was to emerge. For 
Hume, as we have seen, attempts to promote commerce by England’s 
monarchs had been largely unproductive. Once stable property rela-
tions had been established, it was the desires of the populace that 
shaped trade’s expansion, not the ‘encouragement’ offered by gov-
ernment. The effect of such a move was undoubtedly to downgrade 
the importance of the history of economic policy. Indeed, whereas 
a writer such as Guthrie maintained that the statecraft of England’s 
monarchs had been the driving force behind the creation of modern 
commercial societies, Hume saw their actions as, at best, an irrel-
evance. In attacking the record of England’s monarchs, it should 
be emphasised, Hume’s point was an empirical, historical one; his 
claim was not that governments were unable to promote commerce, 
but rather that, in the main, they had not done so. And, from a 
Humean perspective, it was to be hoped that future statesmen might, 
particularly if armed with copies of Political Discourses and the History 
of England, do rather better than their predecessors in administering 
the nation’s trading interests.
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Ultimately, however, the critique of early modern policies that 
Hume helped to inaugurate played a vital role in clearing the way 
for the development of new approaches to commerce and finance. 
And although other writers, foremost among them Adam Smith, 
were to construct the most influential of the intellectual edifices 
that emerged, they did so on Humean foundations. Indeed, Smith’s 
account of the ‘progress of opulence’ draws on Hume’s ‘general’ 
approach to history, just as his attack on the ‘commercial, or mer-
cantile system’ continued and developed the History of England ’s 
critique of Tudor and Stuart practices.15 Smith’s many heirs on both 
the left and right of the political spectrum, meanwhile, would turn 
still further away from economic statecraft. Indeed, one thing that 
Chicago and Marxist economic theorists agree on is that the answers 
to the world’s problems do not, in any sense, lie in the study of the 
history of economic policy, particularly that of a mercantilist bent. 
Hume, it is true, might well have been appalled at the actions of his 
intellectual heirs. Equally, as a historian preoccupied with the unin-
tended consequences of actions, he might, perhaps, have appreciated 
the ironies of his historical thought’s afterlife.
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